A Peace to End All Peace

A Peace to End All Peace Plot Summary

Introduction

At the dawn of the 20th century, the Middle East stood at a pivotal crossroads of history. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire had ruled this vast region spanning three continents, but by 1914, this once-mighty power was crumbling from within and under pressure from without. What followed was one of history's most consequential political transformations—a rapid redrawing of maps and reshaping of identities that continues to define global politics today. The collapse of this centuries-old empire and the European powers' hasty attempts to fill the vacuum created artificial borders, competing nationalisms, and contradictory promises that laid the groundwork for conflicts still unfolding. Through the lens of diplomatic correspondence, military campaigns, and the machinations of figures like Winston Churchill, T.E. Lawrence, and Chaim Weizmann, we witness how decisions made in distant European capitals fundamentally altered the destiny of millions. The story reveals the tension between imperial ambition and emerging nationalism, between strategic calculation and cultural misunderstanding. For anyone seeking to understand today's headlines about Iraq, Syria, Israel-Palestine, or Turkey, this historical narrative provides essential context for how the modern Middle East was born from the ashes of empire—and why the region's borders and conflicts continue to defy simple solutions.

Chapter 1: The Sick Man of Europe: Ottoman Decline (1908-1914)

The Ottoman Empire entered the 20th century as a shadow of its former self. Once stretching from the gates of Vienna to the Persian Gulf, by 1908 it had lost most of its European territories and was derisively known as "the sick man of Europe." Internal corruption, economic stagnation, and the rising tide of nationalism among its diverse populations had weakened the empire's foundations. European powers, particularly Britain, France, and Russia, circled like vultures, imposing humiliating "capitulations" that granted them special economic and legal privileges within Ottoman territory. Against this backdrop, a group of reform-minded military officers and intellectuals known as the Young Turks seized power in 1908, forcing Sultan Abdul Hamid II to restore the constitution he had suspended thirty years earlier. Led by ambitious figures like Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha, and Djemal Pasha, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) promised to modernize the empire and resist European encroachment. However, their rule was immediately tested by crises. Italy invaded Libya in 1911, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 resulted in the loss of nearly all remaining Ottoman territories in Europe, creating a refugee crisis as Muslims fled to Anatolia. The Young Turk leadership faced a fundamental contradiction in their ideology. While some advocated a multicultural Ottoman identity embracing all ethnic groups, others increasingly pushed for Turkish nationalism. This tension became more pronounced as territorial losses mounted, pushing the empire's demographic balance toward a Turkish Muslim majority. Meanwhile, Arab intellectuals in Damascus, Beirut, and Cairo were developing their own nationalist ideas, forming secret societies like al-Fatat that would later challenge Ottoman authority. By 1914, the Ottoman Empire stood at a geopolitical crossroads. Britain, which had traditionally supported Ottoman territorial integrity as a bulwark against Russian expansion, had shifted its position after forming the Triple Entente with Russia and France. Germany, seeing an opportunity to challenge British dominance, cultivated close ties with the Ottomans, providing military advisors and economic investment. When World War I erupted in August 1914, the Young Turk leadership made the fateful decision to align with Germany—a choice that would ultimately seal the empire's fate and transform the entire Middle East. The final years before the war revealed how the Ottoman Empire had become a pawn in European power politics. Foreign ambassadors in Constantinople wielded enormous influence, while European banks controlled much of the empire's finances. The Young Turks' attempts to reassert Ottoman sovereignty through military modernization and economic reforms came too late to overcome decades of decline. Their decision to enter World War I represented a desperate gamble to restore the empire's greatness—a gamble that would instead lead to its complete dissolution and the birth of a new regional order.

