Beyond Good and Evil

Beyond Good and Evil Plot Summary

Introduction

Nietzsche's "Beyond Good and Evil" represents one of the most radical philosophical projects of the modern era: a comprehensive critique of traditional Western morality, epistemology, and metaphysics. Published in 1886, the work challenges the very foundations of philosophical thought, questioning not only what we know but how we know it, and interrogating the hidden psychological motivations behind our most cherished values. Nietzsche's approach is deliberately provocative, employing aphorisms, psychological insights, and genealogical analysis to dismantle what he sees as the dangerous dogmas of his time. The brilliance of "Beyond Good and Evil" lies in its methodological innovation. Rather than accepting the traditional philosophical pursuit of objective truth, Nietzsche introduces a "perspectivism" that views all knowledge claims as expressions of underlying power dynamics and psychological needs. Through this lens, he examines how moral systems, religious beliefs, and philosophical doctrines serve as masks for deeper drives and instincts. As readers follow Nietzsche's analysis, they are invited to question not only the content of their beliefs but also the will to truth itself—a questioning that Nietzsche suggests is necessary for the emergence of genuinely free spirits and new philosophers who might create values beyond the conventional categories of good and evil.

Chapter 1: The Central Thesis: Questioning Traditional Morality and Truth

At the heart of "Beyond Good and Evil" lies Nietzsche's radical thesis that traditional morality and the philosophical quest for truth are not what they seem. He begins by challenging the fundamental assumption that has driven Western philosophy since Plato: that truth is divine, objective, and worth pursuing at all costs. Nietzsche suggests that philosophers have been fundamentally dishonest with themselves, disguising their personal moral prejudices as objective truths. Their supposed love of wisdom masks a deeper psychological need—the will to power expressing itself through the creation of systems that enhance their sense of mastery over the world. Nietzsche's critique extends to the very grammar of our thought. He argues that basic philosophical concepts like "subject" and "object," "cause" and "effect," are not discovered truths but rather projections of our psychological needs onto reality. Even seemingly self-evident truths like "I think, therefore I am" contain hidden assumptions about what constitutes a "self" and what it means to "think." The philosopher writes: "It is perhaps just a matter of words, this 'I think'—perhaps behind it there is not necessarily a 'thinker' at all." Such questioning strikes at the foundation of Cartesian certainty that had underpinned modern philosophy. The will to truth itself becomes suspect in Nietzsche's analysis. He asks why humans value truth so highly and what this valuation reveals about us. "The will to truth which will still tempt us to many a venture, that famous truthfulness of which all philosophers have hitherto spoken with reverence—what questions has this will to truth not laid before us!" Nietzsche suggests that this will to truth is actually a manifestation of the ascetic ideal—a life-denying impulse that privileges an imagined "true world" over the actual world of becoming, change, and appearance. Nietzsche's most provocative claim is that morality itself is not what it claims to be. Rather than a divine command or rational principle, morality is a human creation that serves specific psychological and social functions. Different moral systems reflect different types of human beings and their particular needs. The "slave morality" of Christianity, for instance, reflects the resentment of the weak against the strong, inverting natural values by making weakness, suffering, and self-denial into virtues. What we call "good" and "evil" are not objective categories but expressions of particular perspectives and forms of life. The central thesis culminates in Nietzsche's call to move "beyond good and evil"—not to abandon all valuation, but to recognize the human origins of our values and take responsibility for creating new ones. This requires the courage to question what has previously been unquestionable and to experiment with new possibilities of existence. "What is done out of love," Nietzsche famously writes, "always takes place beyond good and evil"—suggesting that a more authentic form of valuation lies beyond conventional moral categories.

