Extraordinary Popular Delusions and The Madness of Crowds

Extraordinary Popular Delusions and The Madness of Crowds Plot Summary

Introduction

Throughout history, human societies have repeatedly fallen victim to extraordinary episodes of collective madness. From the tulip fields of 17th century Holland to the trading floors of modern Wall Street, these cycles of delusion follow remarkably similar patterns despite occurring centuries apart. When gripped by these manias, rational people abandon common sense, prudent individuals take extraordinary risks, and entire communities become convinced that ancient rules of economics and human behavior have somehow been suspended. These historical bubbles reveal something profound about human psychology—our susceptibility to narratives of endless prosperity, our tendency to follow crowds, and our remarkable capacity for self-deception. The stories of these historical bubbles offer more than mere economic curiosities; they provide a mirror reflecting our own vulnerabilities to collective delusion. By examining how intelligent people throughout history have been swept up in irrational exuberance, we gain valuable perspective on modern financial markets and social movements. The psychological mechanisms that drove Dutch merchants to trade their homes for single tulip bulbs operate just as powerfully today, though in different contexts. For investors, policy makers, or anyone interested in understanding how rational thought can be overwhelmed by emotion and social contagion, these historical episodes offer invaluable lessons about human nature and the fragility of reason when tested by the promise of easy wealth.

Chapter 1: Early Patterns: Tulip Mania and Financial Folly (1634-1637)

In the winter of 1636-1637, the Dutch Republic—then the world's most sophisticated commercial society—succumbed to an extraordinary delusion centered on tulip bulbs. What began as a luxury trade among wealthy connoisseurs transformed into a nationwide frenzy that engulfed citizens from all walks of life. At the peak of this mania, single bulbs of rare varieties like the Semper Augustus changed hands for sums that could purchase elegant Amsterdam canal houses. One particularly famous transaction recorded the exchange of a single Viceroy bulb for a collection of goods worth 2,500 florins—including two lasts of wheat, four lasts of rye, four fat oxen, eight fat swine, twelve fat sheep, two hogsheads of wine, four tons of beer, and substantial quantities of butter, cheese, and clothing. The social dynamics of Tulip Mania revealed how quickly rational economic behavior can collapse when speculative fever takes hold. Initially, tulips were valued for their beauty and rarity, particularly the "broken" varieties whose vivid streaks and flames resulted from a mosaic virus infection. However, by 1636, buyers were purchasing bulbs not to plant but purely to resell at higher prices. Trading moved from specialist markets to taverns where ordinary citizens—weavers, bakers, carpenters, and sailors—engaged in complex futures contracts for bulbs they never intended to take possession of. Contemporary accounts describe people mortgaging homes and businesses to participate in the trade, convinced that prices could only continue rising. The psychological mechanisms driving this mania included several patterns that would reappear in future bubbles. First was the "greater fool theory"—the belief that regardless of an asset's intrinsic value, profits could be made by selling to someone else at a higher price. Second was the fear of missing out, as stories of overnight fortunes made neighbors envious and anxious to participate. Third was the emergence of a new narrative suggesting that traditional valuation methods no longer applied to this "revolutionary" market. As one pamphleteer of the time noted: "Our descendants will laugh that valuable things were once sold for the price of flowers." The collapse came with shocking suddenness in February 1637. At a routine bulb auction in Haarlem, buyers simply failed to appear, triggering a chain reaction of panic selling. Within days, prices collapsed by over 99%, leaving many traders holding worthless contracts and facing financial ruin. The aftermath revealed the hollow nature of the wealth created during the bubble—no new productive capacity had been built, no innovations had improved Dutch commerce, merely money had changed hands from latecomers to those who sold in time. The Dutch government, recognizing the self-inflicted nature of the crisis, refused to enforce many tulip contracts, treating them essentially as gambling debts. Tulip Mania established a pattern that would repeat throughout history: initial interest in a genuinely valuable innovation or asset, a period of price appreciation attracting speculative investment, the entry of uninformed investors driven by stories of easy wealth, the detachment of prices from any reasonable measure of intrinsic value, and finally, the inevitable collapse when the supply of new buyers is exhausted. Though relatively contained in its economic impact, this first well-documented bubble provided a template for understanding the mass psychology of markets that remains relevant nearly four centuries later.

