The Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War Plot Summary

Introduction

In the waning years of the fifth century BCE, Athens faced its greatest challenge. The once-mighty Athenian Empire, which had dominated the Aegean Sea for decades, stood at the precipice of destruction. What began with the disastrous Sicilian Expedition of 415-413 BCE would culminate in the city's surrender to Sparta in 404 BCE, marking the end of Athens' golden age. Yet this story is far more than a simple military defeat; it represents one of history's most fascinating studies in imperial overreach, democratic resilience, and ultimately, political self-destruction. The narrative of Athens' fall illuminates timeless questions about the relationship between democracy and empire, the challenges of governance during existential crisis, and the complex interplay between military strategy and political leadership. Readers will discover how Persian gold fundamentally altered the war's dynamics, how internal political revolution threatened Athens from within, and how brilliant but flawed leaders like Alcibiades simultaneously saved and doomed their city. Whether you're interested in ancient military history, political revolutions, or the dynamics of imperial decline, this historical narrative offers profound insights into how great powers fall and what factors ultimately determine survival in existential conflicts.

Chapter 1: Sicily's Fatal Allure: The Expedition That Doomed an Empire (415-413 BCE)

The Sicilian Expedition marked the beginning of Athens' downfall. In 415 BCE, at the height of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians made the fateful decision to launch a massive naval expedition against Syracuse, a powerful city in Sicily allied with their enemy Sparta. This ambitious campaign represented Athens at its most imperial and overconfident, coming after years of relative peace established by the Peace of Nicias in 421 BCE. The expedition was championed by the charismatic and controversial Alcibiades, who painted visions of vast wealth and expanded empire to the eager Athenian assembly. The more cautious general Nicias opposed the venture, warning of its dangers, but his arguments paradoxically led the assembly to vote for an even larger force than initially proposed. The expedition sailed with 134 triremes and over 5,000 hoplites, representing an enormous investment of Athenian resources and manpower. The campaign was doomed almost from the start. Shortly after the fleet's departure, Alcibiades was recalled to face charges of religious sacrilege in the mutilation of the Hermai statues, but he escaped to Sparta where he betrayed Athenian plans. Leadership fell to the reluctant Nicias, whose hesitation and poor decision-making proved disastrous. The Syracusans, aided by Spartan general Gylippus, gradually turned the tide against the Athenians, trapping their fleet in the Great Harbor of Syracuse. The final battle in September 413 BCE resulted in complete catastrophe. The Athenian fleet was destroyed, and their army was forced to retreat overland, only to be surrounded and captured. Approximately 3,000 hoplites and 9,000 thetes (lower-class citizens who served as rowers) died or were enslaved in the stone quarries of Syracuse. This disaster represented the greatest military defeat in Athenian history to that point, depleting Athens of ships, treasure, and manpower. The treasury, once flush with 5,000 talents at the war's beginning, now held fewer than 500. Beyond the material losses, Athens faced a severe crisis of leadership. The expedition had claimed the lives of its most experienced generals: Demosthenes, Lamachus, Nicias, and Eurymedon. Alcibiades was in exile in Sparta, and no commanders of comparable experience remained. As Thucydides tells us, when news of the disaster reached Athens, citizens responded with a sequence of emotions: anger toward the politicians who had proposed the expedition, fury at the seers who had predicted success, grief for the men lost, and finally, fear for their own safety. The Sicilian disaster shattered the aura of Athenian invincibility and encouraged rebellion throughout the empire. It also revealed the dangerous potential of Athenian democracy to make catastrophic decisions when swayed by charismatic leaders and imperial ambition. As Athens struggled to recover from this blow, they would face new threats both from without and within, setting the stage for the final phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Chapter 2: Persian Gold and Spartan Ships: The Changing Balance of Power

In the aftermath of the Sicilian catastrophe, Athens faced existential threats on multiple fronts. By 412 BCE, Sparta seized the opportunity to launch a new offensive, this time with a naval strategy aimed at dismantling the Athenian Empire piece by piece. The Spartans recognized that Athens' true power lay in its maritime empire, and they now sought to challenge Athenian naval supremacy directly. This period also saw the critical entry of Persia into the conflict, forever changing the war's dynamics. King Darius II of Persia, eager to regain control of the Greek cities in Asia Minor, provided crucial financial support to the Spartan fleet through his satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. The Spartans and Persians formalized their alliance through a series of treaties, with the Spartans essentially abandoning their rhetoric about "liberating the Greeks" by acknowledging Persian claims to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. This Persian gold allowed Sparta to maintain a large fleet for the first time, fundamentally altering the strategic balance. The renegade Athenian Alcibiades played a pivotal role during this period. Having fled from Sparta after political complications (including an affair with King Agis' wife), he attached himself to Tissaphernes and began a complex game of intrigue. Alcibiades convinced the Persian satrap to adopt a policy of balance, providing just enough support to keep both sides fighting without allowing either to achieve decisive victory. Simultaneously, he began negotiations with Athenian officers at Samos, promising to bring Persian support to Athens if they would recall him and modify their democratic constitution. Athens showed remarkable resilience during this crisis. Despite the loss of key allies like Chios, Erythrae, and eventually Rhodes, the Athenians managed to scrape together a new fleet. They emptied their emergency reserve fund of 1,000 talents, mobilized their remaining resources, and maintained control of their naval base at Samos. Thucydides notes approvingly that "in the terror of the moment, as is the way of the demos, they were ready to do everything with discipline." They gathered timber to build ships, reduced public expenditures, built a fort at Sunium to protect grain shipments, and kept close watch on their allies to prevent further rebellions. The Athenians also changed their method of collecting imperial revenue, replacing direct tribute with a 5% duty on all goods imported or exported by sea