Man, the State and War

Man, the State and War Plot Summary

Introduction

International conflict remains one of the most persistent and devastating problems facing humanity. While technological advancements have made warfare increasingly destructive, our understanding of why conflicts occur has not kept pace with our ability to wage them. At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: What causes war? Is it rooted in human nature, the internal structures of states, or the anarchic international system itself? This exploration challenges conventional wisdom by examining three distinct "images" or levels of analysis for understanding international conflict. Rather than accepting simplistic explanations that blame aggressive human nature or particular state structures, it develops a comprehensive framework that integrates multiple causal factors. The analysis reveals how the anarchic structure of international relations creates a permissive environment where conflict becomes possible, while human nature and state characteristics determine when and how specific conflicts manifest. By following this systematic examination, readers gain not just theoretical insights but practical understanding of why peace remains elusive despite our collective desire for it.

Chapter 1: The First Image: Human Nature as a Source of War

The first image perspective locates the primary causes of war in human nature itself. According to this view, international conflicts ultimately stem from the flaws, aggressive impulses, and irrational tendencies inherent in human beings. Wars result from selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses, and human stupidity, with other causes considered secondary and interpreted in light of these fundamental factors. This perspective has a long intellectual history, with proponents ranging from classical philosophers to modern behavioral scientists. Some, like Confucius, believed that moral-intellectual enlightenment could transform human nature and eliminate war. Others, such as Bertrand Russell, advocated for reducing possessive instincts, while William James proposed channeling aggressive energies into constructive alternatives - a "moral equivalent of war." Despite their different prescriptions, these thinkers share the fundamental assumption that achieving peace requires changing humans themselves. The first image contains both optimistic and pessimistic variants. Optimists believe human nature can be sufficiently improved to eliminate war, while pessimists like Reinhold Niebuhr argue that humans possess an ineradicable potential for evil that makes conflict inevitable. Theologians like St. Augustine and philosophers like Spinoza attribute political discord to human defects, arguing that pride and self-interest inevitably lead to conflict. Hans Morgenthau similarly identifies "the ubiquity of evil in human action" as transforming even noble institutions into instruments of power. However, this perspective faces significant limitations. As Emile Durkheim pointed out, "the psychological factor is too general to predetermine the course of social phenomena." Human nature may explain why wars occur in general, but it cannot explain variations in conflict across time and space, since human nature remains constant. The first image thus commits the error of psychologism - uncritically using individual psychology to explain group phenomena without accounting for the social and political contexts in which human behavior unfolds. The behavioral science approach to war prevention represents a more sophisticated version of first-image analysis. Many behavioral scientists have argued that increased understanding among peoples or improved social adjustment of individuals would reduce war. Yet these approaches often overlook crucial questions of implementation and confuse knowledge with control. Even if wars are caused by psychological factors that scientists can identify, implementing solutions requires overcoming enormous practical obstacles within the existing political framework.

Chapter 2: The Second Image: How State Structures Shape International Behavior

The second image shifts focus from human nature to the internal organization of states as the key to understanding war and peace. According to this perspective, certain types of states are inherently more peaceful than others, and reforming states in particular ways can reduce or eliminate international conflict. This view appears in various forms throughout history. Some theorists argue that despotic governments create internal tensions that find expression in foreign adventures. Others suggest that democratic states are inherently more peaceful than authoritarian ones, or that socialist economies produce less aggressive foreign policies than capitalist ones. The common thread is the belief that good states make good neighbors, while bad states generate international instability. Nineteenth-century liberals exemplify this approach. They believed that individual initiative and free market competition would naturally produce harmony within states, and similarly, free trade and democratic governance would create harmony among states. As John Stuart Mill wrote, "the good of no country can be obtained by any means but such as tend to that of all countries." According to liberals, war serves the interests of ruling elites, not ordinary citizens, and democracy would give voice to those who suffer most in war. However, liberal prescriptions faced practical difficulties. Some liberals advocated non-interventionism, believing that good examples set by advanced countries would gradually lead all states toward peace. Others promoted interventionism, arguing that democratic states must actively spread democracy worldwide, sometimes through war, to create conditions for lasting peace. Both approaches proved problematic - non-interventionists couldn't explain how nations could improve internally while international relations remained competitive, while interventionists risked endless war in pursuit of their ideals. The socialist movement before World War I provides a significant test case for the second image. Socialists had developed elaborate theories linking capitalism to war and predicting that socialist states would live in peace. Yet when war broke out in 1914, socialist parties in belligerent countries supported their governments' war efforts. This failure revealed that international solidarity was weaker than national loyalties, and that socialist states would face the same security dilemmas as other states in an anarchic international system. The second image correctly identifies important variations in state behavior based on internal characteristics. However, it often underestimates the constraints imposed by the international environment and overestimates the degree to which internal reform can overcome these constraints. Even well-intentioned leaders of internally perfect states must worry about security in an anarchic world.

