
The Metaphysics
Dive into Ancient Philosophical Insights
Categories
Nonfiction, Philosophy, Science, History, Classics, School, Greece, Ancient History, Ancient, Metaphysics
Content Type
Book
Binding
Paperback
Year
1999
Publisher
Green Lion Press
Language
English
ISBN13
9781888009033
File Download
PDF | EPUB
The Metaphysics Plot Summary
Introduction
What does it mean for something to exist? This seemingly simple question has puzzled philosophers for millennia and lies at the heart of metaphysics—the branch of philosophy concerned with the fundamental nature of reality. While other disciplines study particular aspects of existence, metaphysics examines "being qua being"—being itself, in its most universal and abstract sense. It seeks to understand the basic principles that underlie all reality, not merely specific manifestations of it. Aristotelian metaphysics provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the structure of reality through several interconnected concepts. Through the analysis of substance as the primary category of being, the distinction between form and matter, the relationship between actuality and potentiality, and the doctrine of the four causes, this theoretical system offers profound insights into the nature of existence. By exploring these fundamental principles, we gain not only a deeper understanding of reality but also a foundation for all other forms of knowledge, from the natural sciences to ethics and politics.
Chapter 1: The Nature of Metaphysics as First Philosophy
Metaphysics stands as the most fundamental branch of philosophical inquiry, examining not particular beings or specific aspects of reality, but being itself—what it means for something to exist at all. Unlike specialized sciences that investigate particular domains of reality, metaphysics studies being qua being, the most universal and abstract characteristics that belong to all existing things simply because they exist. This foundational discipline seeks to uncover the first principles and ultimate causes that underlie all other forms of knowledge. The distinctive character of metaphysics emerges from its unique scope and methodology. While physics studies natural bodies in motion, biology examines living organisms, and mathematics explores quantities and spatial relations, metaphysics transcends these particular domains to investigate the very conditions that make any inquiry possible. It asks questions that precede all specialized knowledge: What is substance? What is essence? How do form and matter relate? What is the nature of causality? These questions form the conceptual foundation upon which all other knowledge is built. Aristotle distinguishes metaphysics from other sciences through its universal character and logical priority. While particular sciences study specific kinds of being (living things, physical objects, quantities), metaphysics studies being as such and the attributes that belong to it simply because it is being. This universality gives metaphysics a unique status as "first philosophy"—not merely one discipline among others but the foundational inquiry that establishes the principles presupposed by all other forms of knowledge. The metaphysician examines concepts like substance, essence, unity, and causality that are employed across all domains of inquiry. The method of metaphysics differs from empirical sciences in that it relies primarily on logical analysis and conceptual investigation rather than observation or experimentation. This does not mean metaphysics proceeds independently of experience—indeed, all knowledge begins with perception—but rather that it examines the conceptual structures that make experience intelligible. Through rigorous analysis of our most basic concepts and the logical relations between them, metaphysics seeks to establish necessary truths about the structure of reality that cannot be derived from empirical investigation alone. The significance of metaphysics extends far beyond abstract philosophical contemplation. By clarifying our most fundamental concepts and assumptions about reality, it provides the intellectual foundation for all other forms of inquiry. Scientific theories presuppose metaphysical commitments about the nature of causality, the reality of universals, and the structure of substances. Ethical theories depend on metaphysical conceptions of human nature, action, and the good. Even ordinary thinking about the world implicitly relies on metaphysical assumptions. By examining these presuppositions critically, metaphysics helps ensure that our understanding of the world rests on solid conceptual foundations. In practical terms, metaphysical inquiry enables us to recognize the underlying unity amid the apparent diversity of experience. When we understand that all changes involve the actualization of potential, that all substances combine form and matter, and that all events occur for the sake of some end, we can see patterns and connections that would otherwise remain hidden. This comprehensive vision of reality provides not only theoretical satisfaction but practical wisdom, allowing us to situate our lives within a coherent understanding of the world and our place within it.
