Brave New War

Brave New War Plot Summary

Introduction

In the scorching summer of 2004, a small team of guerrillas struck a section of Iraq's oil pipeline infrastructure. The attack cost them approximately $2,000 to execute, yet it generated over $500 million in lost oil exports - a return on investment 250,000 times the initial cost. This wasn't an isolated incident but part of a sophisticated campaign that would redefine modern warfare. Meanwhile, in cities across the globe, similar patterns of disruption were emerging, from Nigeria's oil fields to Pakistan's natural gas facilities to Thailand's electrical grid. We are witnessing the rise of a new form of conflict that traditional military doctrine struggles to comprehend. This evolution of warfare leverages globalization and technology to create devastating effects through minimal resources. The perpetrators aren't state armies but small, agile groups using systems disruption to collapse critical networks that underpin modern societies. The security implications are profound - these methods have made it possible for nonstate actors to fight nations and potentially win, without needing weapons of mass destruction. Understanding this transformation is crucial not just for military strategists but for anyone concerned with global stability, economic security, and the future of the nation-state in an increasingly networked world.

Chapter 1: The Rise of Superempowered Individuals in a Networked World

The late 20th century marked the beginning of a profound shift in the power dynamics between individuals and states. While states had dominated warfare for centuries, exponential technological growth combined with globalization created a new reality: individuals and small groups gained access to tools that could generate strategic impacts previously reserved for nations. This transformation can be traced to two inexorable trends. First, Moore's law - which observed that computing power doubles approximately every 18 months - has created an accelerating curve of technological capability that has surpassed linear progress. What was once accessible only to governments is now available on consumer markets. Consider how a PlayStation 2 console, purchasable on eBay for $200, contains sufficient graphics-processing capability to guide a missile to its target. Second, the global interconnectivity of the Internet has created a platform for knowledge sharing, coordination, and communication that transcends borders and breaks down barriers to entry. The most visible manifestation of this shift came on September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda demonstrated how a small organization could leverage these trends to inflict damage costing approximately $80 billion with an operation that cost roughly $500,000. But beyond the direct damage, the attack revealed something more profound - that systems disruption could serve as a force multiplier, turning minimal resources into catastrophic impacts by exploiting the interconnected networks that modern societies rely upon. As Donald Rumsfeld once observed: "The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists' cost of millions." This asymmetry forms the core of the superempowered challenge. When individuals can achieve returns on investment measured in the thousands or even millions, the traditional calculus of deterrence breaks down. Nation-states, with their bureaucratic processes and resource-intensive approaches, find themselves outmaneuvered by opponents who adapt more quickly and operate more efficiently. The leverage provided by these technologies has finally reached a threshold where small groups now have the capability to challenge states in warfare and win. And this trend will only intensify as technology continues its exponential march forward. Soon, individual biological hackers may have capabilities that could threaten entire populations, and nanotechnology could enable destructive capacities in microscopic packages. This technological superempowerment represents the bleeding edge of a larger historical shift - the decline of the nation-state's monopoly on violence and the rise of nonstate actors as strategic players on the global stage.

Chapter 2: Disorder on the Doorstep: Hollow States and Failed Systems

The early 21st century has witnessed the emergence of a new global pattern: states failing not through invasion or revolution, but through a process of hollowing from within. This phenomenon became starkly visible in post-invasion Iraq, where despite America's overwhelming military victory, the country descended into dysfunction as electricity operated only 8-12 hours daily, oil exports fell to half their pre-war levels, and unemployment soared to 50 percent. What happened in Iraq wasn't merely poor post-war planning but a demonstration of a new method of warfare. Global guerrillas systematically targeted infrastructure and social networks, creating a situation where the state could not deliver basic services, thus undermining its legitimacy. When a government can't keep the lights on during triple-digit heat, its authority rapidly erodes. As Sabah Kadhim, a senior Iraqi Interior Ministry official, observed: "The new pattern of sabotage lays the groundwork for chaos—a deeply resentful populace, the appearance of government ineffectuality, a halt to major business and industrial activities." This strategy represents a fundamental departure from traditional insurgencies. While conventional guerrillas typically sought to replace the government, these new actors aim to hollow out the state, creating ungoverned spaces where they can operate with impunity. In the words of Michael Ware, Time magazine's bureau chief who interviewed many insurgents: "Idealistically, they're striving to create or to return to the ultimate Islamic caliphate, where borders dissolve and nation-states cease to exist." The phenomenon extends far beyond Iraq. In Nigeria's Niger Delta, militants target oil infrastructure not to seize power but to secure autonomy and resource control. In Pakistan, Baloch tribesmen attack electrical grids and communications networks to gain leverage against the central government. Even in relatively stable Thailand, Islamic separatists have adopted sophisticated systems disruption tactics, coordinating attacks on electrical infrastructure that cause cascading failures. What makes this trend particularly alarming is its connection to the rise of transnational criminal networks. Moisés Naím, former editor of Foreign Policy magazine, documents how these networks form a shadow economy worth between $2-3 trillion annually, growing at seven times the rate of legitimate world trade. These criminal enterprises provide both funding and operational models for global guerrillas, creating a symbiotic relationship between terrorism and transnational crime. The implications are profound. As states lose their monopoly on violence and their ability to deliver services, people increasingly turn to primary loyalties - family, clan, tribe, religion - for security and support. This fragmentation creates a self-reinforcing cycle that further undermines state legitimacy. The result is not necessarily complete state collapse, but rather a new equilibrium where states maintain the trappings of sovereignty while nonstate actors exercise effective control over significant territories and resources.