Chapter 3: The Third Image: Anarchy and the Security Dilemma

The third image locates the fundamental causes of war in the anarchic structure of the international system. With many sovereign states and no reliable central authority to enforce rules or resolve disputes, conflict becomes an ever-present possibility. This perspective does not deny the importance of human nature or state characteristics but argues that these factors operate within constraints imposed by the international system itself. In anarchy, states must ultimately rely on themselves for security and survival. As Thucydides implied when describing how Athenian power "terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war," states must be constantly concerned with their relative power positions. A state will use force to attain its goals if it values those goals more than peace and believes it can succeed. Because any state may use force at any time, all states must be prepared either to counter force with force or accept the consequences of weakness. Jean-Jacques Rousseau provides one of the clearest articulations of this third image through his parable about five men who must cooperate to capture a deer but are tempted to chase rabbits individually. The parable demonstrates how rational individual decisions can lead to collectively suboptimal outcomes in the absence of binding agreements. Applied to international relations, this illustrates the security dilemma - steps taken by one state to increase its security often decrease the security of others, prompting countermeasures that leave everyone less secure than before. The security dilemma helps explain why arms races occur despite their apparent irrationality. When Richard Cobden argued that simultaneous disarmament would make all states equally secure, he ignored a fundamental problem: without a supreme authority to enforce agreements, states cannot trust others to maintain their commitments. The fear that others might cheat makes cooperation difficult even when it would benefit everyone. This perspective clarifies why even well-intentioned states find themselves in conflict. A state cannot know another state's intentions with certainty, and what appears defensive to one may seem aggressive to another. As Frederick Dunn noted, "so long as the notion of self-help persists, the aim of maintaining the power position of the nation is paramount to all other considerations." The third image thus explains persistent patterns in international relations that the first and second images alone cannot account for.

Chapter 4: The Rational Logic of Power Politics in an Anarchic System

In an anarchic international system, what constitutes rational behavior for states? This question lies at the heart of understanding why conflicts persist even when they appear destructive to all parties involved. The third image reveals that what seems irrational from an idealistic perspective may actually represent prudent policy under the structural constraints states face. Without a central authority to enforce agreements or protect states from aggression, each state must prioritize its own security. This necessity creates situations where individually rational decisions produce collectively suboptimal outcomes - a classic "prisoner's dilemma." Arms races exemplify this dynamic: while mutual disarmament might benefit all parties, unilateral disarmament risks national survival if others continue arming. The rational choice for each state - to maintain or increase military capabilities - leads to a situation where all states spend more on defense yet become no more secure. Power - the ability to influence others and resist unwanted influence - stands as the central currency in international relations. Unlike domestic politics, where legitimate authority can separate power from right, international relations frequently reduces to raw capabilities. Military strength represents the ultimate form of power, as it provides the final means of enforcing demands when other methods fail. Economic resources matter largely because they can be converted into military capabilities or used to influence others through inducements or sanctions. The distribution of power across the international system profoundly shapes state behavior. Unipolar systems, dominated by a single superpower, operate differently from bipolar systems with two roughly equal powers or multipolar systems with several major players. Power transitions theory suggests that the greatest risk of major war occurs when a rising power approaches parity with a declining hegemon. The rising power, dissatisfied with an international order designed to benefit the established power, may challenge the status quo precisely when it gains the capability to do so successfully. States respond to power dynamics through various strategies. Balancing against threatening powers represents the most common approach, either through internal efforts (building up military capabilities) or external alliances. Alternatively, weaker states may bandwagon with powerful states when balancing seems futile. These strategies emerge not from ideological preferences but from the structural imperatives of survival in anarchy. Understanding the rational logic of power politics helps explain why well-meaning peace proposals often fail. Appeals to common interests, moral principles, or long-term benefits cannot overcome the immediate security concerns that anarchy imposes on states. Without addressing the structural conditions that make security competition rational, such appeals remain ineffective against the compelling logic of self-help.

