
The Divided Self
An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness
Categories
Nonfiction, Self Help, Psychology, Philosophy, Science, Mental Health, Sociology, Mental Illness, Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry
Content Type
Book
Binding
Paperback
Year
1965
Publisher
Penguin
Language
English
ASIN
0140135375
ISBN
0140135375
ISBN13
9780140135374
File Download
PDF | EPUB
The Divided Self Plot Summary
Introduction
Mental illness, particularly schizophrenia, has long been approached through clinical observation that treats patients as objects of study rather than subjects with valid experiences. This fundamental approach fails to grasp the experiential reality of those labeled "psychotic," treating their words and behaviors as merely symptoms of disease rather than meaningful expressions of their existence. The existential-phenomenological method offers a radical alternative - one that seeks to understand psychosis from within, as a comprehensible human response to unbearable situations. By examining the divided nature of human experience, especially in schizoid and schizophrenic conditions, we find not incomprehensible madness but profound existential strategies for survival. The core insight revolves around ontological insecurity - where the individual lacks a secure sense of their own reality, identity, and autonomy in relation to others. This insecurity leads to defensive maneuvers that, while protecting the self from perceived threats of engulfment or implosion, simultaneously create new forms of suffering and alienation. Through detailed case studies and philosophical analysis, we journey through the territories of the embodied and unembodied self, exploring how the false-self system develops and ultimately how the transition to psychosis occurs as an intelligible human response to an impossible existential position.
Chapter 1: Existential Phenomenology as a Framework for Understanding Psychosis
Existential phenomenology provides a fundamentally different approach to understanding human experience compared to traditional psychiatric methods. Rather than viewing people as objects to be studied from the outside, it seeks to comprehend how individuals experience their world and themselves within it. The standard medical approach to mental illness treats patients as collections of symptoms to be categorized and diagnosed, whereas the existential-phenomenological approach attempts to enter the patient's reality and understand it from within. The scientific approach to studying persons presents unique challenges because the subject matter is itself a subject. When we attempt to study another person as an object, we inevitably distort what we observe. Traditional psychiatry often depersonalizes patients by reducing them to diagnostic categories, viewing their expressions as mere "signs" of disease. This objectification creates an artificial separation between observer and observed that ultimately prevents genuine understanding. The psychiatrist who maintains clinical distance and "objectivity" paradoxically makes it impossible to grasp the patient's lived reality. This fundamental distinction becomes clear when examining how psychiatrists interpret patient communications. Consider Kraepelin's approach to a catatonic patient who seems to speak nonsensically. The traditional psychiatrist dismisses these utterances as meaningless symptoms, but existential analysis reveals them as desperate attempts to communicate genuine distress and to preserve some sense of self in the face of objectification. The patient's seemingly bizarre statements often contain existential truth when understood in their proper context - they are not simply random products of a diseased brain but meaningful expressions of a particular way of experiencing the world. The existential approach acknowledges that understanding another person requires interpretation, much like deciphering an ancient text. This requires not just intellectual analysis but the "cooperation of all the powers of the mind" - what might be called empathy. The psychiatrist must temporarily suspend his own categories of thought and enter the patient's world, recognizing that the patient's expressions make sense within their own existential reality. This does not mean accepting delusions as literal truth, but understanding their truth as expressions of the patient's lived experience. For the existential analyst, the core question shifts from "What symptoms does this patient display?" to "How does this person experience being-in-the-world?" This approach recognizes that sanity and madness are not separated by an unbridgeable gulf but exist on a continuum of human possibilities. The seemingly incomprehensible behaviors of schizophrenic patients become intelligible when viewed as strategies for maintaining existence in an experienced world filled with particular threats and terrors. Understanding psychosis thus requires grasping how the patient's way of being-in-the-world has developed as a response to profound ontological insecurity.
