How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World

How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World Plot Summary

Introduction

The late twentieth century witnessed a curious and disturbing phenomenon: the retreat of rational thought across multiple domains of human endeavor. After centuries of progress toward Enlightenment values of reason, empiricism, and critical thinking, society began sliding backward into superstition, emotion-driven decision making, and intellectual obfuscation. This regression wasn't limited to fringe groups or developing nations but penetrated the highest levels of government, academia, business, and cultural institutions throughout the Western world. What explains this triumph of unreason? The answer lies in a perfect storm of historical, political, and cultural forces that converged in the late 1970s and accelerated through subsequent decades. From the rise of religious fundamentalism to the emergence of postmodern relativism, from economic voodoo to New Age mysticism, rational discourse found itself under siege from both right and left. By examining these seemingly disparate movements through a unified analytical lens, we can identify their common patterns and understand how they collectively undermined the foundations of rational thought in public life. This intellectual journey reveals not just how mumbo-jumbo conquered the world, but why its victory matters—and what might be done to restore reason to its rightful place.

Chapter 1: The Enlightenment Under Siege: Rationality's Retreat in Modern Times

The year 1979 marked a pivotal moment in contemporary history, witnessing two transformative events that would reshape global politics: the return of Ayatollah Khomeini to Iran and Margaret Thatcher's election victory in Britain. Though seemingly unrelated, these events represented the emergence of powerful messianic creeds whose conflict would eventually culminate in the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. What appeared to be a straightforward battle between modernity and medievalism was in fact more complex. The apostles of Thatcherite neo-liberalism were themselves engaged in a struggle against the twentieth-century world of welfare states and regulated economies, while Islamic fundamentalists demonstrated sophisticated technological capabilities that continually surprised their enemies. This paradoxical relationship revealed how both movements, despite their apparent opposition, shared a common rejection of Enlightenment values. The Iranian Revolution succeeded not merely because of religious fervor but because the Shah had suppressed all democratic dissent with American support. The resulting resentment against the "great Satan" of America created fertile ground for Khomeini's return. The Ayatollah's vision was explicitly medieval, proposing to restore a regime that had last existed almost 1,300 years ago. Meanwhile in Britain, Margaret Thatcher came to power amid economic stagnation and labor unrest. Though initially cautious, she would eventually dismantle the post-war consensus with support from American free-market economists like Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek. Her rhetoric combined economic liberalism with religious moralism, claiming that "I am in politics because of the conflict between good and evil." Thatcher's economic revolution paralleled Khomeini's religious one in its rejection of post-war compromises. She explicitly associated economic freedom with Christian doctrine, viewing self-reliance and property ownership as "part of the spiritual ballast which maintains responsible citizenship." This fusion of market fundamentalism with religious certainty created a powerful ideological force that would transform Britain and influence global politics for decades. The consequences of both revolutions would be far-reaching. Khomeini's theocracy established a model for religious governance that inspired fundamentalist movements worldwide, while Thatcher's free-market crusade dismantled social protections and celebrated wealth creation as a moral good. Together, they marked the beginning of an era where rational compromise would increasingly give way to ideological extremism.

Chapter 2: Political Messianism: How Ideological Extremes Replaced Pragmatic Governance

