Destined for War

Destined for War Plot Summary

Introduction

In the fifth century BCE, a Greek historian named Thucydides made an observation that would echo through millennia: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." This simple yet profound insight captures a dangerous dynamic that has shaped world history. When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one, the resulting structural stress often leads to conflict, even when neither side truly desires war. From ancient Greece to the modern era, this pattern has repeatedly pulled great powers into devastating conflicts that transformed the international order. Through a journey spanning 2,500 years of history, readers will discover how this dynamic has played out across sixteen historical case studies, from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War and beyond. By examining why some rivalries ended in bloodshed while others managed to avoid war, we gain crucial insights into how today's powers might navigate their own dangerous transitions. This exploration is essential reading for diplomats, military strategists, business leaders operating in global markets, and any citizen concerned about the prospects for peace in an era of shifting power balances and rising tensions between established and emerging powers.

Chapter 1: Ancient Origins: Athens and Sparta's Fatal Dance

In the aftermath of the Persian Wars in the early fifth century BCE, the Greek world witnessed a dramatic shift in its balance of power. Athens, once a modest city-state, emerged as a dynamic naval power with a flourishing democracy and expanding influence throughout the Aegean Sea. Meanwhile, Sparta, long established as the preeminent land power in Greece with its legendary military discipline, watched Athens' meteoric rise with growing alarm. This changing power dynamic would ultimately lead to one of history's most consequential conflicts: the Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE). The seeds of conflict were sown in the very structure of the post-Persian War order. Athens had transformed the Delian League, initially a defensive alliance against Persian aggression, into what many viewed as an Athenian empire. Member states that once contributed ships to the common defense now paid tribute to Athens, which used these funds to strengthen its navy and embark on magnificent building projects like the Parthenon. As Athenian power and confidence grew, so did Spartan anxiety. Pericles, the foremost Athenian statesman, pursued policies that directly challenged Spartan interests, including economic sanctions against Sparta's ally Megara and military support for Sparta's enemies. Thucydides, who chronicled this conflict with remarkable insight, identified three primary drivers that fueled the rivalry: interests, fear, and honor. Material interests were at stake as Athens and Sparta competed for resources and allies. Fear played a crucial role as Sparta grew increasingly concerned about Athens' expanding power and influence. Honor or prestige factored heavily as both sides sought to maintain their status and reputation among other Greek states. These three factors created a volatile mixture that made compromise increasingly difficult, even as leaders on both sides recognized the catastrophic potential of all-out war. The cultural and political differences between the two powers exacerbated tensions. Athens represented innovation, naval power, democracy, and commerce. Sparta embodied tradition, land power, oligarchy, and military discipline. As Thucydides observed, "The Athenians were addicted to innovation, and their designs were characterized by swiftness alike in conception and execution; the Spartans were cautious and inclined to keep things as they were." These contrasting worldviews made it difficult for each side to understand the other's perspective and concerns, increasing the risk of miscalculation. When war finally erupted in 431 BCE, it devastated the Greek world. The conflict lasted nearly three decades, claimed countless lives, and ultimately ended with Athens' defeat and the dismantling of its empire. Yet in a tragic irony, Sparta's victory proved hollow. The war weakened both powers so severely that neither could prevent the subsequent rise of Macedon under Philip II and Alexander the Great, who would end the era of independent Greek city-states. The Peloponnesian War thus stands as the archetypal case of how structural forces can push nations toward conflict even when their leaders recognize the potentially catastrophic consequences, a pattern that would repeat throughout history as rising powers challenged established ones.

