Black Edge

Black Edge Plot Summary

Introduction

In the high-stakes world of Wall Street, information has always been the most valuable currency. But during the early 2000s, the hedge fund industry transformed this pursuit of knowledge into something far more aggressive and potentially sinister. This is the story of how the relentless quest for what traders called "edge" – information advantages over other market participants – created unprecedented fortunes while pushing the boundaries of legality and ethics to their breaking point. At its center stands Steven Cohen, a trading savant whose hedge fund SAC Capital achieved returns that seemed almost supernatural to outside observers. His rise from a middle-class background to becoming one of the wealthiest men in America exemplifies both the meritocratic promise and the moral hazards of modern finance. Through this narrative, readers will understand how the hedge fund revolution reshaped Wall Street's power dynamics, the blurry line between aggressive research and illegal insider trading, and the challenges regulators face when policing the most sophisticated financial actors. This exploration offers valuable insights for anyone interested in financial markets, business ethics, or the complex interplay between wealth, power, and accountability in American capitalism.

Chapter 1: The Rise of Steven Cohen: From Trader to Hedge Fund Titan (1990s)

The story of Steven Cohen's ascent begins in the early 1990s, a period when Wall Street was recovering from the 1987 crash and traditional investment banks still dominated the financial landscape. Cohen, unlike the polished Ivy League graduates who typically rose to prominence in finance, came from a middle-class family in Great Neck, Long Island. His father ran a dress manufacturing business, and young Steven developed his competitive edge through high school poker games rather than elite connections. This outsider status would shape both his approach to trading and the culture he later created at his firm. After fourteen years at the small brokerage firm Gruntal & Co., Cohen had developed a reputation as an exceptional trader with an almost supernatural ability to predict short-term market movements. In 1992, at age 36, he decided to strike out on his own, founding SAC Capital with approximately $23 million in capital and just nine employees. What distinguished Cohen from other traders was his remarkable tolerance for risk and his ability to act decisively without emotional interference. He described his approach as "taking intelligent risks" and believed that a small percentage of his trades accounted for most of his profits. This philosophy became the cornerstone of his trading strategy. The mid-1990s saw SAC grow rapidly as Cohen refined his distinctive trading style. Unlike traditional money managers who might hold positions for months or years based on fundamental research, Cohen embraced a high-frequency approach, sometimes holding stocks for just hours before selling. He absorbed vast amounts of market information, watched price movements obsessively, and made rapid-fire decisions to buy or sell tens of thousands of shares. This method required extraordinary focus and discipline – Cohen implemented strict rules about cutting losses rather than allowing hope or ego to influence decisions. By 1995, SAC had nearly quadrupled in size to $100 million, and Cohen's returns consistently outperformed the broader market. Cohen's management style was as distinctive as his trading approach. He structured SAC like a bicycle wheel, with himself at the hub and portfolio managers as the spokes, each managing their own teams focused on different sectors. These teams competed against one another to generate profitable trading ideas, creating an intensely competitive internal culture. The best ideas were passed to Cohen, who would then trade on them using the firm's capital. Those who succeeded were rewarded with compensation packages that dwarfed what traditional Wall Street firms offered, while those who failed were quickly dismissed. This Darwinian environment attracted aggressive, results-oriented traders who thrived under pressure. By the late 1990s, Cohen had become a significant force in the stock market, though he remained largely unknown to the general public. His growing success attracted attention from larger Wall Street firms, who initially viewed hedge funds with suspicion but gradually recognized their growing importance. Cohen hired well-connected salespeople to build relationships with major banks and gain access to their best research analysts and investment opportunities. As the decade closed, SAC was positioned to take advantage of the coming hedge fund boom that would reshape Wall Street's power dynamics and create unprecedented fortunes for a new financial elite – with Cohen leading the charge.