The collapse of Soviet communism in 1991 eliminated the primary reference point for left-right distinctions, leaving both sides to redefine themselves. Former Marxists like philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre transformed into religious conservatives, transferring their anti-liberalism from Leon Trotsky to Thomas Aquinas. Meanwhile, conservative politicians adopted traditionally leftist rhetoric about community and social cohesion while implementing free-market policies that undermined both. This ideological convergence was exemplified by Tony Blair's "Third Way" and Bill Clinton's "New Democrats," which abandoned traditional social democratic commitments to equality and public ownership in favor of market-friendly policies. As Peter Mandelson, a key Blair adviser, declared, "In this strictly narrow sense, and in the urgent need to remove rigidities and incorporate flexibility in capital, product and labor markets, we are all 'Thatcherite' now." This mirrored Richard Nixon's earlier admission that "We are all Keynesians now." The post-modern critique of grand narratives contributed to this dissolution of ideological boundaries. By rejecting the possibility of objective truth or universal values, post-modernists undermined the rational foundations of both left and right political projects. Without shared standards of evidence or reasoning, political debate devolved into competing emotional appeals and identity claims rather than substantive policy arguments. Religious fundamentalists and cultural conservatives found common cause with postmodernists in rejecting Enlightenment rationality. Pat Buchanan's defense of the Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie revealed how anti-liberalism could unite figures from opposite ends of the conventional political spectrum. Similarly, academic postmodernists celebrated Islamic theocracy as an authentic alternative to Western hegemony, with Michel Foucault praising the "beauty" of Khomeini's regime. The false dichotomy of left versus right has been replaced by a more fundamental division between those who accept Enlightenment values of reason, evidence, and universal human rights, and those who reject these principles in favor of various forms of particularism, whether religious, cultural, or identitarian. This new alignment cuts across traditional political boundaries, creating unexpected alliances and conflicts.

Chapter 3: Economic Voodoo: The Rise of Market Fundamentalism and Magical Thinking

The economic policies that swept through Western democracies in the late 1970s and 1980s represented a triumph of ideology over evidence. "Supply-side economics," popularized during the Reagan administration, promised that massive tax cuts for the wealthy would stimulate such economic growth that government revenues would actually increase—a claim that defied both economic theory and historical experience. When the predicted miracle failed to materialize, producing instead record budget deficits, the theory's advocates simply doubled down, treating their failed predictions not as evidence of flawed thinking but as proof that the tax cuts hadn't gone far enough. This pattern of immunizing economic claims against empirical refutation became a defining feature of market fundamentalism. When financial deregulation led to savings and loan collapses in the 1980s, the response was calls for further deregulation. When privatization of public services resulted in higher costs and poorer outcomes, the solution was always more privatization. The circular logic became impenetrable: market solutions were axiomatically superior to government intervention, so any failure of market-based policies could only mean the market wasn't free enough. The intellectual foundations for this economic mumbo-jumbo were laid by think tanks and academic departments heavily funded by corporate interests. These institutions produced a steady stream of papers, books, and media commentary that created the appearance of scholarly consensus around policies that primarily benefited their funders. Dissenting economists found themselves marginalized, regardless of the empirical strength of their arguments. The marketplace of ideas, ironically, had been captured by monopolistic thinking. Financial markets, meanwhile, developed their own forms of magical thinking. Wall Street traders embraced pseudo-scientific theories like the Elliott Wave Principle or the Super Bowl Indicator to predict market movements. Investment banks hired astrologers as consultants. The rational actor model of economic behavior—itself a highly questionable abstraction—gave way to increasingly mystical conceptions of market forces as omniscient and inherently moral arbiters of value. By the 1990s, economic discourse had become so detached from empirical reality that even ostensibly center-left governments embraced core tenets of market fundamentalism. The Clinton administration in America and New Labour in Britain implemented policies virtually indistinguishable from their conservative predecessors, having accepted the premise that markets were self-regulating systems best left to their own devices. When this consensus produced the dot-com bubble and eventually the 2008 financial crisis, the response was not a fundamental reassessment but temporary emergency measures followed by a return to business as usual.

Chapter 4: The Cult of Feeling: How Emotional Populism Undermined Rational Discourse

