Revolutionary Iran

Revolutionary Iran Plot Summary

Introduction

In the summer of 2009, the world watched as hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets of Tehran, demanding free, democratic government and an end to tyranny. This dramatic moment, thirty years after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, captured global attention and highlighted Iran's continuing significance on the world stage. The apparent strangeness of Iranian politics and behavior over the past four decades becomes comprehensible only through understanding the country's complex history and unique place in world civilization. Iran is less a country than a continent, more a civilization than a nation. With its remarkable diversity of ethnicity, language, climate, and geography, Iran maintains a cultural self-confidence that has allowed it to resist complete globalization. Since the second millennium BCE, Iranian history serves as a microcosm of human history itself: empires, revolutions, invasions, great thinkers, charismatic leaders, and profound cultural achievements. For readers seeking to understand the Middle East, global politics, or the interplay between tradition and modernity, the story of Iran's revolutionary transformation offers essential insights into one of the world's most misunderstood yet influential nations.

Chapter 1: Revolution and Islamic Republic Formation (1979-1980)

The Iranian Revolution began during a period of economic uncertainty in the late 1970s. After the oil-fueled boom of the early decade faltered, inflation and unemployment rose, creating widespread discontent. In January 1978, a government-backed newspaper published an attack on the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, triggering demonstrations by religious students in Qom where several protesters were killed by police. This incident sparked a cycle of protests and violent repression that grew increasingly intense throughout the year, following the Shi'a tradition of forty-day mourning periods that culminated in new demonstrations. By late 1978, the revolutionary movement had expanded dramatically when workers joined with strikes—particularly devastating were those in the oil industry. On September 8, known as "Black Friday," martial law was declared, and a large number of demonstrators were killed in Tehran. This massacre destroyed whatever credibility the Shah had left, and the general demand aligned with Khomeini's longstanding call for the Shah to leave. On January 16, 1979, the Shah flew out of Iran. Khomeini returned triumphantly on February 1, and within ten days, the last remnants of the Shah's government collapsed when the military declared neutrality. The revolutionary coalition that overthrew the Shah drew strength from multiple sources. Religious elements were guided by Shi'a traditions of resistance to unjust authority, dating back to the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala. Intellectuals like Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati had developed powerful critiques of Westernization and advocated for an authentic Islamic identity. Meanwhile, secular nationalists, liberals, and leftists opposed the Shah's autocracy and human rights abuses. As one observer noted, "The Shah struggles day and night, confident that within a decade we shall have surpassed much of the developed world... Yet no manner of wishful thinking can alter life in these streets." The Islamic Republic was born through a national referendum in March 1979, giving 97 percent support for Khomeini's vision. However, the first year after the revolution was marked by intense struggles over the shape of the new state. Initially, Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan, a moderate Islamic liberal, as prime minister of a provisional government. But real power increasingly resided with Khomeini and his clerical allies who controlled the Revolutionary Council, revolutionary courts, and local revolutionary committees (komitehs). The seizure of the American Embassy in November 1979 by militant students, which Khomeini endorsed, effectively destroyed Bazargan's government and allowed Khomeini's supporters to sideline moderate voices. The drafting of the new constitution became another battleground. The initial draft prepared by Bazargan's government envisioned a democratic republic with Islamic principles but limited clerical authority. However, Khomeini's supporters dominated the Assembly of Experts tasked with reviewing the draft, and they fundamentally transformed it to enshrine velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) as the governing principle. By early 1980, the Islamic Republic Party, dominated by clerics loyal to Khomeini, had consolidated control over most institutions, establishing a theocratic system that few of the revolution's secular participants had anticipated.

Chapter 2: War and Ideological Consolidation (1980-1988)

