New Cold Wars

New Cold Wars Plot Summary

Introduction

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was supposed to herald a new era of international cooperation and peace. As jubilant Germans hammered away at the concrete barrier that had divided their country for decades, Western leaders proclaimed the "end of history" – the final triumph of liberal democracy and free markets over authoritarianism. For nearly three decades, this optimistic vision shaped American foreign policy, guiding efforts to integrate former adversaries like Russia and China into the global economy and international institutions. Yet today, we find ourselves in a world where great power competition has returned with a vengeance. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's increasingly assertive stance in the Indo-Pacific, and technological rivalries between major powers have shattered the post-Cold War consensus. This book takes readers inside the pivotal moments and decisions that led to this dramatic shift, exploring how Western leaders misread the intentions of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, how these authoritarian leaders exploited Western naivety, and what the new era of great power competition means for global stability. Through detailed analysis of key events from the post-Soviet period to the present day, readers will gain a deeper understanding of the forces reshaping our world and the challenges facing democracies in an increasingly multipolar international system.

Chapter 1: The Post-Cold War Illusion: From Optimism to Reality (1991-2007)

The period from 1991 to 2007 represented what many in the West viewed as the dawn of a new global order. With the Soviet Union's collapse in December 1991, the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower. American policymakers, intoxicated by this unprecedented position of strength, embraced what they called a strategy of "engagement" with former adversaries. President Bill Clinton championed the expansion of NATO eastward while simultaneously working to integrate Russia into Western economic and political structures. The underlying belief was simple: as countries became more economically interconnected with the West, they would inevitably become more democratic and less threatening. This optimism extended to America's approach toward China. When Clinton advocated for China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2000, he declared: "By joining the WTO, China is not simply agreeing to import more of our products; it is agreeing to import one of democracy's most cherished values: economic freedom." This sentiment reflected the prevailing wisdom in Washington – that economic liberalization would inevitably lead to political liberalization. Both Republican and Democratic administrations pursued this engagement strategy, despite mounting evidence that neither Russia nor China was following the expected path toward Western-style democracy. In Russia, the chaotic transition from communism under Boris Yeltsin gave way to Vladimir Putin's presidency in 2000. Initially, Western leaders saw Putin as a reformer who would continue Russia's integration with the West. During a 2002 summit in St. Petersburg, President George W. Bush famously claimed he had looked into Putin's eyes and "got a sense of his soul." That same year, the NATO-Russia Council was established, creating a mechanism for cooperation between former Cold War adversaries. Following the September 11 attacks, Putin was the first foreign leader to call Bush, offering support in the fight against terrorism. However, beneath the surface of diplomatic niceties, tensions were building. NATO's eastward expansion in 1999 and again in 2004 deeply alarmed Moscow. While Western leaders saw this as spreading security and democracy, Putin viewed it as a betrayal of promises allegedly made during German reunification negotiations. The "color revolutions" in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) further convinced Putin that the West was pursuing a strategy of regime change that would eventually target Russia itself. As one Russian official later remarked, "We concluded that these were not just spontaneous events but had Western backing." The turning point came in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, when Putin delivered a blistering speech condemning American "unilateralism" and NATO expansion. "NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders," he declared. "We have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended?" Though largely dismissed by Western officials at the time, this speech marked the end of Putin's attempts to integrate Russia into Western structures on Western terms. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates later wrote, "The Cold War was over, but Russia's historical ambitions were not." This period reveals how profoundly both sides misunderstood each other's intentions and worldviews. Western leaders believed economic incentives would transform Russia and China, while these nations increasingly saw themselves as defenders of their own civilizational values against Western encroachment. The seeds of future conflict were sown not just in policy disagreements but in fundamentally different conceptions of international order, sovereignty, and historical destiny – differences that would explode into open confrontation in the years to come.