The death of Princess Diana in 1997 marked a watershed moment in the emotionalization of public discourse. The unprecedented outpouring of public grief—with mourners leaving mountains of flowers, stuffed animals, and personal notes—revealed a profound shift in how citizens related to public events. This wasn't merely sadness at a tragic death but a collective emotional performance that demanded participation. Those who questioned the intensity or authenticity of this grief were condemned as heartless or elitist, establishing a pattern where emotional responses became immune from rational critique. Political leaders quickly learned to harness this new emotionalism. Tony Blair, dubbing Diana "the People's Princess," positioned himself as the nation's emotional interpreter-in-chief. His success established a template for a new style of leadership based not on policy expertise or logical argument but on emotional performance. Politicians increasingly presented themselves as therapists-in-chief, validating public feelings rather than challenging misconceptions or presenting complex analyses. The ability to "feel your pain" became more important than the ability to solve problems. This emotional turn transformed how policy debates were conducted. Arguments based on statistical evidence or cost-benefit analysis lost ground to emotional appeals and personal anecdotes. Political speeches became structured around heart-wrenching stories of individual suffering rather than systematic analysis of social problems. Media coverage followed suit, prioritizing emotional impact over informational content. The result was a public sphere where how policies made people feel often mattered more than what those policies actually accomplished. The September 11 attacks accelerated this trend dramatically. The legitimate trauma of these events was channeled into emotional narratives that precluded rational policy discussion. Questions about proportionality, effectiveness, or unintended consequences of military responses were dismissed as unpatriotic or insensitive to victims' families. Complex geopolitical realities were reduced to simplistic moral frameworks of good versus evil. Leaders who projected emotional certainty were trusted over those who acknowledged complexity or ambiguity. Perhaps most concerning was how emotional appeals were used to bypass constitutional checks and balances. Emergency powers were justified through fear rather than rational assessment of threats. Civil liberties were curtailed based on emotional security theater rather than evidence-based security measures. Democratic deliberation—the rational weighing of competing values and interests—was short-circuited by appeals to fear, grief, and anger. When emotions become the primary basis for political decision-making, democracy itself is undermined, as emotional manipulation replaces reasoned debate as the path to power.

Chapter 5: Religious Fundamentalism's Revival: Theocratic Impulses in Secular Societies

The late twentieth century witnessed an unexpected resurgence of religious fundamentalism as a political force, confounding predictions that modernization would inevitably lead to secularization. This revival occurred not only in the Islamic world but also in the United States, Israel, India, and elsewhere, transforming the political landscape and challenging the Enlightenment separation of church and state. In the United States, the Moral Majority founded by televangelist Jerry Falwell mobilized evangelical Christians as a political force, helping to elect Ronald Reagan in 1980. Reagan skillfully incorporated religious rhetoric into his anti-Communist crusade, telling the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983 that the Soviet Union was "the focus of evil in the modern world." This fusion of religious fervor with geopolitics gave American foreign policy a messianic quality that persisted beyond the Cold War. The Iranian Revolution established a model of theocratic governance that inspired Islamist movements throughout the Middle East and beyond. Ayatollah Khomeini's regime explicitly rejected Western notions of human rights and democracy as un-Islamic, offering instead a vision of governance based on religious law. This challenge to secular modernity found resonance among populations disillusioned with corrupt authoritarian regimes and Western-style development. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989 revealed the transnational reach of religious fundamentalism and the reluctance of Western leaders to defend Enlightenment values. Even the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, expressed sympathy for "devout Muslims' reaction, wounded by what they hold most dear." Pat Buchanan, a conservative Catholic, sprang to the Ayatollah's defense, condemning The Satanic Verses as "a blasphemous assault on the faith of hundreds of millions." This convergence between Western religious conservatives and Islamic fundamentalists reflected their shared opposition to secular liberalism. Both rejected the Enlightenment emphasis on individual autonomy, scientific rationality, and the separation of religion from politics. Both sought to restore traditional gender roles and sexual morality against the perceived corruption of modern society. And both viewed pluralism and tolerance as weaknesses rather than strengths. The revival of religious fundamentalism posed particular challenges for liberal democracies. How could societies committed to religious freedom respond to movements that used democratic processes to advance anti-democratic agendas? The dilemma was captured by Tony Blair, who after the September 11 attacks claimed that religion was the solution rather than the problem since "Jews, Muslims and Christians are all children of Abraham" - apparently unaware that this very concept had inspired the hijackers.