On September 22, 1980, Iraqi forces launched a massive invasion of Iran, beginning what would become the longest conventional war of the 20th century. Saddam Hussein, Iraq's ambitious leader, saw an opportunity to strike while Iran was weakened by revolutionary turmoil and military purges. He sought to overturn the 1975 Algiers Agreement that had settled border disputes unfavorably for Iraq and to establish Iraq as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region. The initial Iraqi offensive drove deep into Iranian territory, capturing the port city of Khorramshahr and besieging Abadan. The invasion had a unifying effect on Iranians, temporarily healing political divisions as the nation rallied to defend itself. By mid-1982, Iran had not only repelled the Iraqi forces but launched a counter-offensive, recapturing Khorramshahr in a bloody battle that became emblematic of Iranian sacrifice and determination. At this point, Saddam Hussein offered peace terms, but Khomeini rejected them, declaring that the war would continue until the Iraqi regime fell. This fateful decision would prolong the conflict for six more years, transforming it into a war of attrition with horrific human costs. Both sides employed brutal tactics, with Iran particularly relying on Basij volunteers, including teenagers who marched to their deaths across minefields wearing plastic keys around their necks that supposedly would open the gates of paradise. Iraq responded with chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve agents, killing or injuring thousands of Iranian soldiers and civilians. As one Iranian veteran recalled, "We had nothing but faith against their modern weapons." The war became internationalized as regional and global powers intervened. The United States, Soviet Union, France, and Arab Gulf states provided Iraq with weapons, intelligence, and financial support, while Iran remained largely isolated. Domestically, the war provided justification for increased state control and the suppression of dissent. Opposition groups like the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, which had initially supported the revolution but later turned against the clerical leadership, were brutally crushed in 1981-82. The war economy necessitated rationing, price controls, and greater centralization, strengthening the state's role in society. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah) and the Basij militia grew in size and influence, often overshadowing the regular military and establishing themselves as powerful institutional players within the Islamic Republic. By 1988, after nearly eight years of fighting, Iran was exhausted economically and militarily. The tragic downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes in July 1988, killing 290 civilians, further demonstrated Iran's vulnerability. Finally, on July 20, 1988, Khomeini accepted UN Resolution 598, comparing the decision to "drinking poison." The war had cost both countries an estimated one million casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, yet ended essentially where it had begun—with borders unchanged. However, the "sacred defense," as Iranians call it, profoundly shaped the Islamic Republic's identity, strengthening the Revolutionary Guards and creating a generation of war veterans who would later dominate Iranian politics.

Chapter 3: Pragmatic Reconstruction Under Rafsanjani (1989-1997)

The end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and Ayatollah Khomeini's death in June 1989 marked the beginning of a new era for the Islamic Republic. The country faced enormous challenges: rebuilding war-damaged infrastructure, addressing economic stagnation, and determining the future direction of the revolution without its charismatic founder. Ali Khamenei, previously serving as president, was elevated to Supreme Leader despite lacking Khomeini's religious credentials, while pragmatic cleric Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president with a mandate to rebuild the shattered economy. Rafsanjani's presidency (1989-1997) focused on economic reconstruction and reintegration into the global economy. His administration implemented policies of economic liberalization, privatization of state enterprises, and attempts to attract foreign investment. These "thermidor" reforms aimed to stabilize the revolutionary system rather than fundamentally change it. As Rafsanjani himself put it, "We cannot remain in a revolutionary state forever; we must build the country." His technocratic approach brought some economic recovery but also widened the gap between rich and poor, creating resentment among those who felt the revolution's egalitarian promises had been betrayed. The five-year development plan Rafsanjani introduced aimed to rebuild oil infrastructure damaged during the war, reduce government controls, and stimulate economic growth. Some notable successes were achieved - economic growth accelerated to impressive levels in the early 1990s, agricultural production increased, and the birth rate declined through a pragmatic family planning program. The government also expanded educational opportunities, with university enrollment growing substantially, including through the establishment of private "Azad" universities that would transform Iran's educational landscape. However, Rafsanjani's economic liberalization program encountered significant obstacles. When oil prices fell in the mid-1990s, foreign debt ballooned and inflation surged to around 50 percent. The privatization initiative was undermined when many state enterprises were transferred to revolutionary foundations (bonyads) and entities connected to the Revolutionary Guards rather than to genuine private ownership. Meanwhile, US sanctions, intensified under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, limited foreign investment and hindered Iran's reintegration into the global economy. By the mid-1990s, Rafsanjani's popularity had declined significantly as ordinary Iranians struggled with inflation and unemployment. The post-Khomeini period also saw significant tensions between competing visions for Iran's future. Conservative clerics who controlled the Guardian Council, judiciary, and security apparatus sought to preserve revolutionary orthodoxy and resist cultural liberalization. Meanwhile, a new generation of reform-minded intellectuals began questioning aspects of the Islamic Republic's governance model. Figures like Abdolkarim Soroush developed theories reconciling Islam with democracy and human rights, influencing many young Iranians educated after the revolution. These intellectual currents, combined with growing social discontent, especially among youth and the urban middle class, created the conditions for the reform movement that would emerge in the late 1990s.