Chapter 2: Imperial Rivalries: European Powers in Conflict (1500-1900)

The four centuries from 1500 to 1900 witnessed a series of intense rivalries between European powers that reshaped the global order. This period began with Spain and Portugal dividing the world between them through the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and culminated in the Anglo-German naval race that helped set the stage for World War I. Throughout these centuries, the pattern Thucydides identified played out repeatedly as rising powers challenged established ones for dominance in Europe and around the globe. The Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry dominated the 16th century as two expansionist empires collided in southeastern Europe. Under Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520-1566), the Ottoman Empire reached the zenith of its power, capturing Belgrade, defeating Hungary at the Battle of Mohács, and laying siege to Vienna in 1529. The Habsburg Empire under Charles V and later Ferdinand I represented the bulwark of Christian Europe against Ottoman expansion. This confrontation was not merely about territory but represented a clash of civilizations with profound religious dimensions. The Ottoman advance was finally halted at the naval Battle of Lepanto (1571) and the failed siege of Vienna (1683), establishing a rough equilibrium that would last until the 19th century. The 17th century saw the rise of new commercial powers challenging established ones, particularly in the Anglo-Dutch rivalry. The Dutch Republic had emerged as Europe's leading commercial and financial center, with the world's largest merchant fleet and most sophisticated banking system. England, seeking to expand its share of global trade, directly targeted Dutch commercial supremacy through the Navigation Acts of 1651, which restricted foreign shipping in English ports. As one English general bluntly stated, "What matters this or that reason? What we want is more of the trade the Dutch now have." This commercial competition soon escalated into three Anglo-Dutch Wars between 1652 and 1674, fought primarily at sea with increasingly sophisticated naval tactics and technology. By the 18th century, Britain and France had emerged as the primary imperial rivals, engaging in a series of conflicts that spanned the globe. The Seven Years' War (1756-1763), often described as the first truly global conflict, saw these powers clash in Europe, North America, the Caribbean, West Africa, India, and the Philippines. The war resulted in a decisive British victory, with France ceding Canada and most of its territories east of the Mississippi to Britain. This outcome significantly altered the global balance of power and established Britain as the preeminent colonial empire. The rivalry would reignite during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), when France under Napoleon Bonaparte directly challenged British hegemony before being ultimately defeated. The final major European power transition of this period involved the rise of Germany following its unification in 1871. Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Germany rapidly industrialized and became the continent's leading economic power. After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II pursued a more aggressive "Weltpolitik" (world policy) that directly challenged British interests, particularly through an ambitious naval building program. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz explicitly designed the German fleet to create a "risk theory" whereby Britain would be forced to respect German interests or face potentially devastating naval losses. This challenge to British maritime supremacy poisoned Anglo-German relations and contributed significantly to the outbreak of World War I. These European power transitions reveal recurring patterns: rising powers seeking recognition and space commensurate with their growing strength, while established powers resist changes to a status quo that has served them well. The outcomes varied significantly—from peaceful accommodation in some cases to prolonged warfare in others—providing crucial insights into the factors that determine whether power transitions lead to conflict or cooperation. These historical rivalries laid the groundwork for the global conflicts of the 20th century and continue to offer valuable lessons for understanding contemporary power transitions.