Chapter 2: The Will to Truth, Power, and the Critique of Philosophers

Nietzsche launches a scathing critique of philosophers throughout history, claiming they have been fundamentally dishonest about their own motivations. Rather than disinterested seekers of truth, philosophers have been "advocates" who "defend with arguments their prejudices, which they call 'truths.'" Their systems, despite claims to objectivity, are expressions of personal temperament and psychological needs. Nietzsche writes, "Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy has been: a confession of its originator, a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir." The will to truth, which philosophers have venerated, is revealed by Nietzsche to be a manifestation of the will to power—the fundamental drive that he sees as animating all life. "Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, severity, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, exploitation." Even the quest for knowledge is an expression of this will to power, a desire to master reality by imposing conceptual order upon it. This insight undermines the traditional philosophical distinction between knowledge and power, suggesting that knowledge-seeking is itself a form of power-seeking. Nietzsche singles out Kant for particular criticism, arguing that his "categorical imperative" is merely a disguised form of the old theological morality. The Kantian notion of duty for duty's sake is, for Nietzsche, a secularized version of divine command ethics. Similarly, he critiques utilitarians for their naïve belief that pleasure and pain are the fundamental motivating factors in human life, when in fact the will to power drives humans to seek challenges and overcome resistance, often at the expense of pleasure and comfort. The dogmatism of previous philosophers is contrasted with Nietzsche's vision of the "free spirit" and the "philosopher of the future." These new philosophers will recognize the perspectival nature of knowledge—that there are no facts, only interpretations shaped by particular vantage points. They will embrace the experimental method, treating ideas as hypotheses to be tested rather than eternal truths. Most importantly, they will have the courage to create values rather than merely discovering them, recognizing that "whatever has value in our world now does not have value in itself, but has been given value at some time." Nietzsche's critique culminates in his call for a "philosophy of the dangerous perhaps"—a recognition that certainty may be neither possible nor desirable. The philosophers of the future will be "attempters" (Versucher) who experiment with new possibilities of thought and life. Their strength will lie not in their certainties but in their capacity to question, to endure doubt, and to create meaning in a world without transcendent guarantees.

Chapter 3: On the Construction of Morality: Genealogy and Psychology

In his examination of morality, Nietzsche employs a revolutionary approach that combines psychological analysis with historical investigation—what he would later call "genealogy." Rather than asking whether moral claims are true or false, he asks: How did these moral systems arise? What psychological needs do they serve? What type of human being do they produce? This approach represents a fundamental shift from evaluating morality by its truth-value to understanding it as a symptom of underlying psychological and social conditions. Nietzsche identifies two fundamental types of morality that have emerged throughout human history: "master morality" and "slave morality." Master morality originates among the strong, noble, and powerful, who designate as "good" that which expresses their own qualities—strength, courage, pride, and power. Its primary opposition is not between "good" and "evil" but between "good" and "bad," where "bad" simply means inferior or contemptible. By contrast, slave morality emerges among the weak and oppressed, who, unable to express their will to power directly, develop a reactive value system that condemns the qualities of their masters as "evil" and elevates their own characteristics—humility, pity, patience, meekness—as "good." Christianity, in Nietzsche's analysis, represents the historical triumph of slave morality over master morality—"the slave revolt in morality." This revolt began with the Jews, who "performed the miracle of the inversion of values" by transforming the aristocratic equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = blessed) into its opposite. Christianity universalized this inversion, making weakness, suffering, and self-denial into virtues. "What is good? Everything that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? Everything that proceeds from weakness." Modern democratic movements, utilitarianism, and socialism are, for Nietzsche, secularized versions of Christian slave morality. The democratic emphasis on equality, universal rights, and the alleviation of suffering continues the life-denying tendencies of Christianity in a new form. "When the anarchist, as the mouthpiece of the declining strata of society, demands with a fine indignation 'right,' 'justice,' and 'equal rights,' he is merely under the pressure of his lack of culture, which cannot comprehend why he suffers." Nietzsche's psychological analysis reveals how morality often serves as a mask for less noble impulses. The ascetic priest's apparent self-denial conceals a will to power that expresses itself through spiritual domination. The demand for universal compassion may disguise a desire to escape one's own suffering by losing oneself in that of others. Even the scientific drive for objective truth represents a sublimated form of the ascetic ideal—a denial of perspective and embodiment in favor of a disinterested "view from nowhere." The genealogical method ultimately reveals morality not as a set of eternal truths but as a historical and psychological phenomenon—a tool that humans have created to serve various needs and purposes. This insight opens the possibility for a "revaluation of all values," where humans might consciously create new values that affirm rather than deny life.