Chapter 2: Building the Information Machine: SAC's Ruthless Culture (1998-2006)

Between 1998 and 2006, SAC Capital evolved from a successful but relatively small hedge fund into a dominant force on Wall Street. The firm crossed the crucial $1 billion threshold in assets under management, a milestone that granted it significant market influence. Cohen's operation had become so powerful that major investment banks competed fiercely for its business, with SAC generating more trading commissions than any other client for many Wall Street firms despite managing far less money than traditional asset managers. This period marked the emergence of hedge funds as the new power center of the financial world, with SAC at the forefront of this transformation. The internal culture at SAC reflected Cohen's personality: intensely competitive, results-oriented, and unforgiving of failure. The trading floor was designed with Cohen at the center, surrounded by monitors displaying market data and news. His most valued portfolio managers sat nearby in an area nicknamed "murderers' row" after the legendary New York Yankees lineup. The environment was deliberately designed to foster competition rather than collaboration, with portfolio managers pitted against each other to generate the best trading ideas. Those who succeeded were rewarded lavishly – some earned tens of millions annually – while those who failed were swiftly terminated. This created enormous pressure to perform consistently, quarter after quarter. As SAC grew larger, Cohen recognized that his day-trading style had limitations. He began transforming the firm into a research-driven organization, hiring traders with deep expertise in specific industries and pushing his employees to develop what he called "fundamental edge" – specialized knowledge that competitors couldn't easily replicate. The firm invested heavily in building information networks, becoming one of the largest clients of expert network firms like Gerson Lehrman Group, which connected investors with employees at public companies for high-priced consultations. SAC spent millions annually on these services, seeking any legal advantage it could find in an increasingly competitive market. Cohen's personal wealth grew exponentially during this period, enabling an increasingly extravagant lifestyle that symbolized the new hedge fund elite. He purchased a 36,000-square-foot mansion in Greenwich, Connecticut, complete with an indoor basketball court, swimming pool, ice-skating rink, and personal golf course. His growing art collection, which would eventually be valued at over $1 billion, included high-profile works like Damien Hirst's shark suspended in formaldehyde. When negotiating to purchase a $14.8 million house, Cohen reportedly told his competitor in the bidding: "You're not going to buy it. I am. Because I have more money than you." This ostentatious display of wealth reflected the enormous profits being generated by SAC and the hedge fund industry as a whole. By 2006, SAC had developed a reputation for being "always on the right side" of major market moves, generating both envy and suspicion among competitors. The firm's consistent outperformance seemed almost supernatural to outside observers. As one trader remarked about Cohen: "No one in the industry understood how he made so much money so consistently; his competitors were envious—and suspicious." This combination of extraordinary success and mysterious methods would eventually attract unwanted attention from regulators and investigators who questioned whether such consistent outperformance was possible through legitimate means alone. The seeds of SAC's eventual downfall were being sown even as the firm reached the height of its power and influence.

Chapter 3: The Pursuit of Edge: When Research Crossed Legal Lines (2006-2008)

By 2006, the hedge fund industry had transformed from a niche corner of finance into the dominant force on Wall Street, with SAC Capital at its pinnacle. This shift created a new dynamic in the financial markets, where the pursuit of "edge" – information that could provide even a slight advantage over other investors – became the central focus of hedge fund operations. The pressure to maintain SAC's extraordinary returns intensified as the financial markets became increasingly efficient and competitive. This environment created powerful incentives for traders to push the boundaries of what constituted legitimate research. At SAC, the quest for edge was institutionalized through sophisticated systems designed to extract maximum value from information while protecting the firm's leadership. Portfolio managers were required to rate their investment ideas on a scale of 1 to 10 based on their "conviction" level before presenting them to Cohen. A rating of 10 indicated absolute certainty – a level that seemed impossible to achieve through conventional research methods. This system allowed Cohen to benefit from potentially questionable information without being directly exposed to its sources. As one former SAC employee explained, the conviction rating was "like a moat around the company's most valuable asset" – Cohen himself. The firm's approach to information gathering became increasingly aggressive during this period. Jason Karp, a senior portfolio manager at SAC, developed a system for categorizing information that revealed the firm's approach. He described "white edge" as publicly available information of limited value, "gray edge" as information in a legally ambiguous zone that might require consultation with compliance, and "black edge" as clearly illegal information that should be restricted. In practice, however, the pursuit of edge often pushed traders into increasingly questionable territory as they competed to deliver profitable ideas to Cohen. When portfolio manager Jon Horvath lost money on a trade, his boss Michael Steinberg allegedly berated him: "What I need you to do is go out and get me edgy, proprietary information that we can use to make money in these stocks." The case of Mathew Martoma, a portfolio manager hired by SAC in 2006 to focus on healthcare stocks, exemplifies how this culture could lead to illegal behavior. Martoma developed a relationship with Dr. Sidney Gilman, a prominent neurologist involved in clinical trials for an Alzheimer's drug being developed by pharmaceutical companies Elan and Wyeth. Through an "expert network" firm, Martoma arranged numerous paid consultations with Gilman, gradually pushing the doctor to reveal confidential information about the drug trial. Their relationship grew so close that Gilman later said Martoma reminded him of his deceased son. This connection would eventually lead to one of the most profitable – and problematic – trades in SAC's history. As the financial crisis intensified in 2008, the stakes grew even higher. The market's extreme volatility made legitimate trading strategies less reliable, increasing the temptation to seek out black edge. In July 2008, SAC made an extraordinary move – after accumulating nearly $700 million in Elan and Wyeth stock, the firm suddenly reversed course, selling its entire position and even taking a substantial short position against both companies. Days later, when disappointing trial results were announced publicly, Elan's stock plunged 42% and Wyeth dropped 12%. SAC had avoided losses and generated profits totaling approximately $275 million. This dramatic reversal would later attract intense scrutiny from regulators, who suspected that inside information had driven the decision. The pursuit of edge had pushed SAC into territory that would ultimately threaten its very existence.