Chapter 4: Reform Movement and Democratic Aspirations (1997-2005)

The surprise election of Mohammad Khatami as president in May 1997 marked the beginning of Iran's reform era. A mid-ranking cleric with a reputation for cultural openness, Khatami won 70 percent of the vote on a platform promising greater freedom, civil society development, and improved international relations. His concept of "dialogue among civilizations" contrasted sharply with the confrontational rhetoric of the previous era, offering hope for Iran's reintegration into the global community. His victory reflected profound demographic and social changes - by 1997, over 70% of Iranians had been born after the 1979 revolution, and this younger generation had different aspirations than their parents. Khatami's early presidency saw remarkable openings. Under his direction, restrictions on media were relaxed, leading to a flourishing of newspapers and journals that critically examined previously taboo subjects. Local council elections were held for the first time since the revolution. In foreign policy, Khatami sought improved relations with European countries and Arab neighbors. The British-Iranian agreement on the Salman Rushdie affair in 1998 led to the restoration of full diplomatic relations with the UK. Iranian cinema flourished during this period, with directors like Abbas Kiarostami, Jafar Panahi, and Mohsen Makhmalbaf gaining international recognition for films that often subtly critiqued social and political conditions. The reform movement was supported by a vibrant intellectual foundation. Thinkers like Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and Mohsen Kadivar developed new interpretations of Islam that emphasized compatibility with democracy, human rights, and pluralism. As Shabestari argued: "I endorse democracy because it is the only system in contemporary times that allows mankind to reach the twin ideals of freedom and justice, without which humanity cannot fulfill its true potential and adequately perform its responsibilities before the Almighty." These ideas resonated particularly with educated youth and women, who formed the backbone of Khatami's support. However, the reform movement soon encountered fierce resistance from entrenched power centers. The judiciary, controlled by conservatives, closed reformist newspapers and imprisoned journalists and intellectuals. In 1998, a series of murders of dissidents and writers (the "Chain Murders") was eventually traced to "rogue elements" within the Intelligence Ministry. When students protested the closure of a reformist newspaper in July 1999, security forces and vigilante groups attacked a university dormitory, triggering the largest street demonstrations since the revolution. Khatami, faced with an ultimatum from Revolutionary Guard commanders threatening intervention, distanced himself from the protesters, disillusioning many of his supporters. Despite these obstacles, reformists won a majority in the 2000 parliamentary elections, seemingly consolidating their position. But the Guardian Council and judiciary effectively neutralized this victory by disqualifying candidates, vetoing legislation, and continuing the crackdown on reformist media. By the end of Khatami's second term in 2005, many of his supporters had become disillusioned. While he had succeeded in expanding the boundaries of acceptable discourse and fostering a more vibrant civil society, structural changes had proven elusive. The reform movement had exposed the fundamental tension within Iran's hybrid system - between republican institutions based on popular sovereignty and unelected bodies claiming divine legitimacy. As one reformist journalist lamented: "The lifespan of our publications had decreased from eighteen months to a year, from a year to six months, and from six months to four months... It was clear that we could no longer have a newspaper."

Chapter 5: Nuclear Crisis and International Isolation (2005-2013)

The 2005 presidential election marked a dramatic shift in Iran's political landscape. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the hardline mayor of Tehran with a populist message, defeated former president Rafsanjani in a runoff election. Ahmadinejad's victory stemmed from several factors: widespread disillusionment with the reform movement, low turnout among middle-class voters, mobilization of rural and working-class Iranians attracted to his promises of economic justice, and support from the Revolutionary Guards and Basij militia. Born to a blacksmith's family, his humble origins and simple lifestyle contrasted with the perceived wealth and privilege of the clerical and revolutionary establishment. Ahmadinejad presented himself as a champion of the poor and a return to revolutionary values. He criticized the "oil mafia" and corrupt elites, promising to "bring the oil money to people's tables." However, his economic policies proved disastrous. Despite record oil revenues exceeding $700 billion during his presidency, inflation and unemployment soared. Massive cash subsidies and populist housing projects created temporary relief but long-term structural damage to Iran's economy. The Revolutionary Guards expanded their economic empire during this period, taking control of major industries and infrastructure projects through privileged access to government contracts and privatization processes. The nuclear issue dominated Iran's international relations during this period. While Iran's nuclear program had begun under the Shah and continued quietly through the 1980s and 1990s, the discovery of undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak in 2002 raised international concerns. Under Khatami, Iran had temporarily suspended uranium enrichment and engaged in negotiations with European powers. Ahmadinejad reversed this approach, declaring that Iran would never surrender its right to nuclear technology and accelerating the enrichment program. As one Iranian nuclear scientist explained: "For us, the nuclear program is a matter of national pride and technological achievement. We see the double standards - Israel has nuclear weapons but faces no sanctions, while we are punished for a peaceful program." Western powers suspected Iran of seeking nuclear weapons capability, leading to increasingly severe sanctions. UN Security Council resolutions between 2006 and 2010 targeted Iran's nuclear and missile programs, while unilateral US and EU sanctions eventually crippled Iran's oil exports and banking system. Ahmadinejad's inflammatory rhetoric exacerbated Iran's isolation. His statements questioning the Holocaust and predicting Israel's disappearance provoked international outrage. By 2012, with international sanctions reaching unprecedented severity and the economy in crisis, Iran found itself more isolated than at any time since the revolution. The disputed presidential election of 2009 triggered the most serious political crisis since the revolution. When official results showed Ahmadinejad winning by a landslide over reformist candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, millions of Iranians took to the streets in protest, believing the election had been stolen. The "Green Movement" demonstrations continued for months despite violent repression that left dozens dead and thousands arrested. Supreme Leader Khamenei firmly backed Ahmadinejad, calling the protests a foreign-orchestrated "velvet revolution." The regime's harsh response, including show trials of reformist leaders and the house arrest of Mousavi and fellow candidate Mehdi Karroubi, revealed the limits of political tolerance within the system and further damaged the Islamic Republic's legitimacy both domestically and internationally.