Chapter 3: The Great War: Germany Challenges British Hegemony

By the dawn of the 20th century, Great Britain stood as the world's preeminent power, commanding a vast empire upon which "the sun never set" and maintaining naval supremacy that secured vital trade routes. However, a unified Germany was rapidly emerging as a formidable challenger. Between 1870 and 1914, Germany's industrial output surged dramatically, surpassing Britain's by the early 1900s. German steel production, which had been half of Britain's in 1870, doubled Britain's by 1914. This economic transformation was accompanied by scientific and technological advances that alarmed British observers, who saw their long-standing industrial leadership slipping away. Kaiser Wilhelm II, who dismissed the cautious Chancellor Bismarck in 1890, was determined that Germany become a "World Power" with global influence matching its economic might. The Kaiser embraced Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's naval program, which explicitly aimed to build a fleet powerful enough to challenge British maritime supremacy. As Tirpitz's Navy Law of 1900 made clear, Germany sought a navy so strong that "even for the greatest naval power, a war against it would involve such risks as to jeopardize its own supremacy." This direct challenge to Britain's core security interest triggered what historians call the Anglo-German naval race, with both powers rapidly expanding their fleets and developing increasingly powerful battleships. Britain responded to this growing threat with alarm and determination. In his famous 1907 memorandum, senior Foreign Office official Eyre Crowe warned that Germany's rise presented a fundamental challenge to British security regardless of German intentions: "It cannot be assumed that Germany will not take full advantage of any opportunity that may present itself to forward her aims at the cost of Great Britain." Britain accelerated its naval construction, converted its fleet from coal to oil power, ended its traditional "splendid isolation" by forming alliances with former rivals France and Russia, and concentrated its naval forces in home waters to counter the German threat. As tensions mounted, both nations became trapped in a security dilemma where defensive measures by one side appeared threatening to the other, creating a spiral of hostility and arms buildup. The structural stress between rising Germany and ruling Britain was compounded by a second Thucydidean dynamic: Germany's fear of a rising Russia to its east. By 1914, Russia's military recovery and rapid industrialization threatened to shift the balance of power against Germany. French investment in Russian railways was shortening Russia's mobilization time, undermining Germany's war plans. This created a sense of urgency among German leaders, with many advocating preventive war while Germany still maintained an advantage. When the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, provided the spark, these underlying tensions erupted into the catastrophic First World War. The consequences were devastating beyond imagination. The war claimed over 16 million lives, destroyed four empires (German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian), and redrew the map of Europe and the Middle East. Britain emerged technically victorious but fatally weakened, while Germany suffered defeat and humiliation that would fuel future conflict. The Great War demonstrates how the Thucydidean dynamic can transform even economically interdependent powers with dynastic ties into mortal enemies when fundamental shifts in the balance of power generate fear and insecurity. It stands as history's most catastrophic example of failure to manage the tensions between rising and ruling powers, a tragedy that would be compounded by its sequel a generation later.

Chapter 4: America's Rise: From Colony to Global Superpower

America's transformation from a collection of British colonies to the world's preeminent power represents one of history's most remarkable ascents. This journey began with the American Revolution (1775-1783), which established the United States as an independent nation, but America's emergence as a global power would take more than a century to complete. Throughout the 19th century, the young republic focused primarily on continental expansion, internal development, and avoiding entanglement in European conflicts, following George Washington's advice to "steer clear of permanent alliances." By the late 19th century, however, America's extraordinary economic growth had created the foundation for greater international ambitions. Between 1870 and 1914, U.S. industrial output grew at an astonishing rate, surpassing Britain's by 1890. American steel production, which had been negligible compared to Britain's in 1870, was twice the British level by 1900. This economic transformation emboldened American leaders to assert greater influence in the Western Hemisphere, challenging European—particularly British—dominance in the region. The 1895 Venezuela Crisis marked a turning point when President Grover Cleveland and Secretary of State Richard Olney demanded that Britain accept American arbitration in a boundary dispute with Venezuela, boldly asserting that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent." Britain's response to America's growing power proved crucial in determining the trajectory of this power transition. Rather than resisting American assertions, Britain made a strategic decision to accommodate the rising power. As Prime Minister Lord Salisbury reflected in 1902, "It is very sad, but I am afraid America is bound to forge ahead and nothing can restore the equality between us." This accommodation reflected Britain's clear-eyed assessment of changing power realities and strategic priorities. Facing more pressing threats in Europe, particularly from Germany, Britain could not afford a confrontation with the rapidly growing United States. The First Sea Lord, Jacky Fisher, advised his government that "under no conceivable circumstances could we escape an overwhelming and humiliating defeat" in any war with America. This peaceful power transition laid the foundation for what historians call the "Great Rapprochement" between the two nations. By yielding to American demands with good grace and emphasizing shared Anglo-American values and interests, Britain transformed a potential adversary into a crucial ally. When war came in 1914, the United States became an essential source of materiel and finance for Britain's war effort. After German submarines began attacking American ships, Washington joined the war alongside London in 1917, helping to secure Allied victory. This special relationship would prove decisive not only in World War I but also in World War II and throughout the Cold War. America's rise to global superpower status was completed in the aftermath of World War II. While European powers lay devastated, the United States emerged from the conflict with its industrial capacity enhanced and its military power unmatched. The development of nuclear weapons, demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, established American technological supremacy. The Bretton Woods agreements established the dollar as the world's reserve currency, while the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction demonstrated America's economic might and strategic vision. By 1945, the United States had achieved a position of global preeminence unprecedented in modern history, producing roughly half of the world's economic output and possessing a monopoly on nuclear weapons. The Anglo-American case demonstrates that war between rising and ruling powers is not inevitable. Several factors contributed to this peaceful transition: geographic separation that reduced security competition; cultural and linguistic ties that facilitated mutual understanding; Britain's preoccupation with more immediate threats closer to home; and skilled diplomacy that recognized changing power realities. Most importantly, British leaders distinguished between vital and peripheral interests, wisely choosing to accommodate American demands in the Western Hemisphere while preserving Britain's core security needs. This case offers perhaps the most hopeful lesson from history about managing great power transitions without catastrophic conflict.