Chapter 3: Systems Disruption: The New Strategic Weapon

In January 2006, a small team blew up two collocated natural gas pipelines in southern Russia. Nearly simultaneously, another team attacked a power transmission pylon carrying electricity to Georgia. The combination cut an entire country off from both gas and electricity during a severe cold snap. For a week, Georgia operated at essentially a pre-industrial level, with the government flying into panic as it struggled to prevent casualties among vulnerable populations. This incident exemplifies systems disruption - a method of warfare that attacks critical networks to generate massive economic and social impacts with minimal resources. While sabotage has existed throughout history, today's interconnected networks create unprecedented vulnerabilities. Our modern infrastructure consists of tightly coupled, complex systems with key nodes whose failure can cascade throughout entire networks, causing widespread collapses. The most alarming aspect of this approach is its extraordinary return on investment. The 9/11 attacks, costing roughly $500,000 to execute, generated approximately $80 billion in economic damage - a 16,000-to-1 return. But even this pales compared to infrastructure attacks. In 2004, Iraqi insurgents struck oil pipelines at a cost of approximately $2,000, causing over $500 million in lost exports - a 250,000-to-1 return. In 2006, Nigerian militants attacked Shell Oil's Forcados export platform, spending roughly $2,000 to inflict over $50 million in damages - a 25,000-to-1 return. What makes these attacks so devastating is their exploitation of network dynamics. Modern infrastructure typically forms what network theorists call "scale-free networks" - systems with highly connected hubs that maintain functionality even when random nodes fail. However, these networks are extremely vulnerable to targeted attacks on those hubs. As Reka Albert, Istvan Albert, and Gary Nakarado demonstrated in their analysis of the North American power grid, removing just 2% of high-load nodes could potentially shut down 60% of the grid. The vulnerability extends beyond individual networks because modern infrastructure systems are interdependent. Electricity powers water pumping stations, which cool natural gas processing plants, which fuel power generation. This interdependence allows disruptions to cascade across systems - what John Robb calls the "cascading failure." Iraqi insurgents demonstrated this when they attacked gas deliveries to a major power plant, which shut down, causing electrical pumping stations at Basra's oil terminal to fail, halting oil exports worth $100 million. Perhaps most concerning is that these attacks require relatively little technical expertise. While defending against them is enormously expensive and complex, executing them can be simple once attackers identify vulnerable systempunkts - the critical junction points where small attacks generate maximum disruption. As systems become more complex and interconnected, the number of potential vulnerabilities multiplies, creating an asymmetric advantage for attackers. The implications extend beyond conventional battlefields. Urban environments, highly dependent on networked infrastructure, become particularly vulnerable. Financial markets, with their psychological underpinnings, can be destabilized through strategic attacks that undermine confidence. Even the global oil market has effectively come under the influence of what might be called a "guerrilla oil cartel" - disparate groups whose combined disruption capacity exceeds Saudi Arabia's swing production.