Chapter 4: Perspectivism and the Critique of Objective Knowledge

Nietzsche's epistemological revolution centers on his concept of "perspectivism," which challenges the traditional philosophical quest for objective, absolute knowledge. "There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective 'knowing,'" he declares, undermining the foundational assumption that truth exists independently of the knower. This does not mean that all perspectives are equally valid or that there is no truth whatsoever—rather, it suggests that knowledge is always situated, embodied, and partial, shaped by the particular position and interests of the knower. The philosopher attacks the "will to truth" that has dominated Western thought, suggesting it represents a naïve faith in the value of truth regardless of its consequences for life. "The falseness of a judgment is not for us necessarily an objection to a judgment... The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating." This radical pragmatism evaluates ideas not by their correspondence to some external reality but by their effects on human flourishing and power. Nietzsche's critique extends to science itself, which he views not as the antithesis of religious faith but as its latest manifestation. Modern scientific objectivity, with its ideal of disinterested observation, represents for Nietzsche another form of the ascetic ideal—a denial of perspective and embodiment in favor of a "God's eye view" that no human can actually achieve. "There is no such thing as science 'without presuppositions,'" he insists, pointing out how even the most seemingly objective scientific methods rest on unproven metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality, causality, and knowledge. The doctrine of perspectivism has profound implications for how we understand truth. Rather than a single, absolute truth waiting to be discovered, Nietzsche suggests a multiplicity of interpretations, each reflecting a particular configuration of the will to power. "Facts are precisely what there is not, only interpretations." This does not mean that all interpretations are equally valid—some interpretations may be more comprehensive, more nuanced, or more life-affirming than others. The strength of a perspective might be measured by how many different viewpoints it can incorporate without losing its coherence. For Nietzsche, the ideal is not to transcend perspective altogether (which he considers impossible) but to cultivate a capacity for multiple perspectives—what he calls "the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them." The philosopher of the future will be able to adopt different perspectives as experiments, testing their consequences for life and power. This represents not relativism but a more sophisticated form of knowledge that acknowledges its own conditions and limitations while still making meaningful distinctions between better and worse interpretations.

Chapter 5: Beyond Herd Morality: The Free Spirit and New Philosophers

Nietzsche envisions a new type of human being who can transcend conventional morality and create new values—the "free spirit" who serves as a precursor to the "philosophers of the future." These exceptional individuals stand in stark contrast to the "herd animal" produced by democratic societies and Christian morality. While the herd seeks comfort, security, and conformity, the free spirit embraces danger, solitude, and experimentation. "The secret for harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment is—to live dangerously!" The free spirit is characterized by intellectual independence and the courage to question even the most sacred beliefs. "The free spirit, the enemy of fetters, of those who worship and those who adore, the dweller in forests, the friend of solitude, the fleer from the crowd." This independence comes at a high price—loneliness, misunderstanding, and the psychological burden of living without the comforts of certainty. The free spirit must endure what Nietzsche calls "the great separation," a breaking away from former ideals and communities that can feel like a painful exile. Nietzsche distinguishes his conception of the free spirit from the shallow "free-thinking" of his contemporaries. While democratic free-thinkers champion equality, universal rights, and the alleviation of suffering, Nietzsche's free spirits recognize the necessity of hierarchy, distance, and even suffering for the cultivation of greatness. They understand that "the discipline of suffering, of great suffering" has been responsible for all the elevations of humanity. The democratic free-thinker seeks freedom FROM things (constraints, traditions, authorities), while the Nietzschean free spirit seeks freedom FOR something—the creation of new values. The philosophers of the future, who represent the culmination of the free spirit's development, will be "commanders and legislators" rather than mere scholars or critics. "The actual philosophers are commanders and law-givers: they say 'thus it shall be!'" Their task is not to discover pre-existing truths but to create new values through an act of will. This creative role requires not only intellectual independence but also a strong will, psychological complexity, and the capacity to endure solitude. They must be "tempters" (Versucher) who experiment with new possibilities of thought and life. Crucially, these new philosophers will move "beyond good and evil" in the sense that they will recognize the human, all-too-human origins of moral values and take responsibility for creating their own. This does not mean a descent into nihilism or moral relativism, but rather a more honest and life-affirming approach to valuation that acknowledges its own creative nature. The new philosophers will have "the conscience for the overall development of man," seeing beyond the immediate concerns of their time to the possibilities of human enhancement. Nietzsche's vision culminates in the figure of the "Übermensch" (overman or superman), only hinted at in "Beyond Good and Evil" but developed more fully in "Thus Spoke Zarathustra." This is not a biological type but a cultural possibility—a human being who has overcome resentment, embraced becoming, and learned to create values that affirm rather than deny life. The Übermensch represents the ultimate fulfillment of the free spirit's potential and the highest expression of the will to power as a creative rather than merely destructive force.

