The End of Power

The End of Power Plot Summary

Introduction

Throughout history, power has been the central force shaping human affairs. From ancient empires to modern nation-states, from religious institutions to multinational corporations, the acquisition and exercise of power has determined who thrives and who struggles. Yet something profound is happening in our time - a fundamental transformation in how power works. The traditional centers of authority are finding it increasingly difficult to achieve their objectives, while previously insignificant actors are suddenly capable of disrupting established systems. This transformation affects every sphere of human activity. In politics, we witness governments struggling to implement policies despite commanding electoral majorities. In business, corporate giants with vast resources are toppled by nimble startups. Military superpowers find themselves frustrated by insurgent groups with minimal resources. Religious institutions, media conglomerates, and labor unions - all traditional bastions of power - are seeing their influence erode as new competitors emerge with surprising effectiveness. By examining these shifts across different domains, we gain insight into a phenomenon that affects everyone from ordinary citizens to world leaders, helping us navigate a world where power is increasingly diffuse, fleeting, and paradoxical.

Chapter 1: The Three Revolutions: More, Mobility, and Mentality

The world has witnessed three fundamental revolutions that have transformed how power operates. The first is the "More Revolution" - there is simply more of everything today. More countries, more people, more education, more technology, and more resources. Since 1950, the number of sovereign states has nearly tripled. Global population has grown from 2.5 billion to over 7 billion. Literacy rates have soared worldwide, with more people receiving advanced education than ever before. This abundance has profound implications for power. When resources were scarce, those who controlled them wielded enormous influence. Today, with more of everything available, traditional gatekeepers find their control diminishing. Consider how the explosion of information sources has undermined state media monopolies, or how the proliferation of universities has democratized knowledge once controlled by elite institutions. The "More Revolution" has created a world where traditional barriers to entry are crumbling across politics, business, and culture. The second transformation is the "Mobility Revolution." People, goods, money, ideas, and data now move faster and more freely than at any point in human history. International travel has exploded from 25 million border crossings in 1950 to over 1.4 billion today. Financial transactions that once took days now happen in milliseconds. Information that once required physical transportation now travels at the speed of light. This hypermobility has dramatically reduced the power of traditional authorities. Governments struggle to control borders in a world where everything from ideas to capital flows freely. Corporations find it harder to maintain market dominance when competitors can emerge from anywhere. Religious institutions face challenges when adherents can easily access alternative viewpoints. The ability to move - whether physically or virtually - has become a crucial source of power in itself, often trumping traditional forms of authority. The third transformation is the "Mentality Revolution." Human expectations and aspirations have fundamentally changed. People worldwide increasingly demand dignity, autonomy, and participation in decisions affecting their lives. This shift transcends cultures and political systems. From the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street, from consumer activism to religious movements, people are less willing to accept authority based solely on tradition or position. This mentality shift has perhaps the most profound implications for power. When people no longer automatically defer to authority, those in power must work harder to maintain their position. Leaders who once commanded respect now face constant questioning. Institutions that once operated behind closed doors now face demands for transparency. The psychological contract between the powerful and everyone else has been fundamentally rewritten.