Chapter 2: War and Imperial Ambitions: Britain's Middle Eastern Strategy

When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I in November 1914, Britain faced both a strategic threat and a historic opportunity. The threat was immediate: Ottoman forces could potentially attack the Suez Canal, Britain's vital artery to India, or foment rebellion among Britain's millions of Muslim subjects by invoking the Sultan's authority as Caliph (spiritual leader of Islam). The opportunity was equally significant: the chance to reshape the entire Middle East according to British imperial interests after centuries of Ottoman rule. Lord Kitchener, Britain's Secretary of State for War and former Consul-General in Egypt, quickly emerged as the architect of Britain's Middle Eastern strategy. Kitchener envisioned transferring the Islamic Caliphate from Turkish to Arab control under British protection, thereby neutralizing Ottoman religious influence while extending British power throughout the Muslim world. This ambitious plan led to correspondence with Hussein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, promising support for Arab independence in exchange for rebellion against Ottoman rule—the famous McMahon-Hussein letters of 1915-1916 that would later become highly controversial. Britain's initial military approach focused on a knockout blow against the Ottoman Empire through the Dardanelles campaign of 1915-1916. Championed by Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, this ambitious plan aimed to capture Constantinople, knock the Ottomans out of the war, and open a supply route to Russia. The campaign's failure at Gallipoli, where Ottoman forces under Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) successfully repelled the Allied invasion, forced Britain to adopt a more incremental strategy focusing on Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq), and fomenting internal revolt. By 1916, British strategic thinking had evolved into a complex balancing act between immediate wartime needs and long-term imperial ambitions. The discovery of oil in Persia and Mesopotamia had fundamentally altered the strategic equation. As Admiral Fisher famously remarked, "Oil is the blood of victory." Controlling Middle Eastern oil fields became essential not just for winning the current war but for maintaining naval supremacy in the future. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP), in which the British government had purchased a controlling stake in 1914, became a key instrument of imperial policy. The contradictions in British policy became increasingly apparent as the war progressed. While promising Arab independence through the McMahon correspondence, Britain simultaneously negotiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France in 1916, dividing much of the same territory into European spheres of influence. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, expressing support for "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, added yet another layer of complexity. As one British official later admitted, these contradictory commitments represented "a colossal blunder in our Eastern policy," creating expectations that Britain could not possibly fulfill simultaneously. By war's end, Britain had positioned itself as the dominant power in the Middle East, with forces occupying Palestine, Mesopotamia, and parts of Syria. However, the cost of this position—both financial and moral—would prove far greater than its architects had anticipated. The imperial ambitions that drove British strategy during the war years would collide with the realities of rising nationalism, economic constraints, and competing claims in the postwar period, creating tensions that continue to shape the region today.

Chapter 3: Competing Promises: Arabs, Jews, and European Powers

Between 1915 and 1917, the British government made a series of overlapping, contradictory promises regarding the future of Ottoman territories that would haunt the Middle East for generations. This diplomatic tangle began with the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, in which Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, exchanged letters with Hussein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, between July 1915 and March 1916. McMahon appeared to promise British support for an independent Arab kingdom in exchange for an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, though the precise territories included remained deliberately vague. The catalyst for these negotiations was Muhammad al-Faruqi, a former Ottoman officer who deserted to the British in 1915. Al-Faruqi convinced British intelligence that he represented powerful Arab secret societies that could bring down the Ottoman Empire from within. Though he greatly exaggerated their strength and his own authority, his claims led British officials to make significant promises to Hussein. The Arab Revolt, launched in June 1916, never became the mass uprising the British had hoped for, but it established the Hashemite family (Hussein and his sons) as key political players and created expectations of Arab independence that would prove difficult to ignore. Even as these promises were being made to Arab leaders, Sir Mark Sykes for Britain and François Georges-Picot for France were negotiating a secret agreement to divide the same territories between their countries. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, concluded in May 1916, envisioned direct French control over coastal Syria and Lebanon and a sphere of influence extending inland, while Britain would directly control southern Mesopotamia and have influence over its northern regions. Palestine was to have an international administration. This agreement reflected centuries-old European assumptions about the Middle East as territory to be divided rather than as home to peoples with legitimate political aspirations. The third layer of competing promises came with the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, in which British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour expressed support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." This brief document emerged from a complex convergence of factors: the effective lobbying of Chaim Weizmann and other Zionist leaders, strategic calculations about securing a friendly presence near the Suez Canal, religious sentiment among British Protestants, and wartime propaganda needs to rally Jewish support worldwide. The declaration specified that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"—a caveat that acknowledged but minimized the presence of the Arab majority. These contradictory commitments reflected the desperate wartime circumstances in which they were made. Each promise served immediate British strategic needs: Arab support against the Ottomans, French cooperation on the Western Front, and Jewish influence in America and Russia. British officials like Sir Mark Sykes genuinely believed they could somehow reconcile these competing promises after the war. As Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour candidly admitted in 1919: "The contradictions between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the independent nation of Palestine than in that of the independent nation of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country." The consequences of this diplomatic tangle would prove profound and enduring. When details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were revealed by the Bolsheviks after the Russian Revolution, Arab leaders felt betrayed. The three sets of promises—to Arabs, to European allies, and to Zionists—created a legacy of mistrust and competing nationalisms that would make post-war settlement nearly impossible. More fundamentally, these diplomatic maneuvers represented a European approach to redrawing the map of the Middle East with little regard for local realities or the complexity of the region's ethnic and religious composition.