Chapter 5: The China Challenge: Economics, Technology, and Military Power

The rise of China in the 21st century represents the most significant shift in the global balance of power since the emergence of the United States. After centuries of decline and a "century of humiliation" at the hands of foreign powers, China has engineered an economic miracle unprecedented in human history. Since initiating market reforms in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, China has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty and transformed itself from an impoverished agricultural society into the world's manufacturing powerhouse. By 2014, China surpassed the United States to become the world's largest economy in purchasing power parity terms, and it continues to narrow the gap in market exchange rates. The scale and speed of China's rise are staggering. China has compressed into a single generation economic development that required a century or more in earlier rising powers. Between 2011 and 2013 alone, China used more cement than the United States did in the entire 20th century. It has built more high-speed rail in a decade than the rest of the world combined and produces more steel in a month than the United States does in a year. As former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew observed, "The size of China's displacement of the world balance is such that the world must find a new balance. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of the world." Under President Xi Jinping, who took power in 2012, China has grown increasingly assertive in pursuing what Xi calls the "China Dream" of national rejuvenation. Xi has outlined ambitious goals: building a "moderately prosperous society" by 2021 (the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party) and becoming a "fully developed, rich and powerful" nation by 2049 (the centenary of the People's Republic). To achieve these objectives, Xi has launched initiatives like "Made in China 2025," which aims to make China dominant in advanced technologies including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and robotics. The Belt and Road Initiative represents another ambitious effort to create a China-centered economic order across Eurasia through massive infrastructure investments. China's military modernization has accompanied its economic growth. The People's Liberation Army has transformed from a massive but technologically backward force into an increasingly sophisticated military with growing power projection capabilities. China has developed "anti-access/area denial" capabilities specifically designed to prevent American intervention in regional conflicts, particularly regarding Taiwan. These include anti-ship ballistic missiles (the so-called "carrier killers"), advanced submarines, and sophisticated air defense systems. China has also built artificial islands in the South China Sea, equipping them with military facilities that extend its reach into disputed waters claimed by several Southeast Asian nations. This dramatic shift in power has generated growing tension between China and the United States. Disputes over the South China Sea, Taiwan, trade practices, technology transfer, and human rights have strained relations between the world's two largest economies. As China's power grows, it naturally seeks greater influence and respect, while the United States resists changes to an international order it has led for decades. This creates precisely the conditions Thucydides identified: a rising power challenging a ruling one, generating structural stress that makes conflict increasingly likely unless both sides take deliberate actions to avoid it. The challenge is compounded by profound cultural differences. Chinese and American worldviews differ fundamentally on issues ranging from the role of government to conceptions of international order. China's political system, with its emphasis on state authority and social harmony, contrasts sharply with American individualism and democratic values. These differences make mutual understanding more difficult and increase the risk of miscalculation. The question now facing both nations is whether they can escape Thucydides's Trap or whether they will become its next victims, with potentially catastrophic consequences for global stability and prosperity.