Chapter 2: China's Rise and America's Strategic Miscalculation (2000-2020)

The first two decades of the 21st century witnessed China's extraordinary transformation from a developing economy to a global superpower. In 2000, China's GDP was just $1.2 trillion; by 2020, it had grown to over $14.7 trillion, making it the world's second-largest economy. This remarkable growth was facilitated by China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, a move championed by the Clinton administration and supported by subsequent presidents who believed economic integration would lead to political liberalization. The prevailing Western theory was elegantly simple: as China grew wealthier and more integrated into global markets, it would inevitably become more democratic and adopt Western values. This belief shaped American policy toward China for decades, with both Republican and Democratic administrations pursuing engagement despite mounting evidence of China's authoritarian resilience. As Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State under George W. Bush, articulated in 2005, the goal was to make China a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system – a partner rather than a competitor in maintaining global order. The watershed moment came with Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012-2013. Unlike his predecessors who maintained a low international profile following Deng Xiaoping's dictum to "hide your strength and bide your time," Xi pursued an assertive foreign policy and consolidated power domestically. He launched the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, extending Chinese influence across Asia, Africa, and Europe through infrastructure investments and loans. Simultaneously, China began militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensifying cyber espionage against Western targets, and implementing the "Made in China 2025" plan to dominate key technologies of the future. American policymakers were slow to recognize the fundamental shift in China's ambitions. In a classified speech to Communist Party leaders in January 2013 (later published), Xi declared that "capitalism is bound to die out and socialism is bound to win" and spoke of "laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position." Yet Washington continued to hope that China would become a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system, even as Beijing systematically worked to reshape that system in its favor. The Obama administration's "pivot to Asia" represented an initial recognition of China's growing challenge, but this reorientation was undermined by continued crises in the Middle East and budget constraints following the 2008 financial crisis. By the time the Trump administration launched its trade war against China in 2018, Beijing had already established dominant positions in many strategic industries and built alternative international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to expand its influence. As one former State Department official noted, "We spent twenty years preparing for the China we wanted, not the China we got." By 2020, a bipartisan consensus had emerged in Washington that the era of engagement with China had failed. The COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan, further strained relations as China's lack of transparency and aggressive "wolf warrior" diplomacy alienated countries around the world. The Trump administration's confrontational approach, though often chaotic in execution, reflected a fundamental reassessment of the China challenge that would continue under President Biden. As Kurt Campbell, Biden's Asia coordinator, reflected: "The period that was broadly described as engagement has come to an end." The collapse of this decades-long strategy represented one of the most consequential shifts in American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

Chapter 3: Putin's Imperial Ambitions and Ukraine's Resistance (2014-2022)

The annexation of Crimea in February 2014 marked a decisive turning point in Russia's relations with the West. Following Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution, which ousted the pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, Putin dispatched "little green men" – Russian soldiers without insignia – to seize control of the Crimean Peninsula. Within weeks, Russia had formally annexed the territory, the first forcible change of European borders since World War II. Simultaneously, Russian-backed separatists began fighting Ukrainian forces in the eastern Donbas region, igniting a conflict that would smolder for eight years. The Western response to this aggression proved tepid. President Obama imposed limited sanctions on Russian individuals and entities but refused to provide lethal weapons to Ukraine, fearing escalation. European leaders, particularly German Chancellor Angela Merkel, pursued diplomatic solutions through the Minsk agreements while simultaneously deepening energy ties with Moscow through the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project. This contradictory approach – condemning Russian aggression while increasing dependence on Russian gas – sent mixed signals to the Kremlin about the West's resolve. For Putin, the Ukraine crisis represented an opportunity to reassert Russia's great power status and prevent what he saw as Western encroachment in Russia's traditional sphere of influence. In a lengthy essay published in July 2021, Putin articulated his historical revisionism, arguing that Russians and Ukrainians were "one people" artificially divided by historical accidents and Western interference. This narrative served both to justify his aggressive policies and to shore up domestic support as Russia's economy struggled under sanctions and falling oil prices. As one Russian analyst observed, "For Putin, Ukraine is not just another country – it's an idea about Russia's place in the world." Ukraine, meanwhile, underwent a profound transformation. Despite corruption and political instability, Ukrainian civil society flourished, and a distinct national identity strengthened in response to Russian aggression. The comedian-turned-politician Volodymyr Zelensky won the presidency in 2019 on a platform of fighting corruption and seeking peace with Russia. Yet his efforts to negotiate with Putin proved fruitless, as the Russian leader refused to recognize Ukraine as a legitimate, independent state with its own right to determine its foreign policy orientation. By late 2021, Putin began massing troops near Ukraine's borders in what initially appeared to be a pressure tactic. American intelligence agencies detected Russian plans for a full-scale invasion and shared this information with allies, many of whom remained skeptical that Putin would take such a drastic step. When the invasion came on February 24, 2022, it shattered the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe and revealed the failure of three decades of Western policy toward Russia. As one senior European diplomat reflected, "We thought economic interdependence would make war unthinkable. We were wrong." The Ukrainian resistance to Russia's invasion surprised both Moscow and Western capitals. Zelensky's decision to remain in Kyiv, despite offers of evacuation, galvanized Ukrainian morale. His famous response to an American evacuation offer – "I need ammunition, not a ride" – symbolized Ukraine's determination to fight for its sovereignty. This resistance forced a fundamental reassessment of both Ukrainian capabilities and Russian military power, which had been significantly overestimated. The war revealed deep structural problems in Russia's armed forces, from corruption and poor logistics to outdated tactics and low morale, while demonstrating the power of a society united in defense of its independence.