Chapter 2: Ontological Insecurity and the Roots of Schizoid Experience
Ontological security refers to a fundamental sense of one's realness, aliveness, and identity - a basic existential position that most people take for granted. The ontologically secure person experiences himself as whole, continuous in time, and clearly differentiated from others and the world. His identity and autonomy are rarely in question; he faces the ordinary hazards of life from a position of basic inner certainty. This foundational security allows him to engage with others without fearing that his selfhood will be overwhelmed or destroyed. The ontologically insecure person, by contrast, lacks this basic certainty. Unable to take his own being for granted, he experiences the ordinary circumstances of life as perpetual threats to his existence. Three primary forms of anxiety characterize this condition: fear of engulfment, implosion, and petrification. Engulfment is the terror that relating to others will result in losing one's identity - that closeness means being absorbed, swallowed up, or drowned by another's personality. Implosion involves the dread that reality itself might crash in and obliterate one's emptiness. Petrification refers to the fear of being turned into an object, a thing, deprived of subjectivity and autonomy. These anxieties lead to distinctive defensive strategies. The individual may isolate himself to prevent engulfment, maintain vigilant self-consciousness to prevent implosion, or attempt to depersonalize others before they can depersonalize him. Such defenses constitute a schizoid position - a particular orientation toward life characterized by detachment and isolation. The paradox is that these very defenses, designed to preserve the self, often result in a more profound sense of unreality and deadness, aggravating the original ontological insecurity. The case of Mrs. R illustrates this dilemma. Her presenting symptom was agoraphobia - fear of being in public places - but deeper analysis revealed this as merely the surface manifestation of profound ontological insecurity. For her, being alone in the street triggered not ordinary anxiety but existential panic; without another person who recognized her, she felt herself ceasing to exist. Her entire identity depended on being perceived by others who knew her. When alone, she required the imagined presence of another to maintain her sense of being. Her fundamental equation was "I am only what other people recognize me as being." Another patient, Mrs. D, demonstrated how this ontological insecurity can lead to identity confusion. She experienced herself as divided between her "true self" and aspects of her personality derived from her mother. When feeling lost or frightened, she would unconsciously adopt her mother's characteristics - even those she consciously hated - as a defense against anxiety. This identification provided temporary security but at the cost of authenticity. Her therapy involved recognizing this pattern and gradually taking responsibility for defining her own identity. These cases illustrate that ontological insecurity creates a characteristic dilemma: the individual oscillates between complete isolation and complete merger with others, unable to achieve the dialectical balance of separateness and relatedness that characterizes mature relationships. This existential position forms the foundation from which schizoid and schizophrenic conditions develop.
Chapter 3: The False Self System as a Defense Against Anxiety
The schizoid individual, faced with persistent ontological insecurity, develops a profound split between what might be called the "inner" or "true" self and an outer "false self" system. The inner self becomes increasingly disembodied and detached from ordinary experience, while the false self handles all direct interactions with the world. This false self is not merely a social facade or mask as might be worn by more "normal" individuals - it constitutes a comprehensive system of defenses designed to protect the vulnerable inner self from perceived existential threats. This false-self system differs from normal social adaptation in several crucial ways. While everyone presents different aspects of themselves in different contexts, the schizoid individual experiences a radical discontinuity between inner experience and outer presentation. The false self does not serve to gratify or express the inner self but to hide it. The individual may comply meticulously with external expectations while feeling no genuine participation in these activities. Such compliance is motivated primarily by fear rather than by desire for social acceptance or genuine connection. The false self initially develops as a form of compliance with parental expectations or demands. The child, sensing that his spontaneous expressions are unacceptable or dangerous, learns to present only what others wish to see. David, a young man of eighteen, had grown up taking for granted that his "personality" and "self" were two entirely separate things. His "personality" was merely what his mother wanted him to be, while his "true self" remained hidden, observing from a distance. This split allowed him to be outwardly "normal" while maintaining a secret inner life that nobody could access or control. Over time, the false-self system becomes increasingly autonomous and complex. What begins as simple compliance may evolve into elaborate impersonations of others. Paradoxically, these impersonations can become vehicles for expressing hostility toward the very people being imitated. The individual begins by slavishly conforming to others' expectations but ends by caricaturing them. This allows for indirect expression of hatred that cannot be acknowledged directly. For example, James "took after" his father in certain irritating mannerisms but exaggerated them to the point of absurdity, thereby subtly mocking him. The relationship between the inner self and the false self grows increasingly problematic. The inner self despises the false self as inauthentic yet depends on it for protection. The false self becomes both a shield against external threats and a prison that prevents authentic self-expression. The individual may experience himself as "giving away" nothing of his true self in any interaction, maintaining a sense of inviolability at the cost of genuine connection. Yet this protective strategy ultimately fails to provide relief from anxiety and may instead intensify feelings of unreality, futility, and inner deadness. This split between true and false self underlies the peculiar sense of inauthenticity reported by schizoid individuals. They experience their actions as mechanical performances rather than genuine expressions of self. Even thoughts and feelings may be experienced as somehow not their own. The most intimate aspects of existence become performative rather than authentic, leaving the individual with a persistent sense of fraudulence and emptiness regardless of outward accomplishments or relationships.