Chapter 2: Substance as the Primary Category of Being
Substance represents the most fundamental category in Aristotle's metaphysical system, serving as the primary sense of being upon which all other categories depend. While being is said in many ways—through qualities, quantities, relations, and other categories—substance holds primacy as that which exists in its own right rather than as an attribute of something else. A quality like "white" or a relation like "taller than" exists only as a property of some substance, but substances like "horse" or "human" exist independently as the ultimate subjects of predication. Aristotle distinguishes between primary and secondary substances, establishing a hierarchical order within this fundamental category. Primary substances are particular individuals like "this specific horse" or "Socrates," while secondary substances are the species and genera to which these individuals belong, such as "horse" or "animal." Primary substances have ontological priority because they are the ultimate subjects of predication—we say that Socrates is human, not that human is Socrates. Without primary substances, nothing else would exist, as all other entities depend on them either as properties or as classifications of them. The essence of a substance is what makes it the kind of thing it is—its defining nature or "what it was to be" that thing. For natural substances, this essence is not merely a collection of properties but an integrated principle that organizes and directs the development and activities of the substance. The essence of an oak tree includes not just its physical characteristics but the internal principle that guides its growth from acorn to mature tree. This teleological dimension of essence explains why substances develop according to regular patterns and maintain their identity despite constant material change. Aristotle's conception of substance addresses a fundamental metaphysical problem: how can we account for both change and persistence in the world around us? When a leaf changes from green to brown, something must persist through this change—the leaf itself, as a substance. Without this underlying substrate, change would be impossible to conceptualize coherently. We would merely have a succession of unrelated states rather than the transformation of a single entity. This explains why substance is considered ontologically prior to other categories like quality, quantity, or relation. In practical terms, the concept of substance helps explain our intuitive understanding of the world as populated by distinct, persisting entities. When we recognize a friend after many years, despite numerous changes in appearance, we implicitly acknowledge that something essential about them has remained the same. This intuition reflects the metaphysical priority of substance—the friend as a continuing entity—over the changing accidents or properties they exhibit over time. Our everyday language and thought are structured around substances as the primary bearers of properties and the subjects of change. The doctrine of substance has profound implications for how we understand reality. It suggests that the world is not merely a collection of properties or events but is fundamentally composed of individual substances with their own natures and capacities. This view stands in contrast to alternative metaphysical systems that reduce reality to bundles of properties, collections of sense data, or processes without underlying substances. By prioritizing substance, Aristotelian metaphysics provides a framework that aligns closely with our ordinary experience of the world as populated by distinct, enduring things.
Chapter 3: Form and Matter in Hylomorphic Theory
Hylomorphism—Aristotle's theory that substances are composites of form (morphē) and matter (hylē)—represents one of his most distinctive metaphysical contributions. Unlike Platonic forms that exist separately from particulars, Aristotelian forms exist within material things as their organizing principles. Form is what makes something the kind of thing it is, while matter is the underlying substrate that receives and is determined by form. Neither exists independently in the natural world; rather, they are complementary aspects of concrete substances. The relationship between form and matter can be illustrated through numerous examples. In artifacts, the relationship is relatively straightforward: a bronze statue consists of bronze (its matter) organized according to a specific shape (its form). The bronze could potentially take many shapes, but it is currently actualized as a particular statue. In living organisms, the relationship is more complex: the body represents matter organized according to the form or soul of that specific type of life. The form is not simply the external shape but the internal organizing principle that determines how the parts function together as a coherent whole. Aristotle distinguishes between different levels of matter and form. Proximate matter is the immediate material cause of a thing, like bronze for a statue. Remote matter would be the elements that constitute bronze. Similarly, forms can be arranged hierarchically, with higher-level forms organizing lower-level forms and their corresponding matter. In a living organism, cells form tissues, tissues form organs, and organs form the complete body, with each level serving as matter for the level above it. This hierarchical conception allows Aristotle to analyze complex entities without reducing them to their most basic physical components. The hylomorphic theory provides a sophisticated solution to the problem of change. When change occurs, the underlying matter persists while taking on a new form. When a block of wood is carved into a statue, the wood remains as the material substrate while acquiring a new shape or form. This explains how something can both change and remain the same entity. In substantial change, like the transformation of food into flesh, the primary matter persists while undergoing a change in substantial form. This account avoids both the Parmenidean denial of change and the Heraclitean view that nothing persists through change. In everyday experience, the form-matter distinction helps explain how we identify and categorize things. When we recognize something as a table, we are identifying its form—the functional organization that makes it a table—regardless of whether it is made of wood, metal, or plastic. The matter may vary, but as long as the form remains recognizable, we identify it as the same kind of thing. This reflects our intuitive understanding that what makes something what it is goes beyond its material composition to include its structural organization and functional purpose. Hylomorphism offers a middle path between extreme materialism and extreme idealism. Against materialism, it maintains that material components alone cannot explain the unity, organization, and purpose evident in natural substances. Against idealism, it insists that forms do not exist in a separate realm but are realized in material reality. This balanced approach allows Aristotle to acknowledge both the intelligible structure of reality (captured by forms) and its material basis, providing a framework that remains relevant for understanding the relationship between physical composition and functional organization in contemporary science.