Chapter 4: Open-Source Warfare: Network Bazaars Against the State

In 2006, the U.S. military achieved a long-sought objective: the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Despite this tactical success, the insurgency continued unabated. Why? Because Iraq's insurgency wasn't structured as a traditional hierarchical organization that could be decapitated - it had evolved into what can best be described as "open-source warfare." This revolutionary approach to conflict draws its name and inspiration from open-source software development, where code is freely available for anyone to modify and improve. In open-source warfare, the "source code" consists of tactics, weapons designs, target selection methods, and organizational structures - all available for continual refinement by a community united only by a "plausible promise" rather than central leadership or unified ideology. The open-source model starts with this plausible promise - an inspiring demonstration that captures imaginations and attracts participants. In Iraq, early successful attacks against American forces served this purpose, suggesting that resistance could succeed. This promise forms the only essential connection between disparate groups that may otherwise have completely different motivations - from religious extremism to tribal loyalty to simple criminality. What emerges resembles not a military organization but a bazaar - a chaotic-seeming but highly effective marketplace of violence where innovations rapidly spread. As Eric Raymond noted in his seminal work on open-source software, "Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." In warfare terms, this means that with enough attackers trying different approaches, solutions to even the most difficult tactical problems will eventually emerge. When American forces deployed countermeasures against roadside bombs, the insurgent community quickly evolved more sophisticated triggering mechanisms and explosive designs, sharing successful innovations across the network. This bazaar creates extraordinary resilience. Without central leadership, there's no head to cut off. Without fixed infrastructure, there are no bases to destroy. Without unified ideology, there's no propaganda narrative to counter. The community learns collectively, adapts constantly, and displays emergent intelligence far exceeding that of its individual participants. When U.S. forces improved armor protection on vehicles, insurgents developed shaped charges that could penetrate it. When electronic countermeasures blocked remote detonation signals, they developed new triggering mechanisms. The open-source approach extends beyond tactical innovation to include economic integration. In Iraq, a complex marketplace developed around improvised explosive devices, with specialized roles for financiers, bomb makers, emplacers, and triggermen - each providing modular services that could be combined as needed. This structure mirrors what we see in legitimate global supply chains and criminal networks like phishing operations, where horizontal specialization replaces vertical integration. Communication within these networks occurs through both direct means and what biologists call "stigmergy" - coordination through environmental signals rather than explicit communication. When one attack succeeds, media coverage serves as a marker for others to follow. If security increases around certain targets, that signals attackers to shift focus elsewhere. This allows coordination without vulnerable communication channels that could be monitored or disrupted. Perhaps most troubling is how open-source warfare transcends geography. The innovations developed in Iraq rapidly spread to conflict zones worldwide. Tactics tested in Baghdad appeared in Nigeria's delta region and Thailand's southern provinces. The Internet facilitated this global learning network, creating what amounts to a worldwide bazaar of asymmetric warfare techniques freely available to anyone with sufficient motivation.

Chapter 5: Security Breakdown: Brittle Systems and Resilient Alternatives

When a significant security breakdown occurs in the United States - and it will - the first casualty will likely be the centralized, bureaucratic security structures we've built since 9/11. Despite expanding surveillance powers and massive funding, organizations like the Department of Homeland Security will prove unable to prevent sophisticated systems disruptions targeting our critical infrastructure. The subsequent attacks will leave regions without energy and communications for extended periods, causing economic pain and public frustration. This failure stems from fundamental limitations of the nation-state approach to security. States are too slow, too resource-constrained, and too blinkered by bureaucratic processes to effectively counter distributed threats. The problem isn't one of effort or intelligence but of structural mismatch - hierarchical organizations simply cannot match the agility and innovation of networked adversaries. As Bruce Schneier argues in "Beyond Fear," centralized security systems create uniformity of methods that make security brittle, vulnerable to single points of failure. The alternative isn't more centralization but its opposite: decentralized, resilient security developed through platform-based approaches that enable distributed innovation. We've already seen early examples emerge. After Hurricane Katrina, when government responses proved inadequate, private networks self-organized to deliver aid. During terrorism incidents, local security organizations like Los Angeles' Terrorist Early Warning Group have developed capabilities that complement and sometimes exceed federal resources. For this approach to scale, we need to reconceptualize security as a platform rather than a product. Platforms provide common services and capabilities that make it easier for end-users to build solutions without reinventing fundamentals. In technology, platforms like the Internet have enabled explosion of innovation by reducing barriers to entry. Security platforms would similarly provide essential shared services while encouraging local customization and experimentation. This platform approach requires three key attributes: transparency, meaning system mechanisms must be viewable by external parties; two-way interaction, allowing all participants to both consume and provide services; and openness, ensuring any party can access the system to contribute innovations. Applied to critical infrastructure like the electrical grid, this would transform a one-way distribution network into an interactive platform where individuals and communities could both consume and produce energy, creating resilience through redundancy and distribution. The final element of resilient security is sustainability - reducing dependencies on vulnerable supply chains and distant resources. Our just-in-time consumption model, while efficient during stability, creates dangerous fragility during disruptions. Sustainability means developing local production capabilities for essential resources, from energy to food to communications. The environmental movement has pioneered many necessary approaches, demonstrating that sustainable living can enhance rather than diminish quality of life. This shift toward decentralized security won't come easily. Powerful interests benefit from centralized approaches, and psychological comfort comes from believing someone else is responsible for our protection. But necessity will eventually force change. As failures accumulate and vulnerabilities become more apparent, we'll see an organic movement toward what Philip Bobbitt calls the "market-state" - a system where security becomes a function of where you live and whom you work for, with wealthy communities and corporations developing private security capabilities while others form collectives to share costs and resources.