Chapter 2: The Mississippi Scheme: France's Economic Fever (1716-1720)

In 1715, France stood on the brink of financial collapse. The death of Louis XIV left the nation with a staggering debt of 3 billion livres—roughly 100 times the annual tax revenue—accumulated through decades of warfare and royal extravagance. Into this crisis stepped John Law, a brilliant Scottish mathematician, gambler, and financial theorist who had fled Britain after killing a man in a duel. Law proposed a revolutionary solution: establishing a national bank that would issue paper money backed by future colonial wealth, particularly from France's vast Louisiana territory in North America. Law's system began modestly in 1716 with the establishment of the Banque Générale, which issued notes convertible to gold at a fixed rate. The initial success of these notes in stimulating trade gave Law tremendous credibility with the French Regent, Philippe d'Orléans. By 1717, Law had expanded his operation by creating the Mississippi Company (officially the Compagnie d'Occident), which received a monopoly on trade with Louisiana. Through a series of mergers and acquisitions between 1718 and 1719, Law's company absorbed other French trading companies, the tobacco monopoly, the royal mint, and eventually the right to collect most French taxes. This extraordinary concentration of economic power culminated in 1720 with Law's appointment as Controller General of Finances—effectively making him France's economic czar. The speculative mania that followed was unprecedented in its intensity and social breadth. Shares in the Mississippi Company rose from 500 livres to 10,000 livres in just months. The street in Paris where trading occurred—the Rue Quincampoix—became so crowded that people were occasionally crushed to death. Aristocrats sold ancient estates to buy shares, while servants and laborers invested their life savings. Contemporary accounts describe a complete inversion of social hierarchy, with a hunchbacked man earning 50,000 livres by allowing speculators to use his back as a writing desk, and a bootblack amassing enough wealth to ride in a carriage with servants. As one observer noted: "The richest men in the kingdom have been seen mixing with the crowd, waiting whole days to know if they could be lucky enough to subscribe." Behind this extraordinary bubble lay Law's sophisticated manipulation of both financial markets and public psychology. He restricted the initial supply of shares, created installment plans to broaden participation, and consistently promoted fantastic stories about Louisiana's mineral wealth. Most crucially, he used the Banque Royale (as his bank was renamed after nationalization) to support share prices by printing more banknotes whenever the market weakened. This created a self-reinforcing cycle where monetary expansion drove share prices higher, which justified further monetary expansion. The collapse began in early 1720 when some investors, including European nobility, began converting their paper wealth to gold and other tangible assets. Law responded by pegging the value of shares and restricting gold conversions, effectively revealing that the entire system depended on public confidence rather than intrinsic value. By late 1720, shares had lost 97% of their peak value, and Law's paper currency became virtually worthless. The French economy was devastated, with thousands of families ruined and a deep public distrust of banking and paper money that would persist for generations. Law himself fled France in disgrace, dying in poverty in Venice in 1729. The Mississippi Scheme demonstrated how financial innovation, while potentially beneficial, can become destructive when combined with excessive speculation, inadequate oversight, and the manipulation of public confidence. It also revealed how quickly rational thought can be abandoned when the promise of easy wealth takes hold of the public imagination. The episode left a lasting legacy in French economic thought, contributing to a conservatism about financial innovation that would influence the nation's development for centuries to come.

Chapter 3: South Sea Bubble: Britain's Speculative Disaster (1720)