Chapter 4: Actuality and Potentiality as Fundamental Principles
The distinction between actuality (energeia) and potentiality (dynamis) represents one of Aristotle's most profound metaphysical innovations. This conceptual framework provides a sophisticated way to understand change, development, and the relationship between what things are and what they might become. Actuality refers to something existing in a complete, realized state, while potentiality denotes the capacity or capability for becoming something else. This distinction helps resolve ancient philosophical puzzles about how change is possible without contradicting the principle that something cannot both be and not be in the same respect. Aristotle employs this distinction to address paradoxes about change that troubled earlier thinkers. For Parmenides, genuine change seemed impossible because it would require something to come from nothing. Aristotle responds by showing that change occurs not from non-being simpliciter, but from potential being to actual being. When a block of marble becomes a statue, the statue does not emerge from absolute nothingness but from marble that was potentially a statue. This insight allows Aristotle to preserve both the reality of change and the principle that nothing comes from nothing. The actuality-potentiality distinction operates across multiple levels of reality. At the most basic level, it explains how physical objects can change while maintaining identity. A block of marble is actually marble but potentially a statue; an acorn is actually an acorn but potentially an oak tree. In living beings, this distinction becomes even more significant: a child is potentially an adult, an embryo potentially a fully developed organism. These potentialities are not mere logical possibilities but real capacities grounded in the nature of the entity. The acorn has within it the intrinsic capacity to develop into an oak tree, not into a pine tree or a rabbit. Crucially, not all potentialities are equal. Aristotle distinguishes between first and second potentialities, which might be understood as different levels of readiness for actualization. A person who has never studied music has only a remote potentiality to play the piano, while someone who has learned but is not currently playing possesses an immediate potentiality. Similarly, a sighted person whose eyes are closed has an immediate potentiality for seeing, whereas someone born blind lacks this capacity altogether. These distinctions help explain the different ways in which things can be "capable" of something. In human affairs, the actuality-potentiality distinction illuminates important aspects of development, learning, and ethical growth. Education can be understood as the process of actualizing intellectual potentialities, while moral development involves actualizing potentialities for virtue. A person may have the potential to become virtuous through practice and habituation, gradually transforming what begins as difficult effort into second nature. This process of self-actualization—becoming fully what one potentially is—represents a central ethical ideal in Aristotle's philosophy. The metaphysical framework of actuality and potentiality continues to influence contemporary thought across disciplines. In biology, it helps explain embryonic development and the relationship between genotype and phenotype. In psychology, it illuminates the development of human capabilities and the realization of potential. Even in physics, similar concepts appear in discussions of probability waves and quantum states. By providing a sophisticated conceptual framework for understanding how things can change while maintaining identity, and how future states can be genuinely rooted in present realities, the actuality-potentiality distinction remains one of metaphysics' most enduring contributions to human understanding.