Chapter 6: The False Dichotomy: Transcending Traditional Left-Right Political Divisions

The traditional political spectrum of left versus right has become increasingly obsolete in the post-Cold War era, replaced by a convergence of formerly opposed ideologies and a blurring of once-clear distinctions. This transformation has profound implications for democratic politics and rational discourse, creating confusion among voters and enabling the rise of new forms of authoritarianism that defy conventional categorization. The collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991 eliminated the primary reference point for left-right distinctions, leaving both sides to redefine themselves. Former Marxists like philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre transformed into religious conservatives, transferring their anti-liberalism from Leon Trotsky to Thomas Aquinas. Meanwhile, conservative politicians adopted traditionally leftist rhetoric about community and social cohesion while implementing free-market policies that undermined both. This ideological convergence was exemplified by Tony Blair's "Third Way" and Bill Clinton's "New Democrats," which abandoned traditional social democratic commitments to equality and public ownership in favor of market-friendly policies. As Peter Mandelson, a key Blair adviser, declared, "In this strictly narrow sense, and in the urgent need to remove rigidities and incorporate flexibility in capital, product and labor markets, we are all 'Thatcherite' now." This mirrored Richard Nixon's earlier admission that "We are all Keynesians now." The post-modern critique of grand narratives contributed to this dissolution of ideological boundaries. By rejecting the possibility of objective truth or universal values, post-modernists undermined the rational foundations of both left and right political projects. Without shared standards of evidence or reasoning, political debate devolved into competing emotional appeals and identity claims rather than substantive policy arguments. Religious fundamentalists and cultural conservatives found common cause with postmodernists in rejecting Enlightenment rationality. Pat Buchanan's defense of the Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie revealed how anti-liberalism could unite figures from opposite ends of the conventional political spectrum. Similarly, academic postmodernists celebrated Islamic theocracy as an authentic alternative to Western hegemony, with Michel Foucault praising the "beauty" of Khomeini's regime. The false dichotomy of left versus right has been replaced by a more fundamental division between those who accept Enlightenment values of reason, evidence, and universal human rights, and those who reject these principles in favor of various forms of particularism, whether religious, cultural, or identitarian. This new alignment cuts across traditional political boundaries, creating unexpected alliances and conflicts.

Chapter 7: Reclaiming Reason: Strategies for Restoring Rational Public Discourse

The triumph of unreason is not inevitable or irreversible. Throughout history, periods of irrationality have eventually given way to renewed commitment to evidence and logical consistency. The question is not whether reason will reassert itself, but how quickly and at what cost. The longer societies operate on the basis of mumbo-jumbo, the more damage accumulates in terms of misallocated resources, undermined institutions, and eroded trust. Reclaiming reason requires understanding both the psychological appeal of unreason and the practical steps needed to counter it. The first step is recognizing that rationality is not opposed to human values but essential to realizing them. The false dichotomy between "cold" reason and "warm" emotion has been exploited by purveyors of mumbo-jumbo to immunize their claims from critical scrutiny. In reality, rational analysis is necessary precisely because we care about human flourishing. Effective altruism, evidence-based medicine, and scientific environmental protection all demonstrate how reason serves human values better than emotional impulse or ideological dogma. Reclaiming this connection between rationality and values is essential to countering the portrayal of reason as inhuman or soulless. Educational institutions must play a central role in this reclamation project. Rather than treating critical thinking as just another academic skill, schools and universities need to place it at the center of their mission. This means teaching not just what to think but how to think—how to evaluate evidence, recognize logical fallacies, and distinguish between genuine expertise and mere authority. It means creating classroom environments where ideas are subjected to rigorous scrutiny regardless of their political valence or emotional appeal. Most importantly, it means modeling intellectual humility—the willingness to revise beliefs in light of new evidence. Media organizations bear particular responsibility for elevating the quality of public discourse. The journalistic norm of "balance" needs to be replaced with a commitment to accuracy, which sometimes means clearly identifying certain claims as false rather than presenting them as one side of a legitimate debate. Greater transparency about sources, methods, and limitations would help audiences develop appropriate levels of confidence in reported information. Most fundamentally, media must resist the temptation to prioritize emotional engagement over informational value, recognizing that their democratic function requires more than simply maximizing audience attention. Ultimately, reclaiming reason requires collective action by citizens committed to rational discourse. This means creating social norms that reward intellectual integrity rather than rhetorical victory. It means supporting institutions that uphold standards of evidence and logical consistency. It means practicing the difficult art of changing one's mind when the facts demand it, and expecting the same of leaders and fellow citizens. The Enlightenment was never a completed project but an ongoing struggle against humanity's tendency toward magical thinking and tribal certainty. That struggle continues today, with the future of democratic governance hanging in the balance.