Chapter 4: Operation Perfect Hedge: The Government's Investigation Begins (2008-2010)

In late 2008, as financial markets were in freefall following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a different kind of drama was unfolding behind the scenes. FBI Special Agent B.J. Kang, working in the securities fraud unit in New York, had grown frustrated with pursuing small-time penny stock scams while major hedge funds operated with minimal scrutiny. His supervisor encouraged him to think bigger: "If you follow the money, hedge funds are where it leads." This simple directive would launch what became known as "Operation Perfect Hedge" – the most extensive insider trading investigation in American history, with SAC Capital as its ultimate target. The investigation gained momentum through an unlikely source – civil lawsuits filed against SAC Capital by companies that believed they were victims of market manipulation. Michael Bowe, a lawyer representing these companies, had spent years investigating SAC and shared his findings with the FBI. During a four-hour meeting with Kang, Bowe outlined how hedge funds had transformed Wall Street, creating new opportunities for corruption that regulators weren't equipped to detect. "This is like gambling at Rick's," Bowe told Kang, referencing Casablanca. "If you start picking up rocks and looking under them, particularly with respect to SAC, you're going to find it." This private attorney had essentially handed the FBI a roadmap for what would become a years-long investigation. By 2009, the FBI had secured an unprecedented tool in its arsenal – wiretap authorization for Raj Rajaratnam, the billionaire founder of Galleon Group hedge fund. This marked the first time wiretaps, traditionally used against organized crime, were deployed in a securities fraud case. Kang and his colleagues were stunned by what they heard. Rajaratnam and his network of traders, analysts, and corporate insiders openly discussed nonpublic information about upcoming earnings announcements and merger deals. Each time they discovered one insider trading circle, it overlapped with another, revealing an extensive network of corruption that spanned multiple hedge funds and investment banks. The investigation expanded when the FBI "flipped" key witnesses who agreed to cooperate in exchange for leniency. In April 2009, Kang approached Ali Far and Richard Choo-Beng Lee, former employees of Galleon and SAC who had started their own hedge fund. By playing recordings of their incriminating conversations, Kang convinced them to become informants. Lee provided crucial insights into SAC's operations, describing it as a place where getting inside information was an implicit job requirement. "I was expected to call companies and get the numbers," Lee told Kang, adding that he thought SAC was "dirty." These insider accounts gave investigators their first real glimpse into how SAC's information machine actually operated. By October 2009, the government had gathered enough evidence to arrest Rajaratnam, leading to a wave of panic across Wall Street. The arrest made headlines nationwide, with prosecutors describing a vast network of insider trading that had corrupted the financial markets. When The Wall Street Journal published an article in November 2010 revealing the scope of the government's investigation, it triggered a frantic response among hedge fund traders. Donald Longueuil, a former SAC portfolio manager, was so alarmed that he physically destroyed his hard drives and scattered the pieces in garbage trucks across Manhattan – an act of obstruction that would later result in criminal charges. As the investigation progressed, the government faced a critical decision: focus narrowly on Rajaratnam or expand to target the entire hedge fund industry, including its biggest player, SAC Capital. The stakes were enormous. Pursuing Cohen would mean challenging one of the most powerful figures on Wall Street, someone with virtually unlimited resources to fight back. The government's strategy evolved into a methodical process described by one prosecutor as "working up the ladder" – building cases against individual traders while gathering evidence that might lead to Cohen himself. This approach would eventually ensnare dozens of hedge fund professionals, corporate executives, and expert network consultants in what became the largest crackdown on insider trading in financial history.