Chapter 5: The Four Causes and Teleological Explanation
Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes provides a comprehensive framework for explaining why things are as they are, offering a more nuanced understanding of causality than modern accounts that focus exclusively on efficient causation. The four causes—material, formal, efficient, and final—work together to provide a complete explanation of any natural phenomenon or artificial production. This framework allows Aristotle to integrate physical, formal, and teleological explanations into a unified account of causality. The material cause identifies what something is made of—the underlying matter or substance from which it is constituted. For a bronze statue, the material cause is bronze; for a wooden table, it is wood; for a living organism, it includes the physical elements that compose its body. Material causes explain certain properties and limitations of things—a bronze statue has different properties than a marble one because of the different material causes involved. However, material causes alone cannot fully explain why something is what it is, as the same material could potentially form many different things. The formal cause explains what makes something the kind of thing it is—its structure, pattern, or essence. For artifacts, this includes the design or blueprint; for living beings, it includes the soul as the organizing principle of the body. The formal cause of a house includes its architectural plan; the formal cause of an oak tree includes the specific organization that makes it an oak rather than a pine. Formal causes explain why things have the specific characteristics and capacities they do, beyond what can be accounted for by their material composition alone. The efficient cause accounts for what brings something into being—the agent or force that initiates change or production. For artifacts, this is typically the craftsperson; for natural substances, it includes the parent organisms or natural forces that generate them. The efficient cause of a statue is the sculptor; the efficient cause of an oak tree includes the parent tree that produced the acorn. Efficient causes explain how things come to be, focusing on the processes and agents that transform potentiality into actuality. The final cause identifies the purpose, goal, or end toward which something naturally tends—the "for the sake of which" something exists or occurs. For artifacts, this includes their intended function; for natural substances, it includes their characteristic activities and developmental patterns. The final cause of a knife is cutting; the final cause of an eye is seeing; the final cause of an acorn is becoming a mature oak tree. Final causes explain why processes unfold in regular, goal-directed patterns rather than randomly or chaotically. This teleological dimension of causality is perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Aristotle's framework. Unlike modern mechanistic explanations that often exclude purpose from scientific accounts, Aristotle sees teleology as essential for understanding natural phenomena. This does not involve attributing conscious intentions to nature but recognizing that natural processes are inherently directed toward specific ends. The development of an embryo, the healing of a wound, or the growth of a plant all exhibit goal-directed patterns that cannot be fully explained without reference to the end states toward which they tend. In everyday life, we intuitively employ all four causes in our explanations. When explaining why a house stands firm, we might reference its foundation and building materials (material cause), its architectural design (formal cause), the construction process (efficient cause), and its purpose of providing shelter (final cause). By integrating these different aspects of causality, Aristotle's framework provides a richer understanding of why things are as they are than approaches that reduce causality to mere mechanical interaction.
Chapter 6: Universals, Particulars, and the Problem of Unity
The relationship between universals and particulars represents one of the most challenging problems in metaphysics: how can we account for both the individuality of particular things and the universal properties they share? When we recognize multiple objects as "red" or different organisms as "human," what exactly is this redness or humanity that they share? Aristotle's approach to this problem offers a middle path between Platonic realism, which posits universals as separate entities, and nominalism, which reduces universals to mere names. For Aristotle, universals exist, but not as separate entities in the manner of Platonic Forms. Rather, universals exist in particulars as their forms or essences. The universal "humanity" exists in individual humans, not apart from them. This position, sometimes called moderate realism, avoids the problems associated with separate Forms while preserving the reality of universals. It explains how knowledge can be of universals (since science studies common natures) while maintaining that only particulars fully exist in reality (since universals exist only as instantiated in particulars). The problem of unity emerges when we consider how multiple attributes can constitute a single substance. If we define "human" as "rational animal," what unifies these predicates into a coherent essence rather than a mere collection of attributes? Aristotle addresses this through his doctrine of substantial forms—the organizing principle that makes something the kind of thing it is. The form of humanity is not simply a list of properties but an integrated principle that organizes matter into a functioning human being. This explains how multiple predicates can constitute a unified essence. The unity problem extends to the relationship between form and matter in individual substances. How can form and matter, which are conceptually distinct, constitute a single unified entity rather than a mere aggregate? Aristotle's solution involves seeing form as the actuality of matter—not something added to matter from outside but the realization of matter's potential. The soul is not added to the body as one thing to another but is the actuality of a potentially living body. This intimate connection between form and matter explains how they can constitute a genuine unity. In scientific classification and explanation, the relationship between universals and particulars becomes especially significant. When biologists classify organisms into species and genera, they implicitly engage with the problem of universals. The question becomes whether these classifications merely reflect human cognitive convenience or capture real divisions in nature. Aristotelian metaphysics suggests the latter—that natural kinds like "tiger" or "oak tree" reflect genuine patterns in reality, not merely arbitrary human categorization. This provides a philosophical foundation for scientific taxonomy. The unity problem also manifests in our understanding of individual identity through time. When we recognize someone as the same person despite years of physical and psychological changes, what constitutes this enduring identity? The metaphysical tradition suggests that underlying accidental changes is a substantial unity—the person remains the same individual despite acquiring and losing particular properties. This explains our intuition that personal identity involves more than mere continuity of memories or physical parts, pointing to a deeper metaphysical unity that persists through change.
