Shutdown

Shutdown Plot Summary

Introduction

In March 2020, the world witnessed something unprecedented in modern financial history. As the novel coronavirus spread beyond China's borders, global financial markets experienced their most severe dysfunction since the Great Depression. The $17 trillion U.S. Treasury market—the bedrock of the global financial system—nearly collapsed. Stock markets plummeted, corporate debt markets froze, and a desperate dash for cash threatened to bring down the entire architecture of global finance. What followed was equally unprecedented: central banks and governments deployed financial firepower at a scale never before seen in peacetime, fundamentally transforming the relationship between states, markets, and money. This extraordinary episode revealed deep truths about our financial system that had long been obscured. The crisis exposed the fragility of market-based finance, the blurring boundaries between fiscal and monetary policy, and the profound inequalities in how different countries could respond to economic emergencies. It accelerated geopolitical realignments, particularly between East and West, while forcing a rethinking of economic orthodoxies that had dominated for decades. For anyone seeking to understand how global finance really works, how economic power is distributed globally, and how our financial system might evolve in coming decades, the pandemic crisis offers essential insights that will shape our world long after the virus recedes.

Chapter 1: Origins of Vulnerability: The Pre-Pandemic Financial System

The financial system that confronted the pandemic in early 2020 was fundamentally different from the one that had collapsed in 2008. Following the global financial crisis, policymakers had implemented sweeping reforms designed to make banks safer. Higher capital requirements, stress tests, and enhanced supervision had indeed strengthened traditional banking institutions. However, these reforms had also pushed risk into less regulated corners of the financial system, creating new vulnerabilities that would become apparent when the pandemic struck. By 2019, market-based finance—the complex ecosystem of asset managers, hedge funds, private equity firms, and shadow banks—had grown enormously. In the United States, non-bank financial institutions controlled assets worth 183% of GDP, compared to 81% in 1980. These institutions relied heavily on short-term funding markets, particularly the repo market where financial firms borrow cash overnight using Treasury securities as collateral. The daily volume in this market had swelled to over $1 trillion. Meanwhile, the Treasury market itself had undergone a structural transformation. Primary dealers—the large banks that traditionally maintained orderly markets—had reduced their market-making capacity due to post-crisis regulations. Hedge funds and high-frequency traders had stepped in, creating an illusion of liquidity that depended on stable market conditions. This evolution created a system that was particularly vulnerable to liquidity shocks. As former Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen warned in 2019, "Non-bank financial institutions... may be taking on significant risks that we don't see." These risks were compounded by the extraordinary monetary policies that had prevailed since 2008. Years of near-zero interest rates and quantitative easing had encouraged risk-taking and asset price inflation. Corporate debt had reached record levels, with the share of BBB-rated bonds—just one notch above junk status—growing to nearly 50% of the investment-grade market. Investors searching for yield had ventured into increasingly risky territory, often using leverage to boost returns. The global dimension added further complexity. The dollar had strengthened its position as the world's dominant currency, with dollar-denominated debt outside the United States reaching $12 trillion by 2019. This created an inherent instability in the international system—when crisis struck, the global demand for dollars would surge, potentially triggering a self-reinforcing spiral of deleveraging and asset sales. Meanwhile, emerging markets had become more integrated into global financial markets, making them vulnerable to sudden capital outflows. Though many had built substantial foreign exchange reserves after previous crises, these defenses would prove inadequate against a truly global shock. Perhaps most significantly, the pre-pandemic financial system operated under a set of assumptions about the relationship between states and markets that would be upended by the crisis. Central bank independence, inflation targeting, and fiscal restraint were the pillars of the prevailing orthodoxy. Few imagined that within months, central banks would be directly financing government deficits while denying they were doing so, or that fiscal stimulus would reach wartime levels without triggering market panic. The stage was set for a crisis that would not only test the financial system's resilience but challenge its fundamental organizing principles.