Chapter 2: Political Fragmentation: From Stable Majorities to Gridlock

The decay of political power is perhaps most visible in the changing nature of elections and governance. In established democracies, incumbent parties and leaders face increasingly precarious positions. Data shows that in the 1950s, incumbent governments in Europe lost on average just 1.08 percent of votes when seeking reelection. By the 1990s, that figure had jumped to 6.28 percent. During the 1950s, thirty-five cabinets won reelection while thirty-seven lost; by the 1990s, only eleven cabinets won reelection while forty-six lost. The message is clear: holding power has become significantly more difficult. This trend extends beyond election results to the very stability of governments. Discretionary terminations of cabinets - those caused by political infighting rather than scheduled elections - increased dramatically in the late 20th century. Even when governments maintain formal control, their ability to implement policies has diminished. In the United States, presidential nominees take far longer to get confirmed by the Senate than in previous decades. Between 1964 and 1984, only 5 percent of appointees waited more than six months between nomination and confirmation; between 1984 and 1999, that figure jumped to 30 percent. Political parties themselves are fragmenting. The rise of the Tea Party in the United States, the Pirate Party in Europe, and countless other political movements demonstrates how traditional party structures are being challenged from within and without. The barriers to forming new political movements have fallen dramatically. In France, the Socialist Party moved from selecting candidates through party insiders to open primaries where any voter could participate simply by signing a basic statement of values. This shift fundamentally altered the power dynamics within the party. Regional and local governments have simultaneously gained power at the expense of national authorities. Since the 1970s, countries from Italy to France, Belgium to Finland have created or strengthened regional assemblies. In Latin America, the percentage of countries where mayors are directly elected rather than appointed by central authorities increased from just three in 1980 to seventeen by 1995. This devolution of power means that even when national leaders appear strong, their actual control over what happens within their borders has diminished. The judiciary has emerged as another check on executive power. In Thailand, courts dissolved the ruling party in 2008, ending months of political unrest. In India, the Supreme Court has stepped into the vacuum created by ineffective coalition governments. Even in countries with respected judicial systems, the precedents for courts solving political disputes are few but spectacular - from the US Supreme Court's role in the 2000 presidential election to the "Clean Hands" investigation in Italy that completely transformed that country's political landscape. Perhaps most significantly, power has shifted from traditional political institutions to individuals operating outside formal structures. Activists like Egypt's Wael Ghonim organized movements through Facebook rather than political parties. In Colombia, an engineer named Oscar Morales started a Facebook group called "One Million Voices Against FARC" that led to massive rallies and the release of hostages. These new actors operate beyond the control of traditional political organizations, using technology to influence, persuade, or constrain politicians more directly and effectively than any classical political theorist could have imagined.

Chapter 3: Military Transformation: How Small Forces Challenge Giants

The transformation of military power represents one of the most profound shifts in how force is projected and resisted. Despite the United States spending nearly $700 billion annually on defense - almost half the world's military spending - its overwhelming conventional superiority has not translated into decisive victories in recent conflicts. The reason lies in the changing nature of warfare itself. Traditional interstate wars have become increasingly rare. During the 1950s, an average of six international conflicts occurred each year; in the first decade of this millennium, that number dropped to less than one per year. Instead, asymmetric conflicts between states and non-state actors have become the norm. In Afghanistan, more than 430,000 Afghan and coalition troops were unable to subdue a Taliban force barely one-twelfth as large. In Iraq, at the peak of the surge in 2007, more than 280,000 coalition and Iraqi security forces faced approximately 20,000 insurgents. Harvard scholar Ivan Arreguín-Toft analyzed 197 asymmetric wars between 1800 and 1998 and found a startling trend: the supposedly "weak" actor won 11.8 percent of conflicts between 1800 and 1849, but 55 percent between 1950 and 1998. This complete reversal of conventional wisdom about military superiority reflects fundamental changes in how power operates in armed conflicts. The traditional advantage of overwhelming force has diminished as smaller, more agile opponents exploit new vulnerabilities. The democratization of lethal technology has played a crucial role in this shift. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made from household or agricultural ingredients have become the weapon of choice in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones. Drones, once the exclusive domain of advanced militaries, now cost as little as a few thousand dollars and are proliferating globally. In 2012, a hobbyist group called DIY Drones already had twenty thousand members. As Stanford's Francis Fukuyama observed: "A world in which people can be routinely and anonymously targeted by unseen enemies is not pleasant to contemplate." The internet has become as essential as physical weapons in modern warfare. Online militant voices amplify hostile messages, spread propaganda, attract recruits, and coordinate attacks. The suicide bomber who attacked a CIA base in Afghanistan in December 2009 was a former "jihadi pundit" who took up arms. The combination of premodern motives (martyrdom) and postmodern possibilities (global reach through technology) has proven devastating for conventional military forces. Perhaps most significantly, the monopoly on legitimate violence that defined the modern state has fractured. Private military companies now perform functions once reserved exclusively for national armies. In 2011, at least 430 employees of American contractors were killed in Afghanistan - more than the number of military casualties. If L-3 Communications, one such contractor, were a country, it would have had the third-highest loss of life in Iraq and Afghanistan, after the United States and Great Britain.