Chapter 7: The Unmoved Mover and Divine Thought
At the pinnacle of Aristotle's metaphysical system stands the unmoved mover, a being of pure actuality that serves as the ultimate cause of all motion and change in the universe. Unlike physical causes that operate through contact and themselves undergo change, the unmoved mover initiates movement while remaining completely unchanging itself. This apparent paradox is resolved through Aristotle's insight that the unmoved mover moves the cosmos not as an efficient cause but as a final cause—it moves by being loved or desired, like a beloved who inspires movement in the lover without herself moving. The unmoved mover must exist, Aristotle argues, because motion in the universe is eternal. If all movers were themselves moved by something else, we would face either an infinite regress of causes (which explains nothing) or a circular explanation (which is logically flawed). Therefore, there must be a first principle of motion that is itself unmoved. Furthermore, this principle must be eternal and fully actual, containing no unrealized potential, for if it contained potentiality, it would be subject to change and would require a prior cause to actualize it. As pure actuality, the unmoved mover is characterized by perfect self-sufficiency and uninterrupted activity. This activity cannot involve change or production, which would imply potentiality. Instead, it consists in the most perfect form of activity possible: thought thinking itself. Divine thought is not directed toward external objects, which would make it dependent on something outside itself. Rather, it engages in eternal contemplation of itself as the most perfect object of thought. This self-thinking thought represents the highest form of life and the most complete reality. Aristotle's conception differs markedly from anthropomorphic views of divinity. The unmoved mover does not create the world, intervene in its affairs, or take any notice of human activities. It does not love or care for the cosmos; rather, the cosmos is drawn toward it through a kind of natural aspiration. Like a mathematical principle that organizes reality without itself being part of the physical world, the unmoved mover provides order and purpose to the cosmos without directly interacting with it. This elegant solution allows Aristotle to explain cosmic order without attributing human-like intentions to the divine. The unmoved mover's nature as pure thought has profound implications for Aristotle's value theory. If the most perfect being engages eternally in theoretical contemplation, then this activity must represent the highest good. Human happiness, accordingly, is found most completely in theoretical activity, which allows us to temporarily approximate divine existence. When we engage in philosophical contemplation, we participate in the very activity that characterizes the divine, achieving the closest possible connection to the unmoved mover. This establishes a direct link between metaphysics and ethics. In everyday terms, the concept of the unmoved mover helps us understand the difference between various types of causation. When we push a cart, we act as an efficient cause that directly transfers motion. But when a beautiful landscape inspires us to walk toward it, or when an idea motivates us to action, we experience something analogous to final causation—being moved by something that does not itself move. This distinction enriches our understanding of motivation and purpose in human life, suggesting that our highest aspirations are drawn not by physical forces but by ideals that attract us through their intrinsic value.
Summary
Aristotelian metaphysics provides a comprehensive framework for understanding reality through its interconnected concepts of substance, form and matter, actuality and potentiality, and the four causes. At its core lies the profound insight that being manifests itself in multiple ways while maintaining an underlying unity and order. This theoretical system offers not merely abstract speculation but a sophisticated conceptual toolkit for making sense of both the natural world and human experience. The enduring significance of this metaphysical framework extends far beyond historical interest. Its concepts continue to influence fields ranging from biology to ethics, from psychology to theology. By providing a middle path between materialistic reductionism and abstract idealism, Aristotelian metaphysics offers a balanced approach that acknowledges both the physical basis of reality and its inherent intelligibility and purpose. In an age often characterized by fragmented knowledge and specialized disciplines, this integrated vision of reality reminds us that understanding the fundamental nature of being remains essential for comprehending our place in the cosmos and the meaning of human existence.
Best Quote
“It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” ― Aristotle, Metaphysics
Review Summary
Strengths: The translation's clarity and fidelity to the original Greek stand out, making Aristotle's complex ideas more accessible. A significant positive is the comprehensive introduction and notes by Sachs and Levine, which provide valuable context and enhance understanding. The exploration of philosophical themes such as substance and causality is particularly noteworthy, offering profound insights into the nature of being.\nWeaknesses: Some readers find the abstract nature of the material inherently challenging, requiring careful study. The dense and complex ideas presented by Aristotle can be difficult to grasp for those unfamiliar with philosophical texts.\nOverall Sentiment: Reception of this edition is highly positive, with readers appreciating its ability to make a seminal philosophical work more approachable. The insightful commentary and accessible translation are frequently highlighted as key strengths.\nKey Takeaway: This edition successfully bridges the gap between ancient philosophical inquiry and modern understanding, offering a valuable resource for those interested in the foundational concepts of Western philosophy.
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The Metaphysics
By Aristotle