Chapter 4: The Technological Battlefield: Cyber Warfare and Critical Infrastructure

The emergence of cyberspace as a domain of great power competition has fundamentally altered the nature of international conflict. Unlike traditional military confrontations, cyber operations exist in a gray zone between peace and war, allowing nations to inflict significant damage while maintaining plausible deniability. This new battlefield became evident in 2020 when Russian hackers executed the SolarWinds operation, penetrating thousands of organizations including multiple U.S. government agencies by compromising a widely-used software update mechanism. The SolarWinds hack represented a watershed moment in cyber espionage – not just for its sophistication but for its scope. By compromising a trusted software supply chain, Russian intelligence services gained access to the Treasury Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and even the cybersecurity firm FireEye. The operation remained undetected for months, allowing the hackers to gather intelligence and potentially place backdoors for future operations. When finally discovered, it forced a fundamental reassessment of cybersecurity practices and highlighted the vulnerability of even the most sophisticated organizations to well-resourced state actors. China's approach to cyber operations has been equally concerning but different in focus. While Russia has emphasized disruptive attacks and intelligence gathering, China has pursued what experts call "the greatest transfer of wealth in history" through systematic theft of intellectual property. Chinese hackers, often working for the People's Liberation Army or Ministry of State Security, have targeted everything from semiconductor designs to pharmaceutical research to aerospace technology. This campaign has saved Chinese companies billions in research and development costs while accelerating China's technological advancement in strategic industries. Critical infrastructure has become particularly vulnerable to digital attacks. In May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline – responsible for transporting 45% of the East Coast's fuel – was shut down by a ransomware attack attributed to DarkSide, a Russian-based criminal group. The attack caused gas shortages across the southeastern United States and highlighted how even criminal hackers could threaten national security. Similar attacks have targeted water treatment facilities, hospitals, and electrical grids, demonstrating the potential for cyber operations to cause physical harm and societal disruption. The technological competition extends beyond cyberspace to encompass artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other emerging technologies with profound security implications. Under the "Made in China 2025" initiative, Beijing has invested billions to achieve dominance in these strategic sectors. The United States has responded with export controls and investment restrictions aimed at slowing China's technological advancement, particularly in semiconductors and other dual-use technologies with military applications. As Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor under President Biden, explained in 2022: "Computing-related technologies, biotechnologies, and clean tech are foundational to economic competitiveness in the 21st century – and are essential to our national security." This technological battlefield has forced a fundamental reconsideration of economic interdependence. Both the United States and China have begun pursuing "industrial policies" to reduce vulnerability to supply chain disruptions and foreign influence. The Biden administration's CHIPS Act, which provides $52 billion to boost domestic semiconductor manufacturing, represents a dramatic departure from decades of free-market orthodoxy. Similarly, China's "dual circulation" strategy aims to reduce dependence on foreign technology while maintaining access to international markets. As one senior American official observed, "The era of economic engagement is over. We've entered an age of strategic competition where technology defines national power."