Chapter 6: Between Theocracy and Democracy: Iran's Ongoing Struggle

The tension between theocratic authority and democratic aspirations has defined Iran's political landscape since the 1979 revolution. The constitution itself embodies this contradiction, establishing both elected institutions like the presidency and parliament alongside unelected bodies like the Guardian Council and the office of the Supreme Leader. This dual structure creates what political scientists call a "hybrid regime"—neither fully democratic nor completely authoritarian, but containing elements of both. Under Khomeini's charismatic leadership (1979-1989), this tension remained manageable, as his unique religious and revolutionary credentials allowed him to mediate between competing factions and institutions. The 2013 election of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani as president reflected Iranians' continuing desire for reform within the existing system. Rouhani campaigned on promises to resolve the nuclear dispute, improve the economy, and expand social freedoms. His administration successfully negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with world powers, which limited Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. This diplomatic breakthrough suggested the possibility of Iran's gradual reintegration into the international community. However, the underlying structural tensions remained unresolved. Supreme Leader Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards continued to exercise decisive influence over security policy, foreign affairs, and cultural issues. Iran's society has undergone profound transformations despite political constraints. Literacy rates have soared to over 85 percent, including among women, who now outnumber men in universities. Urbanization, declining birth rates, and expanded access to information through social media have created a population far different from that of 1979. Young Iranians in particular navigate complex identities, balancing religious traditions with modern aspirations. As one Tehran university student explained, "We respect our Islamic heritage, but we also want to be citizens of the world." This social evolution has created growing pressure for political change, as evidenced by the 2017-2018 nationwide protests triggered by economic grievances but expanding to include political demands. The death of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force, in a U.S. drone strike in January 2020 highlighted Iran's complex regional role. While the Islamic Republic has extended its influence through proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, this has come at the cost of increased tensions with the United States, Israel, and Sunni Arab states. Within Iran, debate continues about whether the country's interests are best served by revolutionary resistance or diplomatic engagement. The withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal in 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions strengthened hardliners who argued that compromise with the West was futile, leading to the election of conservative Ebrahim Raisi as president in 2021. As Iran approaches the fifth decade of its revolutionary experiment, the fundamental questions that animated the 1979 revolution remain unresolved: how to balance Islamic governance with popular sovereignty, national independence with international integration, and revolutionary ideals with evolving social realities. The persistence of protests, despite harsh repression, demonstrates that many Iranians continue to aspire to greater freedom and democracy. Yet the resilience of the Islamic Republic's institutional structure, with its complex blend of theocratic and republican elements, suggests that any future transformation is likely to emerge through evolution rather than revolution, as Iranians continue their long struggle to reconcile their religious heritage with their democratic aspirations.

Summary

The story of revolutionary Iran reveals a nation caught in a fundamental tension between competing visions of governance and identity. From the overthrow of the Shah to the establishment of the Islamic Republic, through war with Iraq and decades of international isolation, Iran has struggled to reconcile religious authority with democratic aspirations. The principle of velayat-e faqih created a hybrid system where elected institutions operate alongside unelected religious bodies, producing ongoing constitutional tensions that remain unresolved. Meanwhile, Iran's society has transformed dramatically through education, urbanization, and technological change, creating new demands that the system struggles to accommodate. Iran's revolutionary experience offers profound lessons about the complex relationship between religion and politics in the modern world. First, revolutions rarely follow the path intended by their initial participants—the alliance of clerics, liberals, leftists, and nationalists that overthrew the Shah quickly fractured, with religious authorities consolidating power. Second, external pressure often strengthens rather than weakens revolutionary regimes by allowing them to rally nationalist sentiment against foreign threats. Finally, Iran demonstrates that political systems evolve through internal dynamics more than external pressure, as successive generations reinterpret revolutionary ideals in light of changing circumstances. Understanding Iran requires recognizing both the persistence of its revolutionary identity and the ongoing evolution of its political and social reality.

About Author

Loading...

Michael Axworthy

Michael George Andrew Axworthy was a British academic, author, and commentator. He was the head of the Iran section at the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office between 1998 and 2000.

Read more