While France was experiencing the Mississippi catastrophe, across the Channel, Britain was embarking on its own journey into financial delusion. The South Sea Bubble of 1720 emerged from similar conditions: war debt, financial innovation, and the allure of colonial trade. Following the War of Spanish Succession, Britain had accumulated a national debt of nearly £31 million, a staggering sum for the era that consumed roughly half of government revenue in interest payments. The South Sea Company was established in 1711 by Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, ostensibly to trade with Spanish colonies in South America. In reality, its primary purpose was financial engineering—the company took over portions of the national debt in exchange for exclusive trading rights. The actual trading prospects were always limited, as Spain strictly controlled access to its American colonies, but this practical limitation did little to dampen enthusiasm for the company's shares. In 1720, the company proposed to take over the entire national debt, offering terms that seemed advantageous to the government. Parliament approved the scheme in April, after heated debate in which voices of caution, notably those of Robert Walpole, were drowned out by enthusiasm. What followed was an extraordinary period of market manipulation and public mania. Company directors talked up the stock and spread rumors of immense trading profits from South America. They also employed the novel technique of selling shares on installment plans with small down payments, making speculation accessible to a broader public. The stock price rose dramatically from £128 in January to over £1,000 by August. This spectacular rise spawned a wave of imitators—nearly two hundred new joint-stock companies appeared, many with absurd or nebulous purposes. One infamous example promised "an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is." Despite this obvious absurdity, the promoter collected £2,000 in down payments before disappearing. The social contagion spread throughout British society. Alexander Pope, the celebrated poet, wrote to a friend: "Most people thought the time is come when we shall all grow rich without art." Lady Mary Wortley Montagu observed that "the South Sea has taken such possession of all heads that people talk of nothing else." Even Isaac Newton, who initially made a profit of £7,000 on South Sea shares before reinvesting and losing £20,000, remarked: "I can calculate the motions of heavenly bodies, but not the madness of people." The collapse began in September when directors and insiders, recognizing the unsustainability of the prices, began selling their holdings. Confidence evaporated rapidly, and by December, South Sea shares had fallen back to £124, wiping out the paper fortunes of thousands. The aftermath brought parliamentary investigations that revealed extensive corruption—company directors had bribed government officials and spread false rumors to inflate the stock price. Several directors were imprisoned, and their estates confiscated. The political fallout brought Robert Walpole to power as Britain's first de facto Prime Minister, a position he would hold for twenty-one years, bringing stability after the bubble's chaos. The South Sea Bubble demonstrated how financial innovation, when divorced from economic reality and corrupted by insider manipulation, can lead to widespread disaster. It also showed the dangerous interaction between government finance and speculative markets. The episode left a lasting legacy in British financial regulation, including the Bubble Act, which restricted the formation of joint-stock companies until its repeal in 1825. Perhaps most importantly, it provided valuable lessons about market psychology that remain relevant three centuries later, showing how even sophisticated societies can succumb to collective delusion when greed overwhelms reason.

Chapter 4: Mass Hysteria Beyond Markets: Witch Trials and Dueling

Financial bubbles represent only one manifestation of collective delusion. Throughout history, societies have periodically succumbed to other forms of mass hysteria that, while not economic in nature, follow similar psychological patterns. The European witch trials of the 16th and 17th centuries provide a striking parallel to financial manias, demonstrating how rational thought can be overwhelmed by fear and social contagion. Between approximately 1450 and 1750, an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 people were executed for the alleged crime of witchcraft across Europe. The most intense period of persecution occurred between 1580 and 1650, coinciding with religious upheaval, climate deterioration (the "Little Ice Age"), and widespread economic hardship. The witch trials followed a pattern remarkably similar to financial bubbles: initial cases built upon pre-existing beliefs, a period of escalation as accusations multiplied, the emergence of "experts" who claimed special knowledge for identifying witches, and eventually, a point of exhaustion when the social costs became unbearable. Like financial bubbles, witch trials spread through contagion—a prosecution in one town often triggered similar cases in neighboring communities. The psychological mechanisms driving witch hunts paralleled those in financial manias. Confirmation bias led investigators to interpret any unusual behavior or coincidence as evidence of witchcraft. Authority figures, including judges and clergy, validated these beliefs, giving them institutional legitimacy. Most importantly, the trials created a self-reinforcing cycle where torture produced confessions that "confirmed" the existence of a witch conspiracy, justifying further accusations and investigations. As historian Hugh Trevor-Roper observed: "The fantasy, once accepted, creates evidence for its own support." Another form of collective delusion manifested in the practice of dueling, which persisted in Europe and America from the Renaissance through the 19th century despite its obvious irrationality. The duel represented a system where men of certain social classes were expected to risk death over matters of honor, often for trivial insults. What made dueling particularly irrational was that many participants recognized its absurdity yet felt compelled to participate due to social pressure. The Duke of Wellington, who famously dueled with Lord Winchilsea in 1829, later remarked that he had acted against both his principles and better judgment. The persistence of dueling despite religious condemnation, legal prohibition, and obvious danger demonstrated how social expectations can override individual rationality—a pattern also evident in financial bubbles, where investors often recognize the unsustainability of prices but continue participating due to social pressure and fear of missing out. In both dueling and market bubbles, participants follow unwritten rules that seem irrational from outside but compelling from within the social context. These non-financial examples of mass delusion provide valuable context for understanding market bubbles. They suggest that the psychological vulnerabilities exposed in financial manias are not unique to economic contexts but represent broader patterns in human social psychology. The same mechanisms that led communities to execute "witches" or gentlemen to risk death over perceived slights can drive investors to pay absurd prices for tulips, shares, or other speculative assets. This broader perspective helps explain why financial education alone often proves insufficient protection against market manias—the forces driving these episodes operate at a deeper psychological level than rational calculation.