Chapter 2: The March 2020 Meltdown: Anatomy of a Market Crisis

The financial crisis that erupted in March 2020 was unprecedented in its speed and scope. What began as a health crisis in China rapidly transformed into a global financial emergency that threatened the very foundations of market capitalism. The catalyst came on March 9, when oil prices collapsed following a price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia. The S&P 500 fell 7.6% in a single day, triggering circuit breakers that temporarily halted trading. Two days later, the World Health Organization officially declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, sending markets into further turmoil. What made this crisis truly extraordinary was the dysfunction in the U.S. Treasury market—the bedrock of the global financial system. Treasuries, normally the safest assets during crises, experienced extreme volatility as liquidity evaporated. The yield on 10-year Treasury bonds swung wildly, sometimes moving more than 40 basis points in a single day. Market depth—the volume of bonds that could be traded without moving prices—collapsed to just 2% of normal levels. As one veteran investor remarked, "I have been in this business for over 30 years, and this is the most stressed bond market I've ever seen." The situation was so dire that some Treasury auctions nearly failed—an unthinkable scenario with potentially catastrophic consequences. The causes of this market breakdown were complex and interconnected. As the pandemic spread, investors everywhere rushed to raise cash, selling their most liquid assets—including Treasuries. Simultaneously, foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds sold Treasuries to obtain dollars needed to support their economies and currencies. Primary dealers who normally maintain orderly markets were overwhelmed by the volume of selling. Their balance sheet constraints, partly resulting from post-2008 regulations, limited their ability to absorb the flood of securities. Meanwhile, hedge funds that had built elaborate arbitrage strategies around Treasury pricing were forced to unwind their positions, adding to market pressure. By mid-March, the crisis had spread to virtually every financial market globally. Corporate bond markets froze, with companies unable to issue new debt. Commercial paper markets, crucial for short-term corporate funding, experienced severe stress. Money market funds faced unprecedented redemption requests, forcing them to sell assets into illiquid markets. The VIX volatility index hit 82.69 on March 16, surpassing levels seen during the 2008 financial crisis. The dollar strengthened dramatically against other currencies as global institutions desperately sought dollar funding, creating additional pressure on emerging markets. The speed of the meltdown was unlike anything seen before. The 2008 crisis had unfolded over months; the March 2020 crisis developed over days. Without immediate intervention, the world faced the prospect of a financial collapse that would dwarf the 2008 crisis. The dysfunction in Treasury markets was particularly alarming because it threatened the foundation upon which all other financial markets rest. If Treasuries could no longer function as the risk-free benchmark, the entire global financial architecture was at risk. As one Federal Reserve official later noted, "This wasn't just a market problem. This was an existential threat to the entire economy." The March 2020 meltdown revealed the fragility of market-based finance and the interconnectedness of global financial markets in ways that even the 2008 crisis had not fully exposed. It demonstrated that liquidity—the ability to buy and sell assets without significantly moving prices—could evaporate almost instantly across multiple markets simultaneously. Most importantly, it showed that despite all the reforms implemented after 2008, the financial system remained fundamentally dependent on central bank support during times of stress. The stage was set for an intervention of unprecedented scale and scope.

Chapter 3: Central Bank Revolution: Monetary Policy Without Limits

The Federal Reserve's response to the March 2020 financial crisis represented nothing less than a revolution in central banking. Faced with market dysfunction of unprecedented severity, the Fed abandoned conventional constraints and deployed tools that would have been unimaginable just weeks earlier. On March 15, Chair Jerome Powell cut interest rates to near zero and announced $700 billion in asset purchases. When markets continued to deteriorate, Powell took even more dramatic steps on March 23, declaring the Fed would purchase Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities "in the amounts needed"—effectively promising unlimited intervention. This open-ended commitment was just the beginning. Between March 17 and April 9, the Fed established or revived nine separate emergency lending facilities targeting specific markets. These included programs to support commercial paper, corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, money market funds, and municipal bonds. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility provided loans to primary dealers, while the Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities allowed the Fed to purchase corporate bonds directly—including, for the first time, high-yield "junk" bonds through ETFs. The Fed also established dollar swap lines with fourteen foreign central banks to address the global dollar shortage. By early April, the Fed's balance sheet had expanded by over $2 trillion, far exceeding the pace of growth during the 2008 crisis. Other central banks followed suit with equally aggressive measures. The European Central Bank launched its €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, explicitly stating it would purchase assets "as much as necessary and for as long as needed." ECB President Christine Lagarde declared "there are no limits to our commitment to the euro," echoing her predecessor Mario Draghi's famous "whatever it takes" moment. The Bank of England resumed quantitative easing and established a facility to directly finance government spending. The Bank of Japan intensified its already substantial asset purchases. These coordinated actions effectively transformed central banks from lenders of last resort to market makers of last resort, supporting virtually every segment of financial markets. The immediate results were dramatic. Financial markets stabilized by early April, with the S&P 500 recovering much of its losses by June. Credit markets reopened, allowing companies to issue record amounts of debt at historically low interest rates. The economic collapse, while severe, was not as catastrophic as initially feared. As one market strategist observed, "The Fed didn't just move the goalposts—they tore them down and built a new stadium." By the end of 2020, the Fed's balance sheet had reached $7.4 trillion, nearly doubling in size over the year. This extraordinary intervention represented a fundamental shift in monetary policy. Central banks had moved far beyond their traditional mandates, effectively monetizing government deficits while denying they were doing so. The traditional boundaries between monetary and fiscal policy had blurred beyond recognition. As former PIMCO chief economist Paul McCulley observed, "We've had a merger of monetary and fiscal policy. We've broken down the church-and-state separation between the two... We haven't had a declaration to that effect. But it would be surprising if you had a declaration—you just do it." The central bank revolution of 2020 raised profound questions about the future of monetary policy. The era of independent central banks focused narrowly on inflation targeting appeared to be over, replaced by a new paradigm of coordinated monetary-fiscal action. Central banks had demonstrated they could create unlimited liquidity when necessary, but at what long-term cost? The massive expansion of central bank balance sheets had supported asset prices, potentially exacerbating wealth inequality. Meanwhile, the precedent of direct market intervention created expectations that central banks would always backstop markets during periods of stress. These questions would shape monetary policy debates long after the immediate crisis had passed.

Chapter 4: Fiscal Firepower: Government Intervention at Wartime Scale

As the pandemic shutdowns halted economic activity around the world, governments responded with fiscal interventions of unprecedented scale. In the United States, the CARES Act approved on March 27, 2020, allocated $2.2 trillion—about 10% of GDP—in emergency spending, tax cuts, and loans. This was the largest fiscal intervention ever delivered to any economy, anywhere. By January 2021, the global fiscal response would reach a staggering $14 trillion, dwarfing the response to the 2008 financial crisis and approaching the scale of wartime mobilization. The CARES Act represented a dramatic departure from previous American crisis responses. It included direct payments of $1,200 to most adults, enhanced unemployment benefits of $600 per week, the Paycheck Protection Program providing forgivable loans to small businesses, and support for severely affected industries like airlines. For a brief moment, America experimented with welfare on a scale befitting a rich country. The combination of stimulus checks and unemployment supplements meant that many low-income Americans who lost jobs actually saw their incomes increase—a remarkable departure from previous recessions. European countries took a different approach, focusing on job retention rather than unemployment support. Germany expanded its Kurzarbeit (short-time work) program, with the government paying up to 80% of wages for workers on reduced hours. France, Italy, and the United Kingdom implemented similar schemes. Across the OECD, job retention programs supported 50 million jobs, ten times more than during the global financial crisis. These programs aimed to preserve employment relationships through the crisis, making economic recovery easier once restrictions lifted. The scale of fiscal intervention varied dramatically across countries, reflecting differences in both capacity and political choices. Advanced economies managed fiscal efforts averaging 8.5% of GDP, while middle-income countries averaged just under 4%, and low-income countries less than 2%. Japan implemented stimulus worth nearly 20% of GDP, while Mexico's response was just 0.7% of GDP. These disparities reflected not just economic constraints but different assessments of the pandemic's severity and appropriate government role. Perhaps most remarkably, the massive increase in government borrowing occurred without triggering market panic or significant inflation. Interest rates on government debt actually fell in most advanced economies despite unprecedented issuance. This paradox was explained by central bank intervention—across the OECD, central banks purchased more than half of all new government debt issued in 2020. In effect, one branch of government (the central bank) was financing the spending of another (the treasury), creating what economists call fiscal-monetary coordination or, more controversially, monetary financing. This arrangement created profound cognitive dissonance among policymakers and economists. Central banks had once defined their independence by refusing to monetize government deficits. Now they were doing precisely that, while insisting their actions were merely about managing interest rates and ensuring financial stability. Finance ministries that had preached fiscal discipline for decades were now borrowing at wartime levels. As economist Adam Tooze observed, "The taboo has been broken, but no one wants to admit it." The pandemic had forced a revolution in economic policy that few were willing to acknowledge explicitly. By the end of 2020, the fiscal response had prevented economic collapse but raised fundamental questions about the future of government finance. How long could central banks continue purchasing government debt without triggering inflation or currency crises? Would the pandemic permanently expand government's role in the economy? And how would societies address the massive increase in public debt once the immediate crisis passed? The answers would shape economic policy for decades to come.

Chapter 5: East-West Divergence: China's Recovery and Western Struggles

The pandemic created a stark divergence between East Asia's successful containment and the West's prolonged struggle with the virus. This divergence had profound economic and geopolitical implications, accelerating shifts in global power that had been underway for years. At the center of this story was China's remarkable recovery, which contrasted sharply with the ongoing health and economic crises in the United States and Europe. After its initial missteps in Wuhan, China implemented a comprehensive containment strategy that effectively suppressed the virus by March 2020. This approach combined mass testing, digital contact tracing, strict quarantines, and localized lockdowns whenever new cases appeared. South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other East Asian countries implemented similar strategies, drawing on lessons from previous epidemics like SARS and MERS. By April, factories across China were reopening while Western economies were still shutting down. By the third quarter of 2020, China's GDP had returned to pre-pandemic levels, and by year-end, it was the only major economy to record positive growth for the year, expanding by 2.3%. This economic divergence was reflected in financial markets. China's CSI 300 stock index rose 27% in 2020, outperforming most Western markets. The renminbi strengthened against the dollar, and foreign investors poured money into Chinese government bonds, attracted by their relatively high yields and stability. Chinese exports surged as the country's factories supplied the world with medical equipment, electronics, and consumer goods. By December 2020, China's trade surplus had reached a record $78.2 billion in a single month. As one economist observed, "China is the only major economy engaged in traditional macroeconomic policy—everyone else is still in crisis mode." The pandemic accelerated China's economic influence in ways that would have been unimaginable at the start of the year. In November 2020, fifteen Asia-Pacific nations including China, Japan, South Korea, and Australia signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), creating the world's largest trading bloc. Meanwhile, China continued to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, offering infrastructure financing to developing countries struggling with the pandemic's economic impact. Chinese vaccine diplomacy complemented these efforts, with Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines distributed throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Western economies, by contrast, experienced recurring waves of infection and economic disruption. The United States and Europe implemented less stringent containment measures than East Asia, often lifting restrictions prematurely only to reimpose them when cases surged. Political polarization in the United States complicated the pandemic response, with mask-wearing and lockdown measures becoming partisan issues. European coordination improved after initial fragmentation, but the continent still faced significant challenges with vaccine procurement and distribution. By the end of 2020, most Western economies remained 3-5% below pre-pandemic levels, with unemployment elevated and small businesses struggling. This divergence had significant geopolitical implications. China's successful containment reinforced the Communist Party's narrative about the superiority of its governance model. State media contrasted China's effective response with the "chaos" in Western democracies, arguing that China's system was better equipped to handle major crises. This messaging resonated in many developing countries, enhancing China's soft power at a time when American global leadership was already in question. As one Chinese academic put it, "The pandemic has been a stress test for different political systems, and many people feel the East has passed while the West has failed." The pandemic thus accelerated a shift toward a more multipolar world, with China's relative position strengthened and traditional Western leadership weakened. The divergent economic trajectories of East and West promised to reshape global power dynamics for years to come, creating new challenges for international cooperation and governance in a post-pandemic world.

Chapter 6: The New Economic Paradigm: Beyond Neoliberal Orthodoxy

The pandemic crisis shattered long-standing economic orthodoxies and forced a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between states, markets, and money. The neoliberal consensus that had dominated economic policy since the 1980s—emphasizing fiscal restraint, central bank independence, minimal government intervention, and free markets—crumbled in the face of existential threat. In its place emerged a new paradigm characterized by fiscal-monetary coordination, expanded state intervention, and a pragmatic approach to economic management that prioritized outcomes over ideological purity. The most dramatic shift occurred in fiscal policy. For decades, politicians and economists had warned about the dangers of government debt, arguing that excessive borrowing would inevitably lead to higher interest rates, inflation, and economic stagnation. The pandemic response turned this conventional wisdom on its head. Governments borrowed at unprecedented levels while interest rates fell to historic lows. Japan's government debt exceeded 250% of GDP without triggering the crisis long predicted by orthodox economists. As former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard observed, "When the interest rate is less than the growth rate, you can sustain higher levels of debt indefinitely." This realization fundamentally changed the calculus of fiscal policy. Monetary policy underwent an equally profound transformation. Central banks moved far beyond their traditional mandates, effectively financing government deficits while maintaining the fiction of independence. The Federal Reserve's balance sheet expanded by $3.1 trillion in 2020, with similar expansions at the European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan. These actions blurred the traditional boundaries between monetary and fiscal policy, creating what some economists called "monetary-fiscal coordination" and others more bluntly termed "helicopter money." The taboo against direct monetary financing of government spending had been broken, even if policymakers were reluctant to acknowledge it explicitly. The pandemic also accelerated a shift in economic thinking about the role of the state. After decades of privatization and deregulation, governments suddenly found themselves nationalizing payrolls, directing industrial production, and intervening in markets on an unprecedented scale. The United Kingdom effectively nationalized its railway system. France and Germany took equity stakes in struggling airlines. The United States implemented what amounted to industrial policy through Operation Warp Speed, directing billions toward vaccine development and manufacturing. These interventions were pragmatic responses to crisis rather than ideological choices, but they demonstrated that the state could play a far more active role in the economy than neoliberal orthodoxy had allowed. Perhaps most significantly, the crisis exposed the limitations of markets in addressing collective challenges. Market mechanisms failed to produce adequate supplies of personal protective equipment, ensure equitable vaccine distribution, or maintain essential services during lockdowns. These failures prompted a reevaluation of what activities should be subject to market logic and what should be treated as public goods. As economist Mariana Mazzucato argued, "The pandemic has revealed the need to rethink what we mean by value in our economy and how we govern the relationship between the public and private sectors." By the end of 2020, a new economic paradigm was emerging—one that was still taking shape but clearly distinct from the neoliberal orthodoxy that had prevailed for decades. This paradigm embraced a more active role for government, recognized the importance of public goods and social infrastructure, and acknowledged the necessity of coordinating fiscal and monetary policy during crises. It was pragmatic rather than ideological, focused on outcomes rather than adherence to abstract principles. As economist Adam Tooze observed, "We are witnessing the birth of a new economic consensus. The question is not whether it will emerge, but what form it will take and who will control it."

Chapter 7: Unequal Impact: Global Disparities in Crisis Response

The pandemic exposed and exacerbated profound inequalities in the global economic system. While all countries faced the same virus, their capacity to respond varied dramatically, creating divergent outcomes that reflected and reinforced existing power hierarchies. This inequality manifested at multiple levels—between advanced and developing economies, between different demographic groups within countries, and between workers in different sectors of the economy. The result was a crisis that, despite its universal nature, was experienced in radically different ways depending on one's position in the global economic order. The most striking disparity appeared in fiscal responses. Advanced economies implemented stimulus packages averaging 10-20% of GDP, while emerging markets typically managed just 2-5%, and low-income countries even less. This gap reflected a fundamental asymmetry in the global financial system—the ability of advanced economies, particularly the United States, to borrow in their own currencies at extremely low interest rates. When the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and expanded its balance sheet, U.S. borrowing costs fell despite massive deficit spending. Emerging markets faced a very different reality. When they attempted similar expansionary policies, many experienced currency depreciation, capital outflows, and rising borrowing costs. This disparity extended to monetary policy. The Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan could expand their balance sheets without triggering currency crises or inflation spirals. Indeed, their currencies often strengthened as global investors sought safety in advanced economy assets. By contrast, central banks in countries like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa faced severe constraints. When they attempted to support their economies through monetary expansion, they often triggered capital flight and currency depreciation, forcing them to raise interest rates despite deepening recessions. As economist Dani Rodrik observed, "The pandemic revealed that monetary sovereignty—the ability to print internationally accepted money—is the ultimate determinant of policy space." Healthcare responses showed similar disparities. Advanced economies could afford extensive testing, contact tracing, and hospital capacity expansion. They also secured the majority of vaccine supplies through advance purchase agreements. By January 2021, high-income countries representing just 16% of the world's population had secured 60% of available vaccine supplies. Meanwhile, many developing countries struggled with basic public health measures due to limited fiscal resources, weak healthcare infrastructure, and large informal sectors that made lockdowns economically devastating. These disparities were reflected in mortality rates, with some Latin American and South Asian countries experiencing far higher excess deaths than their advanced economy counterparts. Within countries, the pandemic's impact varied dramatically across demographic and occupational lines. Workers in sectors amenable to remote work—primarily high-skilled, high-income professionals—largely maintained their incomes and often saw their wealth increase as asset prices rose. Those in face-to-face service industries experienced devastating job losses and income declines. In the United States, employment among workers in the top wage quartile had fully recovered by November 2020, while employment in the bottom quartile remained 20% below pre-pandemic levels. Racial and ethnic minorities suffered disproportionately high infection and mortality rates in many countries, reflecting pre-existing health disparities and overrepresentation in high-exposure essential jobs. The international financial architecture proved inadequate to address these disparities. The IMF and World Bank provided emergency financing to over 100 countries, but the scale was insufficient relative to need. The G20's Debt Service Suspension Initiative offered temporary relief to low-income countries but excluded middle-income countries and private creditors. Proposals for a new allocation of Special Drawing Rights—the IMF's reserve asset—were initially blocked by the United States before being approved in 2021. These limitations reflected the power dynamics embedded in global financial governance, where advanced economies dominate decision-making despite representing a shrinking share of global economic activity. By the end of 2020, the pandemic had accelerated divergence in the global economy, with advanced economies positioned for relatively swift recoveries while many emerging and developing economies faced lasting economic damage. This divergence was further reinforced by unequal access to vaccines, with advanced economies beginning mass vaccination campaigns while many developing countries had no clear timeline for receiving sufficient doses. The crisis revealed that in a globalized world, financial sovereignty—the ability to respond to crises without external constraints—remained highly unequal, with profound implications for future economic development and global inequality.

Summary

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a financial and economic crisis unlike any in modern history, fundamentally transforming the landscape of global finance and economic governance. The extraordinary policy responses—from unlimited central bank intervention to wartime-scale fiscal expansion—shattered long-standing economic orthodoxies about fiscal restraint, central bank independence, and the proper boundaries of government action. What emerged was a new paradigm characterized by fiscal-monetary coordination, expanded state intervention, and a pragmatic approach to economic management that prioritized outcomes over ideological purity. This paradigm shift may prove the pandemic's most enduring economic legacy, demonstrating that when political will exists, resources can be mobilized at extraordinary scale to address collective challenges. Yet the crisis also exposed and exacerbated deep structural inequalities in the global system. The divergent recovery paths of advanced and developing economies revealed the persistent importance of monetary sovereignty in shaping countries' policy options. Nations able to borrow in their own currencies at low rates could implement whatever measures necessary to support their economies, while others faced binding external constraints. This disparity extended to vaccine access, debt sustainability, and capacity to finance recovery. As we confront other global challenges like climate change, these structural inequalities will continue to shape collective action possibilities. The lesson is clear: effective global crisis management requires not just technical solutions but addressing the fundamental power imbalances that determine which countries can respond effectively and which cannot. Building more resilient systems for future crises demands confronting these inequalities directly rather than assuming that market forces alone will generate equitable outcomes.

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Adam Tooze

Adam Tooze is a British historian who is a professor at Columbia University. Previously, he was Reader in Modern European Economic History at the University of Cambridge and professor at Yale University.After graduating with a B.A. degree in economics from King's College, Cambridge in 1989, Tooze studied at the Free University of Berlin before moving to the London School of Economics for a doctorate in economic history.In 2002, he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize for Modern History. He is best known for his economic study of the Third Reich, The Wages of Destruction, which was one of the winners of the Wolfson History Prize for 2006.

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