Chapter 5: The Martoma Case: The Trade That Exposed SAC (2010-2012)

In July 2008, as the global financial crisis intensified, SAC Capital executed one of the most profitable trades in its history – a transaction that would eventually become the centerpiece of the government's case against the hedge fund. After accumulating nearly $700 million in pharmaceutical companies Elan and Wyeth, SAC abruptly reversed course, selling its entire stake and establishing a substantial short position just days before disappointing clinical trial results for an Alzheimer's drug called bapineuzumab were announced. By selling before the news became public and then betting against the stocks, SAC avoided losses and generated profits totaling approximately $275 million. This extraordinary timing raised red flags with regulators, who began a painstaking investigation to determine how SAC had anticipated the negative announcement. The SEC's investigation gained momentum in late 2009 when analyst Charles Riely discovered a referral about suspicious trading in Elan and Wyeth that had been sitting unexamined for nearly a year. Through meticulous analysis of phone records, trading data, and expert network payments, Riely and his colleagues gradually pieced together the connection between Mathew Martoma, a portfolio manager at SAC's CR Intrinsic unit, and Dr. Sidney Gilman, the neurologist who chaired the safety monitoring committee for the bapineuzumab trial. The evidence showed that Martoma had paid Gilman approximately $1,000 per hour for consultations through expert network firm GLG, building a relationship over many months that culminated in a critical meeting in Michigan just before SAC's massive trading reversal. The investigation reached a turning point in August 2011 when FBI Agent B.J. Kang confronted Dr. Gilman at the University of Michigan Medical Center. Though Gilman initially denied wrongdoing, Kang's pressure tactics eventually worked. "Dr. Gilman, you are only a grain of sand," Kang told him. "So is Martoma. The person we're really after is Steven Cohen." Faced with potential criminal charges, the 77-year-old doctor agreed to cooperate, providing crucial testimony about how Martoma had gradually pushed him to reveal confidential information about the drug trial. Gilman admitted that during their meeting on July 19, 2008, he had shown Martoma the complete results of the drug trial, which revealed significant problems with the medication's effectiveness. The final piece fell into place when investigators discovered a 20-minute phone call between Martoma and Cohen on Sunday, July 20, 2008 – the morning after Martoma's meeting with Gilman and just before SAC began liquidating its positions in Elan and Wyeth. Phone records showed that immediately after this conversation, Cohen instructed his head trader to begin selling with specific instructions to keep the trading "low visibility" so no one would notice. This timing created a compelling narrative: Martoma had obtained inside information from Gilman, shared it with Cohen, and together they executed a trade that generated enormous profits while other investors suffered significant losses when the negative trial results became public. On November 20, 2012, FBI agents arrested Martoma at his Florida home, charging him with what prosecutors called "the most lucrative insider trading scheme ever charged." Unlike dozens of others caught in the investigation, Martoma refused to cooperate against Cohen, maintaining his silence even as his own legal situation grew increasingly desperate. This loyalty – or fear – created a firewall that protected Cohen from criminal charges, despite the circumstantial evidence linking him to the trade. The government's inability to flip Martoma highlighted a fundamental challenge in prosecuting financial crimes: the difficulty of proving criminal intent when sophisticated players deliberately create layers of deniability between themselves and questionable information. The Martoma case represented the government's best opportunity to reach their ultimate target – Steven Cohen himself. While they had successfully built cases against numerous SAC employees, prosecutors needed someone who could directly implicate Cohen in knowing about the source of the information that drove the firm's most profitable trade. Without Martoma's cooperation, they would be forced to pursue alternative strategies to hold Cohen accountable for the culture of insider trading that had flourished under his leadership.