Chapter 5: Democracy vs. Autocracy: The New Global Fault Line

The ideological dimension of today's great power competition has emerged as a defining feature of the new Cold Wars. Unlike the original Cold War, where the Soviet Union promoted communism as an alternative to capitalism, today's contest centers on governance models: liberal democracy versus state-controlled authoritarianism. President Biden framed this divide explicitly in his first press conference, declaring, "This is a battle between the utility of democracies in the twenty-first century and autocracies." This framing reflects a genuine ideological struggle taking place across the international system. Both Russia and China have actively promoted their governance models as superior alternatives to Western liberal democracy. Following the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol, Chinese state media broadcast images of the riot to domestic audiences, making the unsubtle point that democracy leads to chaos and instability. Similarly, Russian propaganda has highlighted American political polarization, racial tensions, and economic inequality to argue that Western-style democracy is failing. As Xi Jinping stated at the 19th Party Congress, China offers "a new option for other countries who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence." The authoritarian challenge has gained traction partly because of genuine governance problems in Western democracies. Rising inequality, political gridlock, and the spread of disinformation have undermined public trust in democratic institutions. The 2008 financial crisis and the initially chaotic response to the COVID-19 pandemic in many Western countries further damaged the democratic brand. As political scientist Francis Fukuyama acknowledged in 2020, "The democratic recession has been going on for 15 years, and it's getting worse rather than better." China's model of "authoritarian capitalism" has proven particularly attractive to developing nations. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing offers infrastructure investment without the governance and human rights conditions typically attached to Western aid. Chinese diplomats argue that their system delivers stability and economic growth without the messiness of democratic politics. At a diplomatic meeting in Anchorage in March 2021, China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi bluntly told Secretary of State Antony Blinken, "The United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength." The democracy-autocracy divide has complicated international cooperation on global challenges like climate change and pandemic response. It has also created dilemmas for countries caught between the competing powers, forcing them to choose sides or attempt a precarious balancing act. As one Southeast Asian diplomat confided, "Don't make us choose" has become the mantra of nations trying to navigate between American security guarantees and Chinese economic opportunities. The result has been a fragmentation of the international system into competing blocs, with democratic and authoritarian powers each trying to expand their spheres of influence. The ideological competition has also spilled over into domestic politics within democracies themselves. Authoritarian powers have exploited social media and other digital platforms to amplify existing divisions and undermine trust in democratic processes. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election represented a particularly brazen attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities. As a result, strengthening democratic institutions and addressing social divisions has become not just a domestic priority but a national security imperative for Western nations seeking to counter authoritarian influence.

Chapter 6: Taiwan and Semiconductors: The Silicon Shield Dilemma

Taiwan sits at the intersection of geopolitical rivalry and technological competition, making it perhaps the most dangerous flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. The island's unique status – a self-governing democracy that Beijing claims as its territory – has created a precarious situation that grows more volatile as China's power and ambition expand. What makes Taiwan particularly significant is its dominant position in the global semiconductor industry, adding an economic dimension to what might otherwise be a regional territorial dispute. The roots of the Taiwan issue stretch back to 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces retreated to the island following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War. For decades, both the government in Taipei and Beijing claimed to be the legitimate rulers of all China. The United States recognized Taiwan until 1979, when it switched diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic as part of the normalization of relations. Since then, American policy has been governed by the Taiwan Relations Act, which commits the U.S. to provide defensive arms to Taiwan, and by the principle of "strategic ambiguity" – neither explicitly promising to defend Taiwan nor ruling out intervention. This delicate balance has been increasingly tested by China's growing assertiveness under Xi Jinping. Chinese military aircraft regularly enter Taiwan's air defense identification zone, while naval exercises simulate blockades of the island. In a 2021 speech marking the Communist Party's centenary, Xi reiterated that "resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China's complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment" of the Party. These pressures have coincided with the strengthening of Taiwan's distinct identity, particularly among younger generations who increasingly see themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The semiconductor dimension adds another layer of complexity to this standoff. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces approximately 90% of the world's most advanced chips, making it an irreplaceable node in global technology supply chains. These tiny components power everything from smartphones and data centers to advanced weapons systems and artificial intelligence applications. As one industry executive noted, "The world's most important company that Americans know nothing about is TSMC." This technological centrality has created what some analysts call Taiwan's "silicon shield" – the theory that the island's semiconductor industry makes it too valuable for China to risk attacking. However, this same concentration of critical manufacturing has also created a strategic vulnerability for the United States and its allies, who depend on Taiwanese chips for both economic prosperity and military advantage. A Chinese blockade or invasion of Taiwan could trigger a global economic crisis far exceeding the supply chain disruptions experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Recognizing this vulnerability, both the United States and China have taken steps to reduce their dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors. The CHIPS Act provides billions in subsidies to encourage semiconductor manufacturing in the United States, while China is investing heavily in its domestic chip industry. TSMC itself has begun diversifying its manufacturing footprint, building new facilities in Arizona and Japan. However, these efforts will take years to bear fruit, and Taiwan's technological edge in the most advanced manufacturing processes remains significant. The Taiwan situation illustrates how technology has become inextricably linked with geopolitics in the new era of great power competition. Unlike previous eras where military power or territorial control were the primary currencies of international influence, control of critical technologies now shapes the balance of power. As one senior American official observed, "Semiconductors are the oil of the 21st century – whoever controls their production controls the future." How the United States, China, and Taiwan navigate this complex relationship may well determine whether the Indo-Pacific remains peaceful or becomes the site of the 21st century's most dangerous conflict.