Chapter 6: Religion, Asceticism, and the Revaluation of Values

Nietzsche's analysis of religion, particularly Christianity, forms a central component of his philosophical project. Rather than attacking religion on the grounds of its falsity (as did many Enlightenment thinkers), Nietzsche examines it as a psychological and cultural phenomenon that reveals profound truths about human nature. "Christianity is Platonism for 'the people,'" he declares, suggesting that both share a fundamental devaluation of this world in favor of an imagined "true world" beyond. The religious impulse, according to Nietzsche, stems from the human need to find meaning in suffering. Religious interpretations transform meaningless suffering into meaningful suffering by providing a framework that makes sense of pain—whether as divine punishment, a test of faith, or a path to salvation. The ascetic priest, as the architect of religious meaning-making, offers the suffering masses a explanation for their pain that simultaneously alleviates it and keeps them alive: "You alone are to blame for yourself!" By directing resentment inward rather than outward, the priest prevents the destructive explosion of the "herd" while maintaining his own power over them. Nietzsche identifies asceticism—the denial of bodily desires and worldly pleasures—as a central feature of not only religious but also philosophical and scientific practices. The ascetic ideal represents a paradox: it is a form of the will to power that turns against life itself, expressing "a will to nothingness." Yet this self-negating will is still a will—better to will nothingness than not to will at all. The ascetic ideal has dominated Western culture because it offered the only available answer to the problem of human suffering: suffering must have meaning. The "death of God"—Nietzsche's dramatic announcement of the collapse of religious belief in modern Europe—creates both a crisis and an opportunity. The crisis is nihilism: if God is dead, all values based on divine authority are undermined, leaving humans without a foundation for meaning or morality. "When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet." The opportunity lies in the possibility of a "revaluation of all values"—the creation of new, life-affirming values that do not depend on supernatural authority. Nietzsche's critique extends beyond Christianity to encompass other religious traditions, though with important distinctions. He expresses admiration for certain aspects of Judaism, Hinduism, and Islam, particularly their affirmation of life and power. His harshest criticism is reserved for Buddhism and Christianity, which he sees as nihilistic religions that devalue this world in favor of nothingness (nirvana) or an afterlife. Yet even these religions express the will to power in their own way—as the power of the weak over the strong through the inversion of natural values. The revaluation of values that Nietzsche envisions is not simply a reversal of Christian morality—replacing humility with pride, compassion with cruelty, or equality with hierarchy. Rather, it requires a more fundamental questioning of the very basis of valuation itself. The new philosophers must ask not only "what is good?" but "what is the value of values?" This questioning opens the possibility for values that affirm rather than deny life, that embrace becoming rather than seeking being, and that express the creative rather than merely reactive possibilities of the will to power.

Chapter 7: The Psychology of the Self: Instincts, Will, and the Illusion of Autonomy