Summary

The triumph of irrationality in modern society represents a profound challenge to the Enlightenment legacy of reason, evidence, and universal values. From the rise of religious fundamentalism and market mysticism to the cult of feeling and post-modern truth denial, we have witnessed a multi-faceted retreat from rational discourse that threatens the foundations of democratic governance and scientific progress. This retreat from reason has occurred across the political spectrum, uniting former opponents in their rejection of Enlightenment principles. Religious conservatives and post-modern academics, market fundamentalists and identity politicians have all contributed to undermining the rational basis of public discourse. The consequences include the manipulation of fear for political control, the privileging of emotional authenticity over factual accuracy, and the blurring of once-clear ideological distinctions. What emerges is not a new synthesis but a dangerous vacuum where reason once stood - a vacuum increasingly filled by various forms of authoritarianism that exploit irrationality for their own ends. The challenge for those committed to human freedom and dignity is to reclaim the Enlightenment project without falling into the trap of uncritical scientism or naive universalism, recognizing that reason itself must be constantly renewed through critical reflection and open debate.

About Author

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Francis Wheen

Francis James Baird Wheen (born 22 January 1957) is a British journalist, writer and broadcaster.Wheen was educated at Copthorne Prep School, Harrow School and Royal Holloway College, University of London. At Harrow he was a contemporary of Mark Thatcher who has been a recurring subject of his journalism.[citation needed] He is a member of the 'soap' side of the Wheen family, whose family business was the long-established "Wheen & Sons", soap-makers, as was revealed in the gossip column of the Daily Mail on 26 March 2007. He was married to the writer Joan Smith between 1985 and 1993.He is the author of several books including a biography of Karl Marx, which won the Isaac Deutscher prize. A column for The Guardian ran for several years. He writes for Private Eye and is the magazine's deputy editor. His collected journalism – Hoo-hahs and Passing Frenzies won him the George Orwell Prize in 2003. He has also been a regular columnist for the London Evening Standard.Wheen broadcasts regularly (mainly on BBC Radio 4) and is a regular panellist on The News Quiz, in which he often referred to the fact that he resembles the former Tory party leader Iain Duncan Smith. He is also one of the more frequently recruited guests for Have I Got News For You.Wheen wrote a docudrama, The Lavender List, for BBC Four on the final period of Harold Wilson's premiership, concentrating on his relationship with Marcia Williams, which was first screened in March 2006. It starred Kenneth Cranham as former Prime Minister Wilson and Gina McKee as Williams. In April 2007 the BBC paid £75,000 to Williams (Baroness Falkender) in an out-of-court settlement over claims made in the programme.Francis Wheen is a signatory to the Euston Manifesto and a close friend of Christopher Hitchens. In late-2005 Wheen was co-author, with journalist David Aaronovitch and blogger Oliver Kamm, of a complaint to The Guardian after it published a correction and apology for an interview with Noam Chomsky by Emma Brockes. Chomsky complained that the article suggested he denied the Srebrenica massacre of 1995. The writer Diana Johnstone also complained about references to her in the interview. The Guardian's then readers' editor Ian Mayes found that this had misrepresented Chomsky's position, and his judgement was upheld in May 2006 by an external ombudsman, John Willis. In his report for the Guardian, Willis detailed his reasons for rejecting the argument.

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