Chapter 7: Nuclear Paradox: Deterrence in a Multipolar World

For three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, nuclear weapons receded from public consciousness. Strategic arms control treaties reduced U.S. and Russian arsenals, and the focus shifted to preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation to "rogue states" like North Korea and Iran. This period of relative nuclear stability has now given way to a more dangerous era characterized by modernization programs, collapsing arms control agreements, and the emergence of new nuclear powers and technologies. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 brought nuclear threats back to the center of international politics. Just days after launching the invasion, Putin ordered Russia's nuclear forces to a "special regime of combat duty" – a deliberate signal of nuclear readiness. As Ukrainian forces began reclaiming territory in the fall of 2022, Russian officials made increasingly explicit nuclear threats. Former president Dmitry Medvedev warned that Russia had the right to use nuclear weapons if pushed beyond its limits, while Putin himself declared that his nuclear threats were "not a bluff." These statements represented the most serious nuclear saber-rattling since the Cuban Missile Crisis and forced Western leaders to carefully calibrate their support for Ukraine to avoid triggering nuclear escalation. China's nuclear expansion has further complicated the strategic landscape. For decades, Beijing maintained a relatively small nuclear arsenal focused on minimum deterrence – perhaps 200-300 warheads compared to the thousands held by the United States and Russia. This restraint appears to have ended under Xi Jinping. Satellite imagery has revealed the construction of hundreds of new missile silos in western China, while the Pentagon estimates that China could have 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030. This rapid expansion is transforming what was once a bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia into a more complex triangular dynamic with no historical precedent. New technologies are further eroding nuclear stability. Hypersonic weapons, which travel at more than five times the speed of sound and can maneuver during flight, reduce warning times and complicate defense calculations. Cyber capabilities create new vulnerabilities in nuclear command and control systems, raising the risk of false alarms or unauthorized launches. Artificial intelligence, while potentially enhancing early warning systems, could also increase pressure for rapid decision-making during crises. As one nuclear strategist observed, "The technological environment is evolving faster than our strategic thinking." The collapse of the arms control architecture built during the Cold War has removed important guardrails at precisely the moment when they are most needed. The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, while Russia suspended its participation in the New START Treaty in 2023. No comprehensive agreements exist to limit China's nuclear forces or to address new technologies like hypersonic weapons. As a result, we are entering what former Secretary of Defense William Perry called "a new nuclear arms race, but one that is fundamentally different and in some ways more dangerous than the Cold War." This "nuclear paradox" – where nuclear weapons remain essential for deterrence even as they create existential risks – has become more acute in a multipolar world. During the Cold War, the bipolar U.S.-Soviet relationship created a certain stability through mutual vulnerability. Today's more complex nuclear landscape involves multiple nuclear powers with asymmetric capabilities, different doctrines, and varying levels of experience in managing nuclear risks. The potential for miscalculation or misunderstanding is correspondingly greater. Perhaps most concerning is the erosion of the nuclear taboo – the norm against using nuclear weapons that has held since 1945. Russia's explicit nuclear threats against a non-nuclear state represent a dangerous precedent that could encourage other nuclear powers to make similar threats in future conflicts. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned, "We are at the edge of war with Russia and China on issues which we partly created, without any concept of how this is going to end or what it's supposed to lead to."

Summary

The collision of great powers in the 21st century represents a fundamental shift in the international order that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War. The core dynamic driving this transformation is the tension between America's desire to preserve its global leadership and the determination of Russia and China to reshape the international system in ways that accommodate their interests and values. This conflict manifests across multiple domains – military, economic, technological, and ideological – creating not one but several interconnected "cold wars" that are more complex and potentially more dangerous than the U.S.-Soviet standoff of the previous century. The lessons of this new era of great power competition are sobering but essential. First, economic interdependence does not guarantee peace or political convergence – countries can be deeply integrated economically while remaining geopolitical rivals. Second, technology has become the central battlefield of great power competition, with control over critical innovations like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced semiconductors determining future economic and military advantage. Finally, the contest between democratic and authoritarian governance models will shape the coming decades, with each system's ability to deliver prosperity, security, and effective governance under intense scrutiny. For citizens and policymakers alike, navigating this new landscape requires abandoning post-Cold War illusions and developing a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in an increasingly multipolar world.

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David E. Sanger

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