Nietzsche's psychological insights represent some of his most radical and influential contributions to philosophy. He challenges the Cartesian notion of a unified, transparent self, suggesting instead that what we call the "self" or "I" is a complex multiplicity of drives, instincts, and affects. "The 'subject' is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected behind what there is." This view anticipates later developments in psychoanalysis and cognitive science, which similarly question the unity and self-transparency of consciousness. The will, traditionally conceived as the faculty of free choice, undergoes a profound reinterpretation in Nietzsche's work. He rejects both the libertarian notion of free will and the deterministic concept of "unfree will" as equally misleading metaphysical fictions. "The desire for 'freedom of will' in the superlative metaphysical sense... the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui [cause of oneself]." In place of these concepts, Nietzsche offers his notion of the will to power—not a faculty of choice but the fundamental drive of all life toward growth, expansion, and overcoming resistance. Consciousness itself is revealed as a surface phenomenon, a late development in human evolution that vastly overestimates its own importance. "Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and unstrong." Most of what we attribute to conscious decision-making actually occurs at the level of unconscious instincts and drives. "Your body and its great intelligence does not say 'I' but performs 'I'." The conscious self is not the cause of our actions but rather their effect—a retrospective rationalization of decisions already made at deeper levels. Nietzsche develops a sophisticated understanding of how social forces shape individual psychology. The internalization of social norms creates what he calls "bad conscience"—the turning of aggressive instincts inward against oneself when they cannot be expressed outwardly. "All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward—this is what I call the internalization of man." This process creates the psychological depth that characterizes modern humans but also produces unprecedented suffering as humans become "the sick animal." The illusion of autonomy—the belief that we are self-determining agents who freely choose our actions—is exposed by Nietzsche as a social and linguistic construction. Grammar itself, with its subject-predicate structure, reinforces the fiction of a doer behind every deed. "There is no 'being' behind doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything." Our belief in ourselves as autonomous agents stems from the "seduction of language" and the social need to assign responsibility and blame. Despite this critique of traditional concepts of selfhood and autonomy, Nietzsche does not advocate resignation to determinism. Instead, he envisions the possibility of a new kind of self-creation through what he calls "giving style to one's character"—a process of integrating the chaotic multiplicity of drives into a coherent whole through artistic discipline. This is not freedom in the metaphysical sense but a psychological achievement of self-mastery and self-overcoming. The highest human type for Nietzsche is not the autonomous individual of liberal thought but the "sovereign individual" who has earned the right to make promises because he has become "calculable, regular, necessary."

Chapter 8: Nietzsche's Vision: The Future of Philosophy and Humanity

Nietzsche concludes "Beyond Good and Evil" with a visionary account of what philosophy might become and the new type of humanity it could help create. Traditional philosophy, he argues, has been constrained by moral prejudices, metaphysical assumptions, and a naïve faith in reason. The philosophy of the future must overcome these limitations to become a more honest, life-affirming, and creative enterprise. "Every great philosophy has been the confession of its maker, a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir." Future philosophers must acknowledge this personal dimension rather than hiding behind claims to objectivity. The task of these new philosophers will be threefold: diagnostic, critical, and creative. First, they must diagnose the sickness of modern European culture—its nihilism, decadence, and life-denying values. Second, they must engage in a ruthless critique of existing values, exposing their origins in psychological needs rather than eternal truths. Finally, and most importantly, they must create new values that affirm rather than deny life. "Genuine philosophers are commanders and legislators: they say, 'thus it shall be!'" This creative role distinguishes them from mere scholars or critics who analyze existing ideas without generating new ones. Nietzsche envisions a cultural transformation that would overcome the democratic, egalitarian tendencies of his age. Modern Europe, he believes, is producing a mediocre "last man" who seeks only comfort, security, and the absence of suffering. "One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion." Against this leveling tendency, Nietzsche proposes a new aristocracy of spirit—not based on birth or wealth but on the capacity for self-overcoming and cultural creation. This aristocracy would serve as a counterforce to democratic mediocrity and create the conditions for human greatness. The cultivation of greatness requires what Nietzsche calls "the pathos of distance"—a recognition and affirmation of differences in rank, ability, and worth among human beings. This stands in stark contrast to the democratic faith in equality, which Nietzsche sees as a disguised form of resentment against excellence. The future he envisions is not one of universal happiness but of cultural splendor and the production of exceptional individuals who justify humanity's existence. "The greatness of man is that he is a bridge and not a goal." Central to Nietzsche's vision is the concept of self-overcoming—the idea that humans must constantly transcend themselves to realize their potential. This process is neither easy nor painless; it requires discipline, suffering, and the courage to destroy old values in order to create new ones. "I love him who lives to know, and who wants to know so that the overman may live someday. And thus he wants to go under." The image of humanity as a bridge rather than a destination emphasizes the transitional nature of human existence—we are not the culmination of evolution but a stage in an ongoing process. Nietzsche concludes with a call for "good Europeans" who can transcend nationalism and parochialism to create a higher European culture. Despite his reputation as a critic, his final vision is ultimately affirmative—a "Dionysian" yes-saying to life in all its terrible beauty and endless becoming. The philosopher of the future will embody this affirmation, embracing the eternal recurrence of all things and transforming the heaviest burden into the greatest blessing. "For the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred 'Yes' is needed: the spirit now wills its own will."