Chapter 4: Business Disruption: The Fall of Corporate Barriers

The business world has undergone a seismic shift in how power operates. For decades, industries were dominated by a handful of giants - the "Seven Sisters" in oil, the "Big Five" in accounting, the "Big Three" in automobiles. These companies were so large, rich, and entrenched that dislodging them seemed unthinkable. Today, that static structure has collapsed across virtually every sector of the global economy. The evidence is striking: in 1980, a firm in the top fifth of its industry faced only a 10 percent risk of falling out of that tier five years later; by 1998, that risk had increased to 25 percent. CEO tenure has halved from about ten years in the 1990s to about five and a half in recent years, with nearly 80 percent of CEOs of S&P 500 companies ousted before retirement. According to consulting firm Booz & Company, 14.4 percent of the world's top CEOs left their jobs in 2011 alone, with the turnover rate higher among the largest companies. This volatility reflects the collapse of traditional barriers to entry that once protected incumbent firms. Physical assets, which once represented the primary source of corporate value, now account for a diminishing share of a company's worth. Today, anywhere from 40 to 90 percent of a company's market value comes from "intangibles" - patents, copyrights, brand value, and organizational knowledge. When Facebook purchased Instagram in 2012 for $1 billion, it could have instead bought the New York Times, Peet's Coffee, or Office Depot for roughly the same amount. Economies of scale - the principle that larger production capacity leads to lower per-unit costs - have similarly lost relevance in many industries. Spanish apparel company Zara defied this axiom by producing small batches rather than mass-producing garments. With just two weeks to design, manufacture, and deliver new products (compared to the industry average of six months), Zara demonstrated that speed can trump scale. By 2012, its sales were 25 percent higher than Gap's, having previously surpassed European competitor H&M. The globalization of business has introduced new competitors from unexpected places. Companies like Mexico's CEMEX (cement), India's Bharti Airtel (telecommunications), and Brazil's Embraer (aircraft) have emerged as global players in industries once dominated by Western firms. The number of developing-country firms in the world's largest companies continues to grow, with China now the third-largest country in terms of global company membership. As CEMEX CEO Lorenzo Zambrano explained, his company's success against larger, more established rivals came from "knowledge management" rather than physical assets. Even the financial industry has seen power shift from traditional banks to new players. In early 2011, the top ten hedge funds made $28 billion for clients - $2 billion more than the combined profits of Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Barclays, and HSBC. These hedge funds employed only a few hundred people compared to the banks' one million employees. The stock exchanges themselves have lost ground to upstarts like BATS Exchange (founded in 2005), which now handles more trading volume than any exchange other than NYSE or NASDAQ.