Chapter 6: Escaping the Trap: Historical Success Stories

While Thucydides's Trap has claimed many victims throughout history, several notable cases demonstrate that war between rising and ruling powers is not inevitable. These success stories offer valuable lessons for managing great power transitions peacefully. The most instructive example is the peaceful transition from British to American hegemony in the early 20th century, which we explored in chapter four. Despite tensions over territorial disputes and naval competition, Britain made a strategic decision to accommodate America's rise rather than resist it through force, transforming a potential adversary into a crucial ally. Another success story comes from the Cold War standoff between the United States and Soviet Union. Despite intense ideological hostility and military competition, these nuclear-armed superpowers managed to avoid direct military conflict for over four decades. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 brought them to the brink of nuclear war, with President Kennedy privately estimating the chances of nuclear conflict at "between one-in-three and even." Yet both Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev recognized the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war and worked desperately to find a way out. In the crisis aftermath, both superpowers established a direct hotline to improve communication and began pursuing arms control agreements. They developed what strategists called "mutual assured destruction" (MAD)—the recognition that nuclear war would be suicidal for both sides—which forced leaders to find alternative forms of competition that stopped short of direct military confrontation. Portugal and Spain provide an earlier example of peaceful accommodation. When Christopher Columbus returned from his voyage to the Americas in 1493, Portugal recognized the threat to its virtual monopoly on overseas trade routes to Asia. Rather than resort to war, however, the rivals turned to Pope Alexander VI for arbitration, resulting in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas that divided the world's unexplored territories between them. This diplomatic solution, though imperfect, helped prevent a destructive conflict between the Iberian powers and allowed both to pursue their imperial ambitions in different spheres. More recently, Germany's reemergence as Europe's dominant power after reunification in 1990 provides another example of peaceful power transition. Despite initial fears from Britain and France about a resurgent Germany dominating Europe, Germany pursued a strategy of reassurance and integration. By embedding itself in European institutions, maintaining military restraint, and emphasizing economic rather than military power, Germany has achieved a position of leadership that its neighbors now accept and even encourage. As Henry Kissinger observed, "Seventy years after having defeated German claims to dominating Europe, the victors are now pleading, largely for economic reasons, with Germany to lead Europe." These cases reveal several common factors that help powers escape Thucydides's Trap: the existence of higher authorities or institutions that can constrain competition; economic interdependence that raises the cost of conflict; geographic separation that reduces security competition; cultural commonalities that facilitate mutual understanding; and most importantly, wise leadership that distinguishes vital from peripheral interests and makes strategic accommodations when necessary. While none of these factors alone guarantees peace, together they can help manage the structural stress that arises when rising powers challenge established ones. The success stories also highlight the crucial role of domestic politics. Leaders who can resist nationalist pressures for confrontation and explain to their publics the benefits of accommodation are more likely to navigate power transitions peacefully. Similarly, political systems that allow for long-term strategic thinking rather than short-term political calculations are better equipped to manage the complex challenges of power transitions. These historical examples offer hope that even the most dangerous power shifts can be managed without catastrophic conflict if leaders on both sides demonstrate wisdom, restraint, and strategic foresight.