Chapter 5: The Psychology of Collective Madness

The recurring patterns of mass delusion throughout history reveal fundamental aspects of human psychology that transcend specific cultural contexts. Whether examining tulip mania, witch trials, or modern financial bubbles, certain psychological mechanisms consistently emerge as driving forces behind collective madness. Understanding these mechanisms provides valuable insight into why intelligent, educated individuals repeatedly succumb to irrational beliefs and behaviors when part of a group. Authority bias plays a crucial role in legitimizing collective delusions. When respected figures—whether financial experts, religious leaders, or government officials—endorse a particular narrative, it gains credibility that might otherwise be lacking. During the South Sea Bubble, the involvement of members of Parliament and the royal family convinced many skeptics that the company must be sound. Similarly, in witch trials, the participation of educated judges and clergy made accusations seem credible despite their fantastic nature. This deference to authority creates a shortcut in decision-making that bypasses critical evaluation, particularly when the authority figures themselves benefit from perpetuating the delusion. Social proof—the tendency to view behavior as correct when others are doing it—forms another pillar of collective madness. Humans are inherently social creatures who look to others for guidance about appropriate behavior, especially in ambiguous situations. During financial bubbles, seeing neighbors and colleagues investing heavily and apparently profiting creates powerful pressure to join in. As Charles Mackay observed in his classic study "Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds": "Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, one by one." Narrative fallacy—the human tendency to create coherent stories that explain complex phenomena—provides the intellectual framework for collective delusions. During bubbles, compelling narratives emerge about why "this time is different" or why traditional valuation methods no longer apply. In the 1720s, stories about untold wealth in Louisiana or South America justified astronomical share prices. In the 1990s dot-com bubble, narratives about the revolutionary nature of the internet performed the same function. These stories are particularly powerful because they contain elements of truth—tulips were indeed rare and beautiful, the internet did transform business—but extrapolate beyond reasonable limits. The role of emotion, particularly fear and greed, cannot be overstated in driving collective madness. Financial bubbles typically begin with greed as early investors see genuine profits, but they accelerate through fear—specifically, the fear of missing out. As prices rise, the pain of watching others profit becomes increasingly unbearable, eventually overwhelming rational assessment of value. Similarly, witch trials were driven by genuine fear of supernatural harm combined with the social advantages of being seen as opposing evil. These emotional drivers operate largely below the level of conscious awareness, making them particularly difficult to counteract through rational argument. Perhaps most troubling is how collective delusions create self-reinforcing systems that resist correction. During bubbles, rising prices seem to confirm the underlying narrative, attracting more investors and driving prices higher still. Skeptics are marginalized, ridiculed, or accused of failing to understand the "new paradigm." By the time contrary evidence becomes overwhelming, many participants are too deeply invested—financially, socially, and psychologically—to easily change course. This pattern helps explain why bubbles tend to last longer than rational observers expect and why they typically end not with a whimper but with a dramatic collapse.