Chapter 6: From Globalization to Fragmentation: Future Implications

The collision between superempowered global guerrillas and brittle state security systems is driving a fundamental transformation in our world order. The globalization that defined the late 20th and early 21st centuries - characterized by increasing interconnection, reduced barriers, and expanding trade - is now entering a period of contraction and fragmentation. This isn't merely a temporary disruption but a structural shift with profound implications for societies, economies, and governance worldwide. Several forces are accelerating this fragmentation. First, high oil prices driven by both resource limitations and deliberate disruption by global guerrillas are creating economic pressures that encourage regionalization. When transportation costs soar, global supply chains become less viable, and local production gains advantage. Second, persistent attacks on infrastructure are prompting defensive isolation of critical systems, creating technological islands designed to function independently during disruptions. Finally, the psychological impact of unpredictable attacks is eroding the trust necessary for open systems to function efficiently. China provides a stark example of potential fragmentation. Its economic miracle depended on export-driven growth enabled by globalization. As global trade contracts, the resulting economic distress could easily overwhelm a government whose legitimacy rests almost entirely on delivering prosperity. Without robust democratic institutions or traditional authority to fall back on, China could revert to historical patterns of regional fragmentation under pressure from mass protests that overwhelm centralized control mechanisms. Even within more stable societies, we're witnessing what might be called "nested fragmentation" - the emergence of security enclaves within national boundaries. Wealthy individuals and corporations increasingly opt out of collective security systems, hiring private military companies like Blackwater to establish protective perimeters around their assets and communities. The middle class follows by forming what might be called "armored suburbs" - neighborhoods that share security costs and maintain independent backup systems for critical services. Those without resources find themselves increasingly dependent on degraded public infrastructure and services. Yet this fragmentation, despite its apparent darkness, contains seeds of renewal. Cities, facing the most acute infrastructure challenges, are becoming laboratories for resilient systems. Necessity drives innovation in distributed energy production, local manufacturing, and community-based security. Technologies once championed primarily for environmental reasons - solar power, urban agriculture, efficient water systems - gain mainstream adoption as practical security measures. Communities develop redundant communications networks to function during disruptions, creating resilience that central systems cannot provide. The state itself will evolve rather than disappear. Unable to maintain comprehensive security guarantees, governments will focus on establishing minimal platforms that enable distributed action. The most successful will be those that embrace rather than resist this transition, creating frameworks that harness the innovative capacity of communities and markets while ensuring baseline protections for all citizens. Security will increasingly resemble an ecosystem rather than a command structure, with multiple overlapping systems providing redundancy and adaptability. Throughout history, periods of fragmentation have eventually given way to new forms of integration. The fragmentation we're witnessing now may ultimately produce more resilient and sustainable systems - ones built from the bottom up rather than imposed from above. The transition will be difficult and uneven, but the eventual outcome may be societies better equipped to navigate an increasingly complex and unpredictable world.

Summary

Across the diverse landscape of conflicts examined in this book, a consistent pattern emerges: the traditional advantages of nation-states - centralized command, resource dominance, and technological superiority - are being systematically neutralized by agile, networked opponents using asymmetric methods. The defining feature of this new warfare isn't firepower but leverage - the ability to produce massively disproportionate effects through strategic disruption of interconnected systems. When a $2,000 pipeline attack can cause $500 million in damages, or when a loose network of disparate groups can paralyze a superpower's military might, we've entered a fundamentally different security environment that demands entirely new approaches. The lessons for both states and individuals are profound. First, security must shift from prevention to resilience - we cannot stop all attacks, but we can build systems that degrade gracefully and recover quickly. Second, decentralization provides strength through diversity and redundancy - the most resilient societies will be those that distribute rather than concentrate critical capabilities. Finally, adaptation must occur at the same speed as threats - which means enabling bottom-up innovation rather than relying solely on top-down planning. In practical terms, this might mean developing local energy production, creating community-based emergency response networks, building redundant communications systems, and fostering the skills needed for local self-sufficiency. These approaches won't eliminate threats, but they will transform potentially catastrophic disruptions into manageable challenges, allowing societies to bend rather than break under pressure from an increasingly complex and unpredictable world.

About Author

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John Robb

John is an author, inventor, entrepreneur, technology analyst, engineer, and military pilot. He's started numerous successful technology companies, including one in the financial sector that sold for $295 m and one that pioneered the software we currently see in use at Facebook and Twitter. John's insight on technology and governance has appeared on the BBC, Fox News, National Public Radio, CNBC, The Economist, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and BusinessWeek.John served as a pilot in a tier one counter-terrorism unit that worked alongside Delta and Seal Team 6. He wrote the book Brave New War on the future of national security, and has advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSA, DoD, CIA, and the House Armed Services Committee.

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