Chapter 7: The Path Forward: Managing Great Power Competition

As China's extraordinary rise challenges America's long-standing position, both nations face a critical choice: continue on the current path toward potential catastrophe or chart a new course toward peaceful coexistence. The historical record suggests that escaping Thucydides's Trap requires a combination of realism about structural forces, imagination in developing alternatives to conflict, and skilled leadership on both sides. Several principles emerge from successful cases of peaceful power transitions that could guide American and Chinese leaders today. First, both sides must recognize the fundamental structural reality of their relationship: they are bound together in a condition that nuclear strategists call "mutual assured destruction." With nuclear arsenals capable of destroying each other many times over, neither country can rationally choose war as a means of resolving their differences. This creates what Churchill called a "sublime irony" where "safety is the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation." However paradoxical, this reality means both nations must find ways to compete without catastrophic conflict. As President Kennedy observed after the Cuban Missile Crisis, "Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert confrontations that force an adversary to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war." Second, leaders must distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. Not every dispute requires confrontation, and not every confrontation must escalate to crisis. Britain's accommodation of America's rise succeeded because British leaders recognized that maintaining naval supremacy in European waters was more important than contesting American influence in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, American and Chinese leaders must identify their truly vital interests and be prepared to make accommodations on less essential matters. For the United States, maintaining technological leadership and preventing Chinese military dominance of the Western Pacific may be vital interests, while accepting greater Chinese influence in Central Asia might be a reasonable accommodation. For China, securing its immediate periphery and continuing economic development may be vital, while deferring some territorial ambitions could be a prudent concession. Third, both nations should strengthen the institutional architecture that can help manage competition. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union developed arms control agreements, crisis communication channels, and rules of engagement that reduced the risk of accidental conflict. Similar mechanisms could help manage US-China competition in domains ranging from maritime security to cyberspace. Multilateral institutions can also provide forums for addressing common challenges like climate change, pandemic disease, and nuclear proliferation—areas where cooperation remains essential despite competition elsewhere. As former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has argued, the goal should be "managed strategic competition" within agreed parameters rather than unrestrained rivalry. Fourth, leaders should leverage economic interdependence as a stabilizing force. The deep integration of American and Chinese economies creates what some analysts call "mutual assured economic destruction" (MAED). With China being America's largest trading partner and America being China's largest export market, conflict would devastate both economies. While economic ties alone cannot prevent conflict—as the pre-World War I era demonstrates—they can create powerful constituencies for stability and cooperation. Business leaders, consumers, and workers who benefit from economic exchange can serve as counterweights to nationalist forces pushing for confrontation. Finally, both nations must invest in understanding each other's strategic cultures and perspectives. Chinese and American worldviews differ fundamentally on issues ranging from the role of government to conceptions of international order. These differences increase the risk of misperception and miscalculation. Developing a cadre of leaders in both countries who understand these differences and can communicate effectively across cultural divides is essential for managing competition without conflict. As Henry Kissinger has observed, "American exceptionalism is missionary. It holds that the United States has an obligation to spread its values to every part of the world. Chinese exceptionalism is cultural. China does not proselytize; it does not claim that its institutions are relevant outside China." Reconciling these different conceptions of world order represents perhaps the greatest intellectual challenge of our time. The path forward requires not a grand bargain but a sustained effort to manage competition while avoiding the catastrophe of war. This will demand patience, strategic discipline, and political courage from leaders on both sides. The stakes could not be higher—not just for Americans and Chinese, but for the future of global civilization.

Summary

The recurring pattern of conflict between rising and ruling powers—what we now call Thucydides's Trap—represents one of history's most dangerous dynamics. From ancient Athens and Sparta to Germany and Britain before World War I, this pattern has repeatedly led great powers into devastating wars that none wanted and all regretted. The fundamental driver is structural: as a rising power grows stronger and seeks greater influence, the ruling power naturally feels threatened and resists changes to a status quo that has served it well. This creates a spiral of fear, insecurity, and miscalculation that can overwhelm rational leadership and drag nations into conflicts that serve no one's interests. The resulting wars have repeatedly transformed the international order, often at catastrophic human cost. Yet history also shows that this trap is not inescapable. The peaceful transition from British to American hegemony, the Cold War standoff between nuclear superpowers, and Germany's reemergence as Europe's leading power all demonstrate that war between rising and ruling powers is not inevitable. These success stories offer crucial lessons for managing today's defining geopolitical challenge: the relationship between a rising China and a ruling United States. By recognizing the structural forces at work, distinguishing vital from peripheral interests, strengthening institutional guardrails, leveraging economic interdependence, and investing in mutual understanding, leaders in both Washington and Beijing can navigate this dangerous historical pattern without repeating its most catastrophic outcomes. As we face an uncertain future shaped by shifting power balances, technological disruption, and global challenges that transcend national boundaries, the wisdom gained from studying these historical patterns becomes not merely academically interesting but potentially civilization-saving.

About Author

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Graham Allison

Librarian Note: Also writes under the name Graham T. Allison.Graham Allison is Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the bestselling author of Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap (2017); Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World (2013); Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (2004); and Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971, 1999). Founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, Dr. Allison has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense and advised the secretaries of defense under every president from Reagan to Obama. He has twice been awarded the Department of Defense's highest civilian award, the Distinguished Public Service Medal, and serves on the Advisory boards of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

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