Chapter 5: Institutional Decay: Churches, Unions, and Media

The decay of power extends far beyond politics, military affairs, and business to encompass virtually every form of organized human activity. Traditional institutions that once dominated religion, labor, philanthropy, and media now face unprecedented challenges from nimble competitors that have exploited the More, Mobility, and Mentality revolutions to carve out their own spheres of influence. In religion, the Catholic Church has witnessed a dramatic erosion of its dominance in Latin America. Between 1995 and 2005, the proportion of Latin Americans identifying as Catholic dropped from 80 percent to 71 percent. In Brazil, half a million Catholics leave the church each year, with the Catholic population decreasing from 73.6 percent in 2000 to 64.6 percent by 2010. The beneficiaries have been Pentecostal and charismatic Christian churches that have proliferated across the region. The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1977, now has five thousand chapters worldwide. The success of these new religious movements stems largely from their organizational flexibility. Unlike the Catholic Church with its rigid hierarchy and centralized authority, evangelical churches can spring up without regard to any preexisting structure. A pastor simply appoints himself or herself and begins operations, adapting to local circumstances much like a well-conceived niche business. As one evangelical pastor in Bolivia put it: "Our churches are more open, the songs use local rhythms, and I visit my people every day." The communications revolution has further empowered these churches by allowing even small congregations to reach television viewers, radio listeners, and web users far beyond their immediate community. Labor unions have experienced a similar fragmentation. Union density has plummeted from 36 percent after World War II to just 12 percent today in the United States, with the private sector seeing an even sharper decline to less than 8 percent. Traditional unions structured to represent workers in large, hierarchical corporations have struggled to adapt to an economy characterized by globalization, technological change, and the shift toward services and part-time work. The few labor success stories have come from organizations that have radically rethought their approach. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) more than doubled its membership between 1996 and 2010 by focusing on previously neglected workers like janitors and healthcare providers, many of whom were immigrants. SEIU formed alliances with community groups, immigrant organizations, and churches, developing new organizing and negotiating tactics suited to the contemporary labor market. In China, factory workers have bypassed official unions entirely, using technology to organize strikes and communicate without detection by authorities. The media landscape has undergone perhaps the most visible transformation. Newspapers have seen circulation and advertising revenues plummet, with the US newspaper industry shrinking 43 percent since 2000. Traditional gatekeepers have been challenged by bloggers, citizen journalists, and social media platforms. The Huffington Post, once derided as a mere aggregator, won a Pulitzer Prize in 2012. Statistics geek Nate Silver applied his baseball analysis skills to political polling on his site fivethirtyeight.com, accurately predicting election results and eventually being licensed by the New York Times.

Chapter 6: Global Power Diffusion: The Rise of Micropowers

The international system is undergoing a profound transformation as power diffuses beyond traditional great powers. In March 2012, the collective size of developing economies surpassed those of the rich world for the first time since 1840. This shift has prompted intense debate about which countries will dominate in the coming decades, with many analysts focusing on the rise of China and other emerging powers. However, this conventional narrative of power transition misses a more fundamental change. The nature of geopolitical power itself is being transformed. Even the United States, as the sole superpower after the Cold War, has found its ability to shape global outcomes increasingly constrained. WikiLeaks diplomatic cables reveal a hegemon struggling to get things done - stymied by other countries' bureaucracies, politicians, NGOs, and ordinary citizens. Several factors explain this transformation. First, the costs of projecting military power have risen dramatically while its effectiveness has declined. The United States spent over $1 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan without achieving clear strategic victories. Second, economic interdependence has made coercion more costly for all parties. When countries are deeply integrated through trade and investment, sanctions and other punitive measures often harm the sender as much as the target. Third, the proliferation of international institutions and agreements has created multiple veto points in global governance. The UN Security Council, WTO, IMF, and other bodies provide forums where smaller powers can block, delay, or water down initiatives from major powers. Fourth, the information revolution has empowered non-state actors - from NGOs and multinational corporations to terrorist networks and transnational activists - to influence international affairs. The result is what international relations scholar Joseph Nye calls "power diffusion" rather than power transition. Power is not simply shifting from one set of countries to another; it is spreading to a wider array of actors and becoming more contextual and issue-specific. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed: "In the 21st century, I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion." This new landscape has given rise to what might be called "the power of the weak." Small states and non-state actors have discovered effective strategies to constrain great powers - from the power to veto (blocking initiatives in international forums), to the power to resist (making occupation or intervention prohibitively costly), to the power to leak (exposing secret negotiations or operations). Brazil and Turkey, for instance, inserted themselves into nuclear negotiations with Iran. WikiLeaks published classified diplomatic cables that complicated US foreign policy. The decay of geopolitical power doesn't mean the end of great power influence, but it does suggest a world of more complex, diffuse, and constrained power relationships - one where even the strongest players must navigate a landscape of distributed authority and competing legitimacies.