Chapter 4: Drawing Lines in the Sand: The Sykes-Picot Agreement

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 stands as perhaps the most notorious example of imperial map-drawing in modern history. Negotiated secretly between November 1915 and May 1916 by Sir Mark Sykes for Britain and François Georges-Picot for France, this arrangement divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into zones of direct control and spheres of influence with little regard for local populations or historical realities. Sykes, a wealthy Catholic Member of Parliament and self-styled expert on the Ottoman Empire, famously described the division by tracing "a line from the 'e' in Acre to the last 'k' in Kirkuk" across the map—a cavalier approach to nation-building that would have lasting consequences. Under the agreement's terms, France would receive direct control of coastal Syria and Lebanon (the "Blue Zone"), along with an inland "sphere of influence" (the "A Zone") extending to Mosul. Britain would directly control southern Mesopotamia around Basra and Baghdad (the "Red Zone") and maintain influence over an area extending from the Mediterranean to Persia (the "B Zone"). Palestine was designated for international administration, though this would later be modified. Russia, consulted during the negotiations, was promised Constantinople and the Turkish Straits—a longstanding Russian ambition that would be nullified by the Bolshevik Revolution. The agreement reflected fundamentally different imperial traditions. France based its claims on historical connections to the Levant dating back to the Crusades, commercial interests, and its self-appointed role as protector of Catholic communities in the region. Britain's interests were more strategic than cultural, focused on securing routes to India, protecting the Suez Canal, and increasingly, controlling access to oil resources. Both powers viewed the Middle East through the lens of their global imperial competition, with little consideration for the aspirations of local populations. The cynicism of the agreement was particularly evident in its treatment of Arab aspirations. While British officials were simultaneously encouraging Arab revolt with promises of independence through the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, Sykes-Picot envisioned only limited Arab self-rule under European supervision. When the Bolsheviks published the secret agreement after seizing power in Russia in November 1917, Arab leaders were understandably outraged. T.E. Lawrence, who had been working closely with Arab forces, felt personally betrayed by his government's duplicity, later writing that he had been "continually and bitterly ashamed" of the deception. By the war's end, the agreement was already being modified in practice. British forces had advanced well beyond their designated zones, and Lloyd George's government increasingly viewed the agreement as an inconvenient constraint rather than a binding commitment. Nevertheless, the basic framework—dividing the region into British and French spheres—would survive into the post-war settlement, though in modified form. The mandate system established by the League of Nations after the war essentially legitimized the colonial division envisioned in Sykes-Picot, though with the rhetoric of "sacred trust" and eventual self-government. The Sykes-Picot Agreement's legacy extends far beyond its immediate historical context. The arbitrary boundaries drawn by European diplomats, with little regard for ethnic, religious, or economic realities on the ground, created artificial states that would struggle for legitimacy and stability throughout the 20th century. The agreement has become a powerful symbol in Middle Eastern political discourse of Western duplicity and imperial arrogance. As recently as 2014, when ISIS militants bulldozed the Iraq-Syria border, they explicitly referenced "breaking the Sykes-Picot border" as a rejection of the Western-imposed order. A century after it was negotiated, this secret wartime agreement continues to shape both the physical and psychological landscape of the modern Middle East.