Summary

"Beyond Good and Evil" represents Nietzsche's most comprehensive critique of traditional Western philosophy and morality, as well as his most developed vision of what might replace them. Through his penetrating psychological analysis, Nietzsche exposes how our most cherished values and beliefs—our faith in truth, our moral certainties, our sense of ourselves as autonomous agents—are not what they appear to be. Rather than objective truths, they are interpretations that reflect particular configurations of the will to power, serving specific psychological and social functions. This unmasking is not merely destructive but preparatory for Nietzsche's constructive project: the creation of new values that would affirm rather than deny life. The enduring significance of Nietzsche's work lies not only in its critical power but in its methodological innovations. His genealogical approach to morality, his psychological insights into the unconscious motivations behind conscious thought, and his perspectival theory of knowledge have profoundly influenced subsequent philosophy, psychology, and cultural theory. While many of his specific cultural and political views remain controversial, his fundamental insight—that humans create rather than discover values—has become an inescapable challenge for contemporary thought. In a world increasingly characterized by value pluralism and the absence of shared metaphysical foundations, Nietzsche's vision of human beings as value-creators rather than value-discoverers offers a potential response to the threat of nihilism. His philosophy invites us not to despair at the groundlessness of our values but to embrace the creative responsibility this entails, making "Beyond Good and Evil" not merely a work of its time but a resource for navigating our own.

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Friedrich Nietzsche

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was a German classical scholar, philosopher, and critic of culture, who became one of the most influential of all modern thinkers. He began his career as a classical philologist before turning to philosophy. He became the youngest person to hold the Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel in 1869 at the age of 24, but resigned in 1879 due to health problems that plagued him most of his life; he completed much of his core writing in the following decade. In 1889, at age 44, he suffered a collapse and afterward a complete loss of his mental faculties, with paralysis and probably vascular dementia. He lived his remaining years in the care of his mother until her death in 1897 and then with his sister Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche. Nietzsche died in 1900, after experiencing pneumonia and multiple strokes.Nietzsche's work spans philosophical polemics, poetry, cultural criticism, and fiction while displaying a fondness for aphorism and irony. Prominent elements of his philosophy include his radical critique of truth in favour of perspectivism; a genealogical critique of religion and Christian morality and a related theory of master–slave morality; the aesthetic affirmation of life in response to both the "death of God" and the profound crisis of nihilism; the notion of Apollonian and Dionysian forces; and a characterisation of the human subject as the expression of competing wills, collectively understood as the will to power. He also developed influential concepts such as the Übermensch and his doctrine of eternal return. In his later work, he became increasingly preoccupied with the creative powers of the individual to overcome cultural and moral mores in pursuit of new values and aesthetic health. His body of work touched a wide range of topics, including art, philology, history, music, religion, tragedy, culture, and science, and drew inspiration from Greek tragedy as well as figures such as Zoroaster, Arthur Schopenhauer, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Wagner, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.After his death, Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth became the curator and editor of his manuscripts. She edited his unpublished writings to fit her German ultranationalist ideology, often contradicting or obfuscating Nietzsche's stated opinions, which were explicitly opposed to antisemitism and nationalism. Through her published editions, Nietzsche's work became associated with fascism and Nazism. 20th-century scholars such as Walter Kaufmann, R.J. Hollingdale, and Georges Bataille defended Nietzsche against this interpretation, and corrected editions of his writings were soon made available. Nietzsche's thought enjoyed renewed popularity in the 1960s and his ideas have since had a profound impact on 20th- and early 21st-century thinkers across philosophy—especially in schools of continental philosophy such as existentialism, postmodernism, and post-structuralism—as well as art, literature, music, poetry, politics, and popular culture.

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