Chapter 6: The Fall of an Empire: SAC's Guilty Plea and Aftermath (2013-2014)

By early 2013, the government's investigation had reached a critical juncture. Despite numerous convictions of SAC employees, prosecutors had been unable to gather sufficient evidence to charge Steven Cohen personally with insider trading. Faced with this challenge, they made a bold decision – if they couldn't get the man, they would take down his company. In July 2013, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Manhattan indicted SAC Capital itself on four counts of securities fraud and one count of wire fraud, describing it as a "magnet for market cheaters" with an "institutional indifference" to illegal conduct. The indictment painted a devastating picture of SAC's culture, where the pursuit of "edge" consistently crossed legal boundaries and compliance systems were designed to protect Cohen rather than prevent misconduct. The criminal charges against SAC triggered an exodus of investor capital. Major institutions like Blackstone Group, which had long stood by Cohen despite the swirling allegations, finally submitted redemption notices. The firm's reputation was in tatters, with newspapers and television reports describing it as a criminal enterprise. Cohen's personal wealth remained largely intact – he still had approximately $9 billion of his own money in the firm – but his dream of building a financial dynasty that would outlast him was crumbling. By November 2013, Cohen agreed to a historic settlement: SAC would plead guilty to all charges, pay $1.8 billion in penalties, and shut down its business of managing outside investor money. In a federal courtroom on November 8, 2013, SAC's general counsel Peter Nussbaum stood before Judge Laura Taylor Swain and uttered the word "guilty" on behalf of the firm. The aftermath of the guilty plea forced a complete transformation of Cohen's operation. By January 2014, SAC had shrunk from $15 billion in assets to a family office managing only Cohen's personal fortune, and its name was changed to Point72 Asset Management to distance it from the scandal. Cohen dismissed many of his top lieutenants who had been associated with the scandal and hired a former federal prosecutor as his general counsel. The firm implemented strict new compliance measures, including monitoring of employee communications and restrictions on contact with public company employees. These changes reflected a new reality for hedge funds – the era of aggressive information gathering with minimal oversight had come to an end. The broader impact on Wall Street was profound. The investigation resulted in more than 80 convictions or guilty pleas, decimating networks of traders, analysts, and corporate insiders who had treated confidential information as a commodity to be bought and sold. Expert network firms, once a booming industry, faced existential challenges as clients feared association with them. Hedge funds dramatically strengthened their compliance departments and established strict policies governing interactions with corporate executives and industry consultants. The definition of insider trading, once seen as a gray area by many traders, was now clearly understood as a criminal offense carrying severe penalties. For the government, the SAC case represented both a landmark victory and a sobering reminder of the limitations of the justice system when confronting the most powerful figures on Wall Street. Despite years of investigation and numerous convictions of SAC employees, prosecutors had failed to charge Cohen himself with any criminal wrongdoing. The SEC had filed civil charges against him for failing to supervise his employees, but these were far less serious than the criminal insider trading charges they had hoped to bring. As one prosecutor reportedly remarked, "We got the company, but the guy got away." This outcome raised troubling questions about accountability in American finance – if even the most extensive investigation in Wall Street history couldn't reach the person at the top, was true justice possible?

Chapter 7: Accountability's Limits: Cohen's Survival and Wall Street Justice (2014-2016)