Chapter 7: Governance Challenges: Trust Erosion and Vetocracy

The erosion of trust in institutions represents both a cause and consequence of power's decay. Across developed democracies, public confidence in governments, political parties, corporations, media, and other traditional authorities has declined steadily for decades. This trend creates a paradoxical situation: as citizens demand more accountability and transparency from power holders, they simultaneously impose constraints that make effective governance increasingly difficult. This trust deficit manifests most visibly in the proliferation of veto points throughout political systems. In the United States, the constitutional separation of powers has evolved into what Francis Fukuyama describes as a "metastasized" system of checks and balances. Beyond the formal veto points established by the Constitution, countless interest groups, regulatory requirements, judicial interventions, and procedural obstacles now allow opponents to block almost any significant initiative. Similar dynamics play out in other democracies, where coalition governments, proportional representation systems, and powerful regional authorities fragment decision-making authority. The consequences extend beyond domestic politics to international cooperation. Governments with weak mandates at home cannot make the commitments, compromises, or sacrifices necessary for effective international agreements. This explains why multilateral efforts on climate change, trade, and other global challenges have repeatedly faltered. The last significant international nonproliferation agreement was reached in 1995, the last global trade deal in 1994, and efforts to address greenhouse gas emissions have repeatedly fallen short despite scientific consensus on the dangers of inaction. This erosion of trust has deep roots. Political scandals, economic disappointments, and the failure of governments to meet rising expectations have all contributed. Media scrutiny has intensified, highlighting the misdeeds and inadequacies of those in power. The internet and social media have democratized criticism while making it harder to establish shared facts or narratives. These factors have created a chronic condition of low trust that undermines governance across domains. The challenge is particularly acute for political parties, once the principal organizations for mobilizing citizens and translating their concerns into coherent policies. Since the 1990s, parties in most democracies have seen their prestige and public standing decline precipitously. As electoral platforms became less ideologically distinct, parties increasingly relied on personalities, marketing techniques, and fundraising rather than ideas to win elections. Meanwhile, single-issue organizations and social movements attracted the energy and commitment that parties once commanded. This transformation creates a dangerous vacuum. Without trusted institutions capable of aggregating diverse interests and forging workable compromises, societies struggle to address complex challenges requiring sustained collective action. The decay of power thus threatens not just the effectiveness of particular leaders or organizations, but the capacity of democratic systems to deliver on their fundamental promise: translating the will of citizens into effective governance that serves the common good.

Summary

The transformation of power represents one of the defining phenomena of our time. Across domains from politics and business to religion and media, traditional power structures are decaying as barriers that once protected established players collapse. This isn't simply a shift in who holds power, but a fundamental change in how power works. It has become easier to get, harder to use effectively, and more difficult to keep. The result is a world where governments struggle to govern despite electoral mandates, corporate giants face disruption from nimble startups, military superpowers are frustrated by insurgents, and established institutions of all kinds find their authority challenged by previously marginal actors. This transformation brings both promise and peril. The diffusion of power has undermined authoritarian regimes, broken monopolies, expanded choices, and created opportunities for innovation and participation. Yet it has also contributed to political paralysis, undermined collective action on global challenges, and created space for extremism and misinformation to flourish. Moving forward requires neither celebrating nor lamenting these changes, but developing new approaches to governance that can function effectively in a world of diffuse power. This means reinventing political parties to become more networked and participatory, restoring trust in public institutions through greater accountability and effectiveness, and fostering a new wave of political innovation comparable to earlier democratic revolutions. By understanding how power is changing, we can work to ensure that its transformation enhances human freedom and welfare rather than undermining our capacity to address shared challenges.

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Moisés Naím

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