Chapter 5: Balance of Power: Inevitable Consequence of International Anarchy

The balance of power emerges not as a policy choice but as an inevitable consequence of states seeking survival in anarchy. This system, often misunderstood as merely a diplomatic doctrine, represents a fundamental pattern in international relations - one that recurs across vastly different historical and cultural contexts whenever multiple independent political units coexist without a superior authority. When states prioritize their security and independence, they naturally resist domination by others. Any state growing too powerful threatens the autonomy of others, prompting counterbalancing behaviors. These responses need not be consciously directed toward maintaining a balance - they simply reflect rational reactions to perceived threats. States build armaments, form alliances, and sometimes even go to war not to preserve some abstract equilibrium but to ensure their own survival against potentially overwhelming power. Historical evidence demonstrates the persistence of balancing behavior across diverse international systems. In ancient Greece, city-states combined against Athenian hegemony. Renaissance Italian city-states practiced sophisticated balance of power politics. Early modern Europe saw constantly shifting alliances preventing any single power from dominating the continent. Even in regions and eras where the term "balance of power" was unknown, similar patterns emerged whenever multiple independent political units interacted. The balance of power operates through several mechanisms. Most directly, states form countervailing coalitions against threatening powers. Additionally, states may intervene to prevent the defeat of weaker powers by stronger ones, maintaining the diversity of the system. Territory and resources may be redistributed through peace settlements to prevent excessive concentration of power. These mechanisms function whether or not statesmen consciously pursue balance - they reflect structural imperatives rather than ideological preferences. Critics often denounce balance of power politics as amoral, outdated, or destabilizing. Yet these criticisms frequently misunderstand its nature. The balance of power is not a policy choice that can be abandoned for more enlightened alternatives - it is a condition that exists whenever multiple independent states coexist. States may reject balance of power rhetoric while still engaging in balancing behaviors under different names, such as "collective security" or "defense cooperation." The persistence of the balance of power despite centuries of criticism testifies to its roots in the fundamental structure of international politics. As long as states value their independence and no world government exists to guarantee their security, some form of power balancing will continue. This does not mean perpetual conflict is inevitable, but it does suggest that security competition remains an inescapable feature of international relations under anarchy.

Chapter 6: Integrating the Three Images: A Comprehensive Framework

A comprehensive understanding of international conflict requires integrating all three images rather than relying exclusively on any single one. Each image captures important aspects of reality but provides an incomplete picture when considered alone. Together, they form a multi-layered explanation that accounts for both the possibility of war and its specific manifestations. The first image correctly identifies human nature as a necessary condition for war. Without human aggression, selfishness, and irrationality, wars would not occur. However, human nature alone cannot explain variations in conflict over time or differences between states. The same human nature that produces war also produces peace, cooperation, and altruism. The first image thus establishes that war is possible but cannot explain when and where it actually happens. The second image rightly emphasizes how internal state structures shape foreign policy. Democratic, authoritarian, capitalist, and socialist states do behave differently in some respects. Improving states internally may reduce certain causes of war. Yet history has repeatedly confounded those who predicted peace based solely on the spread of particular state forms. Democratic states have fought wars, and socialist states have clashed with one another. The second image helps explain variations in state behavior but cannot account for the persistent security competition that characterizes international relations. The third image provides the essential systemic context within which the other factors operate. The anarchic structure of international politics creates pressures and incentives that constrain all states regardless of their internal characteristics. Even well-intentioned leaders of internally perfect states must worry about security and relative power in an anarchic environment. The third image explains why conflict remains possible even among states with no inherent desire for war. These images interact in complex ways. The international system shapes state behavior, but states also shape the system. Human nature influences both state structures and international interactions, while being constrained by them. War has multiple causes operating at different levels of analysis, and eliminating it would require addressing all three levels: improving human nature, reforming states, and transforming the international system. A balanced approach recognizes that complete success at any level is unlikely. More realistically, we should understand how the three levels interact and develop strategies that work within these constraints. The most promising approaches acknowledge the reality of international anarchy while seeking to mitigate its effects through institutions, norms, and carefully designed incentives. They recognize human imperfections while creating systems that channel human behavior in more constructive directions. And they promote beneficial internal reforms while understanding the limits of what such reforms can accomplish in an anarchic world.

Summary

The analysis of international conflict through three distinct images - human nature, state structure, and systemic anarchy - reveals that while each perspective captures important aspects of reality, the third image provides the essential foundation for understanding why wars occur. The anarchic structure of international relations creates a permissive environment where conflict becomes possible, regardless of human nature or state characteristics. Within this framework, states rationally pursue security through power accumulation and balancing behaviors, often producing collectively suboptimal outcomes despite individually rational decisions. This framework offers profound implications for peace efforts. Rather than focusing exclusively on changing human nature through education or reforming states through democratization, effective approaches must address the structural conditions that make security competition rational. While perfect solutions remain elusive, understanding the multi-causal nature of international conflict provides a more realistic foundation for managing interstate relations. The enduring value of this analysis lies not in offering simple prescriptions but in clarifying the complex interplay of factors that shape international politics, allowing us to develop more nuanced and effective approaches to reducing the scourge of war.

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Kenneth N. Waltz

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