The aftermath of the SAC Capital case revealed profound truths about justice, wealth, and accountability on Wall Street. By early 2015, the legal landscape had shifted dramatically in favor of Cohen and other hedge fund managers. In December 2014, a federal appeals court overturned the insider trading convictions of Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson, two portfolio managers with ties to SAC. The court ruled that prosecutors had overreached in their definition of insider trading, establishing a higher bar for future convictions. This decision, known as the "Newman ruling," sent shockwaves through the legal community and forced prosecutors to dismiss charges against several defendants, including Michael Steinberg, one of Cohen's closest lieutenants who had previously been convicted. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney who had led the charge against SAC, was outraged by the Newman decision. "This creates an obvious road map for unscrupulous behavior," he declared, arguing that it effectively legalized certain forms of insider trading as long as traders remained deliberately ignorant about the sources of their information. The ruling highlighted a fundamental challenge in prosecuting financial crimes: the law often struggles to keep pace with the sophisticated methods used by Wall Street to gain advantages in the market. The legal definition of insider trading had evolved through court decisions rather than clear legislation, creating ambiguities that skilled defense attorneys could exploit. Meanwhile, Cohen himself was staging a remarkable comeback. In January 2016, he reached a settlement with the SEC that resolved the failure-to-supervise charges against him. The deal banned him from managing outside money for only two years, meaning he could return to the hedge fund business in 2018. Industry observers predicted that investors would eagerly entrust their money to him once again, despite the scandal. "People are going to be lining up out the doors," said one hedge fund investor. "It's a layup." This prediction proved accurate – when Cohen reopened his fund to outside investors in 2018, he quickly raised billions of dollars, demonstrating that in the world of high finance, performance often matters more than past controversies. Cohen's personal fortune continued to grow throughout this period. In May 2015, he paid $141.3 million for Alberto Giacometti's sculpture "L'homme au doigt" (Pointing Man) – the highest price ever paid for a sculpture at auction. He maintained his lavish lifestyle, with homes in Greenwich, Manhattan, and the Hamptons, and continued to expand his art collection, which was valued at over $1 billion. The $1.8 billion fine that had seemed so enormous when it was announced had barely made a dent in his wealth; in 2014 alone, trading only his own money, Cohen reportedly earned $2.5 billion. This extraordinary resilience demonstrated the insulating power of extreme wealth in American society. The careers of those who had pursued Cohen took interesting turns. Many of the prosecutors and SEC attorneys who had worked on the case moved to lucrative positions in private practice, often at the very law firms that defended Wall Street executives. This revolving door between government and the private sector raised questions about the incentives facing those tasked with enforcing financial regulations. If a successful prosecution could lead to a high-paying job at a defense firm, did that create conflicts of interest? The system seemed designed to ensure that even those who temporarily challenged Wall Street's power would eventually be absorbed by it. By 2016, the landscape had shifted even further in favor of Wall Street with the election of Donald Trump, who promised a new era of financial deregulation. The SAC Capital saga had exposed fundamental weaknesses in the financial regulatory system – the industry had evolved to become so complex that large parts of it were almost completely beyond the reach of regulators and law enforcement. The fear of suffering embarrassing losses after long, expensive trials had led to a kind of paralysis in law enforcement, with prosecutors increasingly reluctant to bring cases against the most powerful figures in finance. The rise and fall – and subsequent resurrection – of Steven Cohen illustrated a troubling reality about American finance: after paying the largest fines in the history of financial crime and seeing a dozen of his employees implicated in insider trading, Cohen had emerged from the crisis that engulfed his company as one of the world's wealthiest men, ready to resume his place at the pinnacle of Wall Street power.

Summary

The saga of SAC Capital represents one of the most revealing chapters in modern financial history, exposing the fundamental tension between Wall Street's relentless pursuit of profit and the legal boundaries designed to ensure market fairness. At its core, this story illustrates how the hedge fund industry created unprecedented fortunes through increasingly aggressive information-gathering tactics that blurred ethical lines. Steven Cohen's empire was built on an institutional culture that prized "edge" above all else, creating a system where portfolio managers felt immense pressure to deliver profitable trading ideas regardless of how they were obtained. This culture of information asymmetry – where some traders possessed knowledge that others did not – undermined the foundational principle of fair and efficient markets that is supposed to be the cornerstone of American capitalism. The ultimate outcome of the SAC investigation offers sobering lessons about accountability in American finance. Despite years of investigation, dozens of subpoenas, multiple convictions of SAC employees, and the largest financial penalty ever imposed in an insider trading case, the central figure in the story emerged largely unscathed. This suggests that our legal system struggles to effectively police the most sophisticated financial actors, particularly when they have virtually unlimited resources for their defense. For ordinary investors, the message is clear: markets are not always the level playing fields they are purported to be, and those with access to better information – legally obtained or otherwise – will continue to enjoy significant advantages. Perhaps the most important takeaway is that meaningful reform requires not just stronger enforcement but a fundamental cultural shift within financial institutions themselves, where ethical boundaries are respected not merely out of fear of punishment, but because market integrity itself is valued as essential to long-term prosperity.

About Author

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Sheelah Kolhatkar

Sheelah Kolhatkar, a former hedge fund analyst, is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where she writes about Wall Street, Silicon Valley and politics among other things. She has appeared as a speaker and commentator on business and economics issues at conferences and on broadcast outlets including CNBC, Bloomberg Television, Charlie Rose, PBS NewsHour, WNYC and NPR. Her writing has also appeared in Bloomberg Businessweek, New York Magazine, The Atlantic, The New York Times and other publications. She lives in New York City.

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