Chapter 5: From Empire to Nations: The Settlement of 1922

The years 1921-1922 witnessed the formal establishment of the new political entities that would define the modern Middle East. Through a combination of League of Nations mandates, treaties, and unilateral declarations, Britain and France transformed the former Ottoman provinces into proto-states with boundaries, governments, and institutions that largely survive to this day. This process, culminating in what historians call "the Settlement of 1922," represented the final act in the dismantling of Ottoman authority and its replacement with a European-designed state system. The Cairo Conference of March 1921, convened by Winston Churchill as Colonial Secretary, played a pivotal role in shaping this settlement. Facing nationalist rebellions in Egypt, armed resistance in Mesopotamia, and growing tensions between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, Churchill sought practical solutions that would maintain British strategic interests while drastically reducing the £35 million annual cost of military occupation. The conference brought together an extraordinary collection of British experts on the Middle East, including T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, and Sir Percy Cox, who helped craft what became known as the "Forty Thieves" settlement—a reference to both the number of participants and the perception that they were dividing spoils. Iraq emerged as a constitutional monarchy under Feisal, son of Sharif Hussein and former king of Syria (until expelled by the French). Though presented as an expression of Iraqi self-determination, Feisal's coronation in August 1921 was orchestrated by British officials who had eliminated rival candidates. The new kingdom artificially combined three former Ottoman provinces (Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul) with distinct religious and ethnic compositions. Kurdish areas in the north, promised autonomy under the Treaty of Sèvres, were incorporated into Iraq despite local resistance. British air power, rather than costly ground troops, became the primary instrument for maintaining control—an innovative approach that Churchill claimed reduced the cost of controlling Iraq from £14 million to £4 million annually. Transjordan evolved from a temporary arrangement with Abdullah, Feisal's brother, into a more permanent entity. In September 1922, the British government formally separated the territory from Palestine, creating an emirate under Abdullah's rule but still under British protection. The region, which had never existed as a distinct political unit before, was largely desert with a small population of Bedouin tribes and settled communities. British subsidies and military advisors, particularly Colonel Frederick Peake who organized the Arab Legion, helped consolidate Abdullah's initially precarious position. In Palestine west of the Jordan River, the British Mandate formally came into effect in September 1922, incorporating the Balfour Declaration's commitment to a Jewish National Home. Churchill's White Paper had attempted to reassure Arabs that this did not mean Jewish domination, but tensions continued to escalate. The appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel, a British Jew, as High Commissioner symbolized Britain's commitment to Zionism, while the selection of Amin al-Husseini as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem reflected attempts to appease Arab nationalism. The contradictions in British policy were becoming increasingly difficult to manage. The Settlement of 1922 represented the high-water mark of British imperial power in the Middle East. Within months, the fall of Lloyd George's government following the Chanak Crisis with Turkey would bring to power a more isolationist Conservative administration. Economic pressures and growing nationalist resistance would gradually erode Britain's position, though its formal influence would continue for decades. The boundaries and political structures established in this brief period, however, would endure long after the imperial power that created them had retreated.