Chapter 6: Warning Signs: How Bubbles Begin and Accelerate

Historical bubbles, despite their diverse contexts, typically follow recognizable patterns in their formation and acceleration. By identifying these common warning signs, attentive observers can spot potential bubbles before they reach their destructive peak. The initial stage of bubble formation almost invariably involves a legitimate innovation or opportunity that generates genuine value. Tulips were indeed rare and beautiful flowers that signified status. The Mississippi Company and South Sea Company addressed real financial needs through debt restructuring. The internet companies of the 1990s were building revolutionary technologies. This foundation of legitimacy provides crucial credibility that attracts initial investment and serious attention. The transition from legitimate opportunity to speculative mania typically involves a period of price appreciation based on fundamental factors, which then attracts attention from investors motivated primarily by price movement rather than underlying value. This shift in investor composition represents a critical warning sign. During the early stages of the Dutch tulip market, buyers were primarily wealthy connoisseurs who valued the flowers for their beauty. The speculative phase began when ordinary citizens with no horticultural interest entered the market solely to profit from rising prices. Similarly, the early internet was developed by technology enthusiasts before attracting purely speculative investment during the dot-com bubble. Credit expansion almost always accompanies and accelerates bubble formation. Easy money—whether through bank lending, new financial instruments, or government policy—provides the fuel that allows asset prices to rise far beyond what could be supported by cash transactions alone. During Tulip Mania, buyers purchased bulbs through promissory notes rather than immediate payment. The Mississippi and South Sea bubbles were explicitly tied to new forms of paper money and credit. Modern bubbles similarly correlate with periods of loose monetary policy and financial innovation. As economist Hyman Minsky observed: "The more stable things become and the longer things are stable, the more unstable they will be when the crisis hits." Media amplification plays an increasingly important role as bubbles develop. Newspapers during the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles published exaggerated accounts of colonial wealth that fueled investor enthusiasm. Modern financial media often inadvertently accelerate bubbles by giving disproportionate attention to rising assets and the people profiting from them. The constant coverage creates a false impression that "everyone" is participating and profiting, intensifying the fear of missing out. As financial historian Edward Chancellor noted: "The media does not cause bubbles, but it provides the mirror in which the crowd admires itself." Perhaps the most reliable warning sign of a bubble nearing its peak is the entry of unsophisticated participants with little understanding of the asset they're purchasing. When taxi drivers and hairdressers begin offering investment tips, as famously observed by Joseph Kennedy before the 1929 crash, the bubble has likely entered its final, most dangerous phase. This democratization of speculation often coincides with declining standards for participation—installment plans during the South Sea Bubble, no-money-down mortgages before the 2008 housing crash—that allow the last wave of buyers to enter with minimal commitment. These late entrants, lacking both capital reserves and understanding of the risks, become the most vulnerable when the inevitable collapse occurs. The acceleration phase of bubbles is marked by increasingly frequent justifications for why traditional valuation methods no longer apply. Phrases like "new paradigm," "new economy," or "this time is different" signal attempts to dismiss historical patterns and rational analysis. When proponents argue that an asset's value derives primarily from what someone else will pay rather than its intrinsic usefulness or income generation, the speculative nature of the market has become dominant. As Warren Buffett observed during the dot-com bubble: "The line separating investment and speculation, which is never bright and clear, becomes blurred still further when most market participants have recently enjoyed triumphs."