Chapter 4: The Embodied and Unembodied Self in Schizoid Conditions
The most fundamental split in the schizoid individual occurs between the self and the body. While ordinary people experience themselves as essentially embodied - their physical existence forming the very foundation of their being - the schizoid person experiences his self as partially detached from his bodily existence. The body becomes not the core of one's being but merely one object among others in the world, observed rather than inhabited. This disembodiment has profound consequences for how the individual experiences himself and relates to others. For the embodied person, physical sensations, emotions, and desires are directly experienced as aspects of selfhood. Being grounded in one's body provides a sense of realness, aliveness, and continuity in time. The embodied person has a natural orientation in space - a clear sense of being "here" in contrast to things and others being "there." Physical vulnerability is accepted as an inevitable aspect of existence rather than an overwhelming threat. The body serves as a secure base from which to engage with the world. The unembodied self, by contrast, experiences the body as an alien entity that must be controlled, observed, and protected rather than directly lived in. This detachment initially serves as a defense against anxiety - if "I" am not fully identified with my body, then threats to the body do not entirely threaten my existence. Yet this defensive maneuver creates new problems. The unembodied self becomes hyperconscious, constantly observing rather than spontaneously experiencing. Cut off from direct participation in life, it retreats into imagination, fantasy, and observation. This unembodied position creates a characteristic pattern of experience. The individual feels more "real" in his mental life than in his physical actions. Direct sensory experience becomes attenuated while inner mental activity intensifies. The body, rather than being the medium through which one lives, becomes part of a false-self system that handles interactions with the world. Bodily expressions - gestures, posture, speech - feel mechanical and inauthentic rather than spontaneous. The individual may describe himself as going through motions or playing parts rather than genuinely living. David, a university student, exemplified this condition. From childhood, he had experienced his "self" and his "personality" as radically separate. His "personality" - his observable behavior - consisted largely of impersonations designed to meet others' expectations. His "real self" remained detached, observing but never directly participating. This allowed him a sense of invulnerability but at the cost of feeling unreal and disconnected. His theatrical appearance and manner were not expressions of eccentricity but desperate attempts to maintain some semblance of identity in the absence of genuine embodied selfhood. The unembodied self experiences a paradoxical relationship to others. Terrified of genuine connection that might threaten its tenuous boundaries, it nevertheless longs for confirmation of its existence. Only through being seen and recognized by others can it attain some sense of reality. Yet being seen also creates intense anxiety, as the gaze of others threatens to penetrate and expose the inner emptiness. This creates a painful oscillation between isolation and engulfment, with no middle ground of secure relatedness. The schizoid individual thus faces an impossible dilemma: both contact and isolation threaten annihilation.
Chapter 5: The Transition from Schizoid States to Psychosis
The transition from schizoid position to actual psychosis often follows a gradual path wherein the defensive structures that have maintained a precarious sanity begin to collapse. What begins as a strategy for self-preservation eventually becomes self-destructive. The unembodied self, having withdrawn from direct engagement with reality to maintain safety, finds itself increasingly impoverished, empty, and unreal. The false-self system, originally designed to protect the inner self, grows more autonomous and alienated from the individual's sense of identity. Several key factors contribute to this deterioration. The inner self, isolated from nourishing contact with reality, becomes "phantasticized" - increasingly detached from the constraints of the actual world. Without the corrective influence of reality-testing, the self's sense of omnipotence paradoxically coexists with feelings of utter impotence. The individual may experience himself as potentially anyone or anything in phantasy while feeling like nothing in reality. This inner world becomes governed by magical rather than causal thinking, further widening the gap between inner experience and shared reality. Simultaneously, the false-self system grows more extensive, autonomous, and mechanical. What began as selective compliance becomes a comprehensive pattern of inauthenticity. The individual may experience his actions, perceptions, and even thoughts as not truly his own but as mechanical processes happening to him. This creates a terrifying sense that one's being has been colonized by alien forces. The false self, initially a protective facade, begins to feel like a persecutor - an imposter usurping one's life while the "real" self watches helplessly from a position of isolation. As these processes intensify, the individual faces a critical dilemma. He may attempt to reassert his "true" self after years of concealment, suddenly rejecting the false-self system. This "coming out" of hiding often appears to others as the abrupt onset of psychosis. Alternatively, he may try to destroy his self entirely - not physically through suicide, but existentially through a form of inner death. Both paths typically lead to manifest psychosis, as the delicate balance maintaining the schizoid position collapses. The case of Rose illustrates this progression. Initially experiencing herself as trying to "forget herself" by focusing entirely on others, she gradually felt herself "going down and down" into a state where even simple actions required enormous effort. Eventually, she came to believe she had actually "killed herself" or "lost herself." Her desperate attempts to "recapture reality" - imitating others, agreeing with everything said to her, trying to produce effects in others to prove her own existence - revealed the catastrophic loss of her sense of being a real person. Her statement "I have to die to keep from dying" encapsulates the paradoxical logic of psychotic defense. What appears from the outside as deterioration or disintegration may be experienced from within as a desperate attempt at self-preservation. The individual feels compelled to destroy his self (in an existential sense) to prevent its destruction by external forces. This represents the ultimate defense: the denial of being as a means of preserving being. The schizophrenic feels he has killed his "self" to avoid being killed. He is dead in order to remain alive. This paradoxical position forms the foundation of psychotic experience, creating a world where normal categories of logic and causality no longer apply.