Chapter 6: Legacy of Artificial Borders: A Century of Consequences

The borders drawn by European powers across the Middle East between 1916 and 1922 have proven remarkably durable despite their artificial nature. A century later, the map of the region still largely reflects the lines drawn by British and French diplomats in the aftermath of World War I. Yet this territorial stability has been accompanied by chronic political instability, as the states created during this period have struggled with fundamental questions of identity, legitimacy, and governance. The legacy of these artificial borders continues to shape conflicts and crises across the region today. Iraq perhaps best exemplifies the problematic legacy of European boundary-drawing. By combining the three former Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul into a single state, the British created an entity with deep internal divisions. The Kurdish north, the Sunni Arab center, and the Shi'a Arab south had different historical experiences and identities. Gertrude Bell, one of Iraq's British architects, wrote prophetically in 1920: "I don't for a moment doubt that the final authority must be in the hands of the Sunnis, in spite of their numerical inferiority; otherwise you will have a mujtahid-run, theocratic state, which is the very devil." This preference for Sunni minority rule established a pattern that would continue under the monarchy, the Ba'athist regime, and contribute to the sectarian violence that followed the 2003 American invasion. The division of the Levant between British and French spheres created equally problematic arrangements. Syria and Lebanon under French mandate were configured to maximize sectarian divisions and minimize Arab nationalism. Lebanon was deliberately designed with a narrow Christian majority that would depend on French protection, while Syria was initially divided into multiple statelets based on sectarian and regional identities. These divisions, though later modified, established patterns of sectarian politics that continue to this day. The Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011 has in many ways followed fault lines established during the French mandate period. Palestine represents perhaps the most contentious legacy of the post-Ottoman settlement. By making contradictory promises to Arabs and Jews, Britain created an intractable conflict that it ultimately could not resolve. The mandate system, which was supposed to prepare territories for self-government, provided no clear mechanism for determining how competing national claims would be reconciled. As Jewish immigration increased under British rule, tensions escalated into open conflict. Britain's eventual withdrawal in 1948 led to war and a partition different from any that had been planned, creating the State of Israel and the Palestinian refugee crisis that remains unresolved today. Even in areas where the post-Ottoman settlement appeared more successful, such as Transjordan (later Jordan), fundamental questions of identity and legitimacy persisted. The Hashemite monarchy, installed by the British, ruled over a population that became majority Palestinian after 1948. In Egypt, nominal independence granted in 1922 came with significant British reservations that maintained imperial control over defense, imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests, and Sudan. These arrangements created a legacy of incomplete sovereignty that would fuel nationalist movements for decades. The artificial state system established in the 1920s has proven resistant to change despite numerous challenges. Pan-Arab nationalism under Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s failed to overcome the state boundaries established after World War I. Similarly, Islamist movements calling for the restoration of the caliphate have not succeeded in erasing national identities that developed within these colonial-era borders. Even the violent attempt by ISIS to erase the Iraq-Syria border ultimately failed to permanently alter the map. The resilience of these boundaries, despite their artificial origins, suggests that they have acquired a legitimacy through time that their creators could not have anticipated.

Summary

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent European reshaping of the Middle East represents one of history's most consequential political transformations. Throughout this tumultuous period, we witness the fundamental tension between imperial ambition and emerging nationalism—European powers sought to replace Ottoman authority with their own while simultaneously encouraging nationalist movements they could not fully control. The contradictory promises made during wartime—to Arabs through the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, to Jews through the Balfour Declaration, to each other through the Sykes-Picot Agreement—created an impossible situation that no diplomatic ingenuity could resolve. Britain and France, victorious but financially exhausted after World War I, attempted to secure their strategic and economic interests through a complex system of mandates, protectorates, and client states that would prove unsustainable in the face of growing nationalist resistance. The legacy of this period continues to shape the modern Middle East in profound ways. The artificial borders drawn by European powers, with little regard for ethnic, religious, or historical realities, created states lacking organic cohesion yet proved surprisingly durable. Today's policymakers would do well to recognize how current conflicts in the Middle East often reflect unresolved tensions dating back to this formative period. The lesson is clear: external powers, however well-intentioned, cannot impose lasting political solutions that fail to account for indigenous identities and aspirations. Sustainable stability can only emerge from arrangements that reflect local realities rather than foreign interests. As we continue to witness upheaval across the region, we would do well to remember how the hasty decisions of a century ago continue to shape—and often limit—the possibilities for peace and development in the modern Middle East.

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David Fromkin

David Henry Fromkin was an American historian, best known for his interpretive account of the Middle East, A Peace to End All Peace (1989), in which he recounts the role European powers played between 1914 and 1922 in creating the modern Middle East. The book was a finalist for both the National Book Critics Circle Award and the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction. Fromkin wrote seven books, ending in 2007 with The King and the Cowboy: Theodore Roosevelt and Edward the Seventh, Secret Partners.

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