Chapter 7: Historical Lessons for Modern Investors

The recurring patterns of financial bubbles across centuries offer invaluable lessons for modern investors seeking to protect their wealth and potentially profit during periods of market extremes. Perhaps the most fundamental lesson is that human psychology in financial markets changes remarkably little over time. The same cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and social dynamics that drove Dutch merchants to trade houses for tulip bulbs operate just as powerfully in contemporary markets. This consistency suggests that studying historical episodes is not merely an academic exercise but practical preparation for navigating modern financial landscapes. One crucial insight from historical bubbles is the importance of maintaining independent judgment amid collective enthusiasm. During every major bubble, there were skeptics who recognized the disconnection between prices and fundamental value. Sir Isaac Newton initially sold his South Sea shares at a profit before being drawn back in by the frenzy and ultimately losing a fortune. His experience illustrates how social pressure can overwhelm even the most brilliant analytical minds. Modern investors would do well to establish decision-making frameworks and valuation disciplines before market manias take hold, as these pre-commitments provide anchors against the powerful currents of crowd psychology. Historical patterns reveal that timing the exact peak of bubbles is virtually impossible, even for sophisticated investors. Many who correctly identify bubbles face what economist John Maynard Keynes observed: "Markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent." This reality suggests that rather than attempting precise market timing, investors should gradually reduce exposure to overvalued assets while maintaining diversification. During the Mississippi Bubble, those who converted some paper profits to tangible assets like land or gold preserved portions of their wealth despite the system's eventual collapse. This balanced approach acknowledges both the difficulty of perfect timing and the real risks of remaining fully exposed to bubble dynamics. The aftermath of historical bubbles provides particularly valuable lessons about recovery patterns. Major bubbles typically lead to regulatory reforms, public disillusionment with the bubble asset class, and a period of undervaluation in the affected sector. However, the fundamental innovations that initially sparked the bubble often continue to develop and eventually create substantial value. After the railway manias of the 19th century, many investors were ruined, but the railway networks themselves transformed economies. Similarly, after the dot-com crash, internet technology continued its revolutionary impact. This pattern suggests that post-bubble environments may offer exceptional investment opportunities for those with patience and discernment. Perhaps most importantly, historical bubbles demonstrate that financial markets are not merely economic mechanisms but deeply social institutions shaped by narrative, emotion, and collective psychology. Successful navigation of these environments requires not just financial analysis but an understanding of how stories spread, how emotions influence decisions, and how social dynamics can override individual rationality. As historian Niall Ferguson observed: "The lesson of financial history is that sooner or later every bubble bursts. The challenge for investors is not to predict exactly when this will happen, but to ensure they are not among those who need to discover the precise moment." For modern investors, these historical lessons suggest a framework that balances participation in market opportunities with protection against extreme outcomes. This includes maintaining diversification across asset classes, avoiding excessive leverage that could force liquidation at inopportune moments, cultivating information sources that challenge rather than reinforce existing beliefs, and perhaps most crucially, developing an awareness of one's own psychological vulnerabilities to fear, greed, and social pressure. By internalizing these lessons from history's greatest bubbles, investors can hope to capture the benefits of financial innovation while avoiding the devastating losses that have repeatedly accompanied periods of collective financial delusion.

Summary

Throughout the centuries of financial history examined in this exploration, one fundamental pattern emerges with striking clarity: the cyclical nature of human delusion in markets. From tulip bulbs to tech stocks, these episodes reveal not merely economic phenomena but profound insights into human psychology. At their core, all these bubbles expose the tension between our rational capabilities and our emotional, social nature. When caught in the grip of financial mania, even the most educated and sophisticated individuals abandon critical thinking in favor of narratives that promise extraordinary wealth without extraordinary effort. The consistency of these patterns across vastly different historical contexts suggests something fundamental about human nature rather than merely specific market failures. These historical lessons hold particular relevance for our contemporary world, where information travels instantaneously and financial markets are increasingly accessible to ordinary citizens. First, we must recognize that financial education alone provides insufficient protection against bubble psychology—Isaac Newton's mathematical genius did not save him from the South Sea disaster. Second, institutional safeguards and regulations, while necessary, will always be playing catch-up to financial innovation and the creative ways humans find to pursue quick wealth. Finally, perhaps our best defense lies in cultivating historical awareness and psychological humility—recognizing that we are not immune to the delusions that captured our ancestors, and that claims of "this time is different" almost always prove false. By studying these cycles of delusion not as distant curiosities but as warnings about our own vulnerabilities, we might hope to moderate, if not entirely prevent, their destructive impacts on our financial and social systems.

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Charles Mackay

Charles Mackay was a Scottish poet, journalist, author, anthologist, novelist, and songwriter, remembered mainly for his book Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.Mackay became a journalist in London: in 1834 he was an occasional contributor to The Sun. From the spring of 1835 till 1844 he was assistant sub-editor of the Morning Chronicle. In the autumn of 1839 he spent a month's holiday in Scotland, witnessing the Eglintoun Tournament, which he described in the Chronicle, and making acquaintances in Edinburgh. In the autumn of 1844, he moved to Scotland, and became editor of the Glasgow Argus, resigning in 1847. He worked for the Illustrated London News in 1848, becoming editor in 1852.Mackay published Songs and Poems (1834), a History of London, The Thames and its Tributaries or, Rambles Among the Rivers (1840), Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841), and a romance entitled Longbeard. He is also remembered for his Gaelic Etymology of the Languages of Western Europe and the later Dictionary of Lowland Scotch.His daughter was English novelist and mystic Marie Corelli.

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