Chapter 6: Case Studies of Schizophrenia: Fragmentation of Being
The fragmentation of being that characterizes schizophrenia becomes vividly apparent in detailed case studies. Julie, a chronic schizophrenic hospitalized since age seventeen, exemplifies how a person's existence can disintegrate into quasi-autonomous partial systems. Her speech consisted of a "word salad" - seemingly disconnected fragments that made little sense to observers. Yet these utterances were not random nonsense but expressions of different "partial assemblies" or components of her fragmented self, each with its own perspective and voice. When interacting with Julie, one had the uncanny sense of encountering not a unified person but a collection of separate entities speaking through the same body. Her fragmentary utterances included statements from a peremptory, bullying voice that condemned "this child" as "wicked" and "wasted time" - evidently an internalized bad mother figure. Another voice belonged to a protective "big sister" who defended "this child" and insisted she needed care. These partial systems functioned as separate personalities, each with consistent characteristics and attitudes. Julie herself referred to having "two mes" - "She's me, and I'm her all the time." This fragmentation had specific consequences for Julie's experience. Without a unified self, she lacked reflective awareness - the ability to observe herself as a whole. Memory became patchy and disorganized since it lacked a consistent reference point. The boundaries between self and not-self blurred, making it difficult to distinguish between what belonged to her and what belonged to others. Perception itself became threatening as it risked confusion between perceiver and perceived: "That chair... that wall. I could be that wall. It's a terrible thing for a girl to be a wall." Joan, another schizophrenic patient, provided remarkable insight into her condition during periods of relative lucidity. She described how schizophrenics deliberately mix important communications with nonsense to test whether anyone cares enough to discern the difference. Her account reveals the profound isolation of psychosis: "Being crazy is like one of those nightmares where you try to call for help and no sound comes out." Yet she also articulated how therapeutic relationship could begin to heal this fragmentation: "Meeting you made me feel like a traveller who's been lost in a land where no one speaks his language." For Joan, the split between an inner "real self" and a compliant "false self" had been absolute. She described how sexual contact would have confirmed her sense of being treated as merely a body rather than a person: "The real me would have been up on the ceiling watching you do things with my body." Her recovery involved developing a sense of embodied personhood through experiencing herself as wholly accepted by another. She needed to feel that "both her body and her self were wanted" to begin integrating these split aspects of her being. These case studies reveal that schizophrenia is not an incomprehensible disease process but an intelligible human response to profound existential dilemmas. The fragmentary utterances, bizarre behaviors, and apparent detachment from reality represent attempts to solve impossible problems of existence. Behind the seemingly impenetrable facade of psychosis lies a person struggling to preserve some sense of being in the face of overwhelming threats to identity and autonomy. Understanding this struggle requires entering their experiential world rather than merely categorizing symptoms from the outside.
Chapter 7: Implications for Therapy and Human Understanding
The existential-phenomenological approach to understanding schizophrenia radically transforms therapeutic practice. Traditional psychiatry, by treating psychosis as merely a medical condition to be diagnosed and managed, fails to address the profound existential issues at its core. When practitioners approach patients as objects of study rather than subjects with valid experiences, they recreate and reinforce the very conditions that contribute to psychotic fragmentation. Effective therapy must begin by acknowledging the patient's experience as meaningful within its own terms. The cornerstone of therapeutic engagement with schizophrenic patients is the establishment of ontological security within the therapeutic relationship. The therapist must provide what the patient's original environment could not - recognition of their existence as a person with autonomous rights to their own experience. This requires extraordinary patience and the willingness to suspend judgment about what constitutes "reality." The therapist must temporarily enter the patient's reality without being overwhelmed by it, maintaining enough distance to help bridge the gap between private and shared worlds. Trust forms the essential foundation for this process. As Joan articulated, schizophrenics cannot trust anyone to understand them or to accept them as they are. The therapist must demonstrate not only intellectual understanding but emotional reliability - becoming what one patient described as "a great rock that I could push and push, and still you would never roll away and leave me." This constancy allows the patient to risk expressing aspects of experience previously kept hidden, including rage and hatred that may seem overwhelming. The therapeutic process often begins with the emergence of negative emotions. Joan observed that "Hate has to come first. The patient hates the doctor for opening the wound again and hates himself for allowing himself to be touched again." These negative feelings, far from representing resistance, constitute the first authentic engagement with another person. The therapist who can accept hatred without retaliation or abandonment provides a new experience of relationship that contradicts the patient's expectation of annihilation. Through this relationship, the patient gradually develops capacity for integration. Fragmented aspects of self can be acknowledged and reincorporated into a more coherent identity. The false self, constructed as a defense against ontological insecurity, becomes less necessary as genuine security develops within the therapeutic relationship. The patient begins to risk authentic self-expression rather than compliance or withdrawal. This process requires not interpretation of symptoms but recognition of the person behind them. Beyond clinical practice, this approach holds broader implications for human understanding. By revealing the intelligibility of psychotic experience, it challenges the sharp division between sanity and madness that permeates our culture. The existential vulnerabilities evident in schizophrenia - concerns about identity, authenticity, and connection - exist in subtler forms in all human experience. The schizophrenic patient, far from being incomprehensibly "other," manifests extreme versions of dilemmas common to human existence. This perspective fosters compassion rather than fear toward those experiencing psychosis. It suggests that the most alienated individuals in our society may have important truths to convey about the conditions necessary for human flourishing. Their breakdown reveals, by negative example, what we all require for psychological integration - recognition of our unique subjectivity, freedom from impossible binds, and relationships that allow authenticity without threatening annihilation.
Summary
The existential-phenomenological approach reveals that psychosis is not an impenetrable mystery but an intelligible human response to profound ontological insecurity. When individuals lack a secure sense of their own being, they develop defensive strategies - detachment from embodied experience, creation of false-self systems, and ultimately fragmentation of consciousness - that paradoxically intensify their suffering while attempting to prevent annihilation. This perspective transforms our understanding of "madness" from a mere medical condition to a comprehensible human possibility arising from specific existential contexts. The journey from ontological insecurity through schizoid withdrawal to psychotic fragmentation follows a coherent, if tragic, logic. Each step represents an attempt to solve impossible existential dilemmas when direct engagement with reality threatens the self's very existence. By recognizing this inner coherence, we gain not only more effective therapeutic approaches but a deeper understanding of the human condition itself. The schizophrenic patient, rather than an incomprehensible other, becomes a mirror reflecting universal human vulnerabilities in their most extreme form - reminding us that security in one's being, authentic self-expression, and meaningful connection with others constitute the foundation of sanity that none of us can take for granted.
Best Quote
“In a world full of danger, to be a potentially seeable object is to be constantly exposed to danger. Self-consciousness, then, may be the apprehensive awareness of oneself as potentially exposed to danger by the simple fact of being visible to others. The obvious defence against such a danger is to make oneself invisible in one way or another.” ― R.D. Laing, The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness
Review Summary
Strengths: The review provides a reflective and philosophical exploration of the author's personal journey, drawing connections between spiritual emptiness and psychological struggles. It references cultural and literary figures like William Burroughs and R.D. Laing, adding depth to the analysis.\nWeaknesses: The review is somewhat disjointed and lacks clarity, making it difficult to follow the narrative or understand the specific critiques of the book. The use of personal anecdotes and philosophical musings may detract from a focused analysis of the book itself.\nOverall Sentiment: Mixed. The reviewer seems to appreciate the philosophical insights but struggles with the coherence and clarity of the narrative.\nKey Takeaway: The review suggests that the book delves into the complexities of spiritual and psychological crises, using personal experiences and philosophical references to explore the construction and collapse of the ego.
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The Divided Self
By R.D. Laing