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Business, Nonfiction, History, Economics, Politics, Sociology, Africa, International Relations, Poverty, International Development
Book
Hardcover
2007
Oxford University Press
English
0195311450
0195311450
9780195311457
PDF | EPUB
In the dusty corridors of an underfunded school in Sierra Leone, the effects of decades of civil war and economic stagnation are painfully evident. Meanwhile, in the skyscrapers of Singapore and Shanghai, economies forge ahead at unprecedented rates. This stark contrast highlights the central crisis of our time: why have certain countries remained trapped in poverty while others have raced ahead? For forty years, development experts considered "developing countries" as a single entity. But the reality is more complex – roughly one billion people live in countries that haven't just failed to grow, they've actually regressed since the 1970s. This divergence creates a fascinating yet troubling puzzle. What keeps these "bottom billion" trapped in cycles of conflict, corruption, and economic failure? The answer lies in understanding four critical traps: the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, the landlocked with bad neighbors trap, and the bad governance trap. These mechanisms don't just create poverty; they actively prevent escape from it. By exploring these traps and the potential solutions – from rethinking aid to military intervention, from new laws to trade policy – we gain crucial insights into what might genuinely help these societies break free. Whether you're a policymaker, a development professional, or simply a global citizen concerned about humanity's future, understanding why a billion people remain trapped in fourteenth-century conditions amid twenty-first century prosperity is essential.
In the shadow of global progress, approximately one billion people live in countries that have effectively fallen off the development ladder. Unlike the familiar narrative of a rich world of one billion people facing a poor world of five billion, the real story is more complex. The vast majority of those five billion "developing" people live in countries that are indeed developing, often at remarkable speed. China and India have dramatically transformed their economies in recent decades, while countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh are following a similar trajectory. But there exists a stark contrast – roughly 60 countries, mostly in Africa and Central Asia, housing about one billion people, that have stagnated or declined while the rest have surged forward. These nations aren't merely poor; they're caught in what economists call "development traps." Their growth rates tell a sobering tale. While the middle four billion saw per capita income rise at 4-4.5% annually in recent decades, the bottom billion experienced zero or negative growth. By 2015, their average income had fallen to about one-fifth that of the typical person in other developing countries. Life in these nations reflects medieval rather than modern realities. The average life expectancy in the bottom billion is only fifty years compared to sixty-seven years in other developing countries. Infant mortality reaches 14% versus 4% elsewhere. The proportion of children suffering long-term malnutrition is 36% compared to 20% in other developing countries. This isn't simply a gap; it's a chasm that continues to widen every year. These countries share a critical feature – they're caught in one or more development traps that create a self-reinforcing cycle of decline. Seventy-three percent of people in these societies have recently experienced civil war. Twenty-nine percent live in countries dominated by problematic natural resource economics. Thirty percent are landlocked with bad neighbors, and seventy-six percent have endured prolonged periods of bad governance. Many suffer from multiple traps simultaneously. What makes these traps so pernicious is their probability characteristics. Unlike black holes in physics, escape isn't impossible, just extremely difficult. The mathematical expectation of remaining stuck in bad governance, for instance, is nearly sixty years. This explains why economic and political reforms often fail – the forces maintaining the status quo are overwhelmingly powerful unless addressed directly. The implications extend beyond these societies themselves. As the gap between the bottom billion and everyone else widens, these nations become potential breeding grounds for terrorism, disease, and mass migration. By 2050, the development divide won't be between a rich billion and a developing five billion; it will be between a trapped billion and the rest of humanity. Understanding how these traps function is the first step toward finding effective solutions.
The conflict trap represents perhaps the most devastating mechanism keeping countries impoverished. Civil wars aren't random occurrences but predictable outcomes of specific conditions. Research reveals that a country's risk of civil war doubles when its income is halved, creating a dangerous cycle where poverty increases conflict risk, which then deepens poverty. Natural resource dependence further heightens this risk, as valuable commodities like diamonds or oil provide both motivation and financing for rebellions. In Angola, for instance, oil funded government forces while diamonds financed rebels, creating a perfect storm of resource-fueled violence. The natural resource trap functions through a different mechanism. One might expect resource wealth to catalyze prosperity, but the opposite often occurs. In resource-rich countries, democracy frequently malfunctions through what might be called "the survival of the fattest" – electoral competition degenerates into patronage politics as resource revenues enable governments to bribe voters rather than deliver public services. Without proper checks and balances, oil or diamond wealth corrodes institutions rather than strengthening them. Nigeria, despite receiving approximately $280 billion in oil revenues over three decades, has shockingly little development to show for it. Resource wealth also triggers "Dutch disease," where currency appreciation makes other exports uncompetitive, preventing economic diversification. Geographic misfortune creates another trap for countries that are landlocked with bad neighbors. While Switzerland thrives despite being landlocked, it's surrounded by prosperous, stable countries with excellent infrastructure. By contrast, landlocked African nations like Uganda depend on neighboring countries that themselves struggle with conflict or poor governance. Transport costs become prohibitive, and valuable spillover effects from neighboring growth never materialize. Research shows that when coastal African countries grow by an additional 1%, landlocked African neighbors gain only about 0.2% growth – far below the global average of 0.7% spillover. The bad governance trap completes this quartet of misfortune. When governance is truly terrible, as in Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, economic collapse follows regardless of other advantages. Yet breaking free from bad governance proves extraordinarily difficult. Reform requires both political will and technical knowledge, both often in short supply. External conditionality from aid agencies frequently fails because governments learn they can promise reforms without implementing them. Studies reveal that the probability of a sustained turnaround in governance starting in any given year is merely 1.6%, meaning the mathematical expectation for escaping this trap is fifty-nine years. These traps don't operate in isolation but reinforce each other. Resource wealth increases conflict risk; conflict destroys governance; bad governance prevents investment in infrastructure needed by landlocked countries. The cumulative economic costs are staggering. A single failing state costs its region approximately $100 billion over its lifetime of failure. Breaking this cycle requires understanding not just the individual traps but their interconnections and the specific instruments that might disrupt them.
While globalization has powered unprecedented growth across most developing countries, it has paradoxically made things harder for the bottom billion. The rapid integration of global markets for goods, capital, and labor that began in the 1980s created a historical window of opportunity for poor countries to join global manufacturing networks. Countries like Vietnam seized this chance, using their low wages to attract labor-intensive industries, creating jobs and gradually building more advanced capabilities. But the countries of the bottom billion largely missed this boat. Manufacturing has dramatically transformed the export profile of most developing nations. Where once they primarily exported raw materials, now 80% of their exports are manufactured goods. This shift matters tremendously for development patterns. Manufacturing is labor-intensive, spreading benefits widely through employment, while resource extraction often benefits only elites or foreign companies. But breaking into global manufacturing networks requires meeting a threshold of cost-competitiveness. Once the first manufacturer succeeds, others follow, creating clusters of expertise and infrastructure that lower costs for everyone. The problem for the bottom billion is that Asia's success has made their entry much more difficult. China and India now host massive manufacturing agglomerations with both low wages and scale economies that new entrants can't match. The countries that broke into global markets first had only to compete against high-wage Western producers. Today's aspiring exporters must compete against established low-wage producers with decades of experience and well-developed supply chains. Madagascar briefly succeeded in creating 300,000 export processing zone jobs, but political instability derailed this progress. The window for easy entry has largely closed. Capital flows follow a similar pattern of marginalization. Despite being chronically short of investment capital, the bottom billion don't attract substantial foreign investment except in natural resource extraction. Even more troublingly, their own capital flows outward rather than inward. By 1990, approximately 38% of Africa's private wealth was held abroad – the highest percentage of any region globally. Investors perceive these countries as extremely risky, with ratings agencies assigning them scores that make investment prohibitive. Even when countries implement significant reforms, their risk ratings improve only slowly and marginally. The international mobility of skilled labor compounds these problems. The countries of the bottom billion desperately need educated professionals, yet globalization makes it increasingly easy for their most talented citizens to emigrate. Research shows that educated people from poor countries make migration decisions similar to portfolio choices – they move where returns on their human capital are highest. This creates a devastating brain drain, as doctors, engineers, and entrepreneurs leave precisely when they're most needed for development. Far from lifting all boats, globalization has created a dangerous divergence between countries that successfully integrated into global markets and those left behind. Without intervention, this gap will continue to widen, leaving the bottom billion increasingly isolated from global prosperity.
For decades, foreign aid has been the primary tool for addressing development challenges. While intensely politicized – with the left viewing it as reparations and the right as welfare handouts – evidence suggests aid does modestly accelerate growth in recipient countries. Over thirty years, it has added approximately one percentage point to annual growth rates in the bottom billion. Given their otherwise flat growth trajectory, this contribution has been significant, preventing what might have been severe decline. However, aid suffers from diminishing returns. Research indicates that when aid reaches about 16% of a recipient's GDP, its effectiveness approaches zero. Many bottom billion countries already receive aid at or near this threshold, suggesting that merely doubling aid volumes, as proposed at the 2005 G8 summit, won't produce transformative results. More concerning is that aid can sometimes undermine development by causing "Dutch disease" – currency appreciation that makes exports less competitive, precisely when export diversification is crucial. Aid's effectiveness varies dramatically depending on when and how it's delivered. In countries with reasonably good governance, budget support can work well. But in failing states, where less than 1% of health funding might reach clinics (as documented in Chad), unconditional money achieves little. Technical assistance – providing skilled personnel rather than just money – proves particularly valuable during reform attempts. Studies show that $250 million in technical assistance during the first four years of reform significantly increases the chances of success, providing a $15 return for each dollar invested. Yet this opportunity remains underutilized because aid agencies lack the flexibility to rapidly deploy expertise when reform windows open. Military intervention represents a more controversial but sometimes essential instrument. Despite the shadow cast by Iraq, successful interventions like Britain's Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone demonstrate that well-executed military action can establish security at reasonable cost. With just a few hundred properly deployed troops, Britain helped end Sierra Leone's devastating civil war and establish lasting peace. Cost-benefit analysis suggests the intervention's benefits exceeded its costs by approximately thirty times. Military assistance proves particularly crucial in postconflict situations. Counterintuitively, research shows that high military spending by postconflict governments actually increases rather than decreases the risk of conflict recurrence. External peacekeepers provide more credible security guarantees than domestic forces, which often signal government intent to renege on peace agreements. Similarly, external guarantees against coups can prevent military establishments from engaging in "grand extortion" – threatening coups to extract resources from civilian governments. Both aid and military intervention require fundamental rethinking. Aid agencies must become more nimble, concentrating resources on reform opportunities rather than spreading them thinly. They need higher administrative budgets to effectively supervise projects in difficult environments. Military planners must design interventions that are sustainable, properly resourced, and matched to specific contexts. Neither instrument alone can break the poverty traps, but used strategically and in concert with other tools, they form essential components of an effective response.
Beyond aid and military intervention lie powerful but underutilized tools for addressing development traps: legal reforms in wealthy countries, international standards and charters, and strategic trade policies. These approaches are remarkably cost-effective but require coordination across government departments and between nations. Western legal systems often inadvertently enable corruption and resource theft in bottom billion countries. Banks in financial centers like London, New York, and Zurich routinely accept deposits from corrupt officials with minimal scrutiny. When Nigeria's military dictator Sani Abacha died in 1998, his family had stashed billions in Western banks. Even after Swiss courts ruled the money belonged to Nigeria, Swiss officials initially refused repatriation. Similarly, until recently, bribes paid by European companies to foreign officials were tax-deductible in their home countries. Closing these loopholes requires minimal legislation but faces resistance from powerful financial interests who profit from the status quo. International charters and standards offer a complementary approach by establishing transparent benchmarks for good governance. Just as the European Union's accession requirements drove dramatic reforms across Eastern Europe, tailored charters could help bottom billion countries address specific challenges. A natural resource charter would establish standards for transparent auction of extraction rights, publication of government revenues, and prudent fiscal management. A postconflict charter would guide security sector reform and reconciliation processes. Budget transparency standards would enable citizens to track public expenditure, dramatically reducing corruption. These voluntary standards work through three mechanisms. First, they empower reformers within societies by providing concrete goals around which diverse constituencies can unite. Second, they help governments signal credible commitments to investors and citizens. Third, they create peer pressure between countries, as adopters gain legitimacy while non-adopters face increasing scrutiny. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative demonstrates this potential – several West African governments have adopted its standards despite initial skepticism. Trade policy represents the final underutilized tool. The bottom billion need to diversify their exports beyond raw materials, but face overwhelming competition from established Asian manufacturers. Temporary trade preferences – giving bottom billion exports preferential access to rich country markets – could provide the economic equivalent of a "pump-priming" strategy. The African Growth and Opportunity Act demonstrates this potential, increasing African apparel exports to the United States by over 50% by eliminating tariffs and simplifying rules of origin requirements. However, these schemes need longer time horizons and broader country coverage to achieve their full potential. Critically, these tools cost wealthy countries very little compared to aid budgets or military deployments. Their effectiveness stems not from resource transfers but from changing incentives and enabling bottom billion societies to harness their own resources more effectively. However, they require coordination across traditionally siloed government departments – treasury, trade, defense, and development – creating organizational challenges that only high-level political leadership can overcome.
The development community stands at a crossroads. The traditional approach – treating all developing countries as facing similar challenges and relying primarily on aid – has failed the bottom billion. A more effective response requires narrowing our focus to these trapped societies while broadening our toolkit beyond conventional development instruments. This transformation demands coordinated action at multiple levels – within governments, between nations, and among citizens themselves. The first critical shift involves reconceptualizing the development problem. Rather than tracking progress across five billion people through broad Millennium Development Goals, we must recognize the distinctive challenges facing the one billion people in trapped countries. This narrower focus enables tailored strategies addressing specific traps rather than one-size-fits-all approaches. Growth must return to center stage, not as an end itself but as the essential foundation for sustainable improvements in health, education, and governance. Without economic expansion, these societies remain vulnerable to cyclical collapse. Implementing this approach requires unprecedented coordination across government departments. In most wealthy countries, development ministries control only aid budgets, while trade, finance, and defense policies remain disconnected from development objectives. Breaking this pattern requires elevating development from a specialized portfolio to a government-wide priority. Only heads of government can force coordination between departments with competing objectives and cultures. The G8 provides a potential forum for this leadership, but it must move beyond focusing exclusively on aid volumes to embrace the full range of available instruments. International institutions similarly require reform. The World Trade Organization functions primarily as a negotiating forum where countries trade market access. But the bottom billion lack negotiable market size, leaving them sidelined. Adding a non-reciprocal "transfer round" of trade preferences before traditional bargaining begins would acknowledge their special circumstances while maintaining the organization's fundamental structure. Similarly, central banks and financial regulators must recognize their role in preventing corruption and money laundering from bottom billion countries. Civil society plays a crucial role in driving these changes. NGOs have successfully mobilized concern for global poverty but often promote simplistic solutions based on aid alone or reflexive opposition to trade liberalization. More sophisticated advocacy is needed that recognizes the complexity of development challenges and the necessity of coordinated responses. Consumer pressure on multinational corporations, particularly in extractive industries, can drive adoption of transparency standards even when governments hesitate. Ultimately, helping the bottom billion escape their development traps serves both moral and self-interest imperatives. A world with a billion people trapped in medieval conditions alongside unprecedented prosperity is neither just nor stable. The security threats, disease vectors, and migration pressures emanating from failing states affect everyone. The good news is that we possess the knowledge and tools to address these challenges – what's lacking is the political will and coordination to deploy them effectively. Building this capacity requires citizens in wealthy countries to move beyond ideological debates and embrace evidence-based approaches that combine aid, security, legal reform, and trade in a coherent strategy for change.
The divergence between the "bottom billion" and the rest of humanity represents the central development challenge of our time. While most formerly poor countries are steadily converging with developed nations, approximately one billion people live in societies trapped by conflict, natural resource dependency, poor geography, and dysfunctional governance. These traps aren't merely speed bumps on the development highway but self-reinforcing cycles that have kept these nations stagnant or declining for decades. Without intervention, this divergence will accelerate, creating a permanent global underclass with devastating humanitarian and security implications. Addressing this challenge requires fundamentally rethinking our approach to development. We must narrow our focus to these specific trapped societies while broadening our toolkit beyond aid alone. Military interventions, legal reforms, international standards, and strategic trade policies all play crucial roles alongside more effective aid delivery. This coordinated approach demands leadership at multiple levels – from heads of government forcing departmental coordination to citizens demanding more sophisticated responses than the traditional left-right divides allow. The bottom billion will ultimately escape poverty only through their own efforts, but we can dramatically improve their chances by dismantling the external enablers of corruption, providing security guarantees during transitions, and offering temporary trade advantages to jump-start diversification. The technical solutions exist; what's needed now is the political will to implement them.
“Elections determine who is in power, but they do not determine how power is used.” ― Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It
Strengths: Collier's exploration of the economic traps affecting the world's poorest countries offers profound insights. His clear and accessible writing style makes complex economic issues understandable to a broad audience. The book's practical policy recommendations, such as targeted aid and trade policies, are particularly noteworthy and appreciated for their potential to break the cycle of poverty.\nWeaknesses: Some critics argue that Collier's solutions can appear overly simplistic, not fully accounting for the geopolitical and cultural complexities involved. His advocacy for military intervention is also seen as controversial and potentially problematic by some readers.\nOverall Sentiment: The general reception is largely positive, with many finding the book eye-opening and a valuable contribution to understanding global poverty. It is considered essential reading for those interested in development economics and global policy.\nKey Takeaway: "The Bottom Billion" emphasizes the importance of addressing the specific economic traps that keep the poorest nations in poverty, urging the international community to implement targeted interventions to effectively assist these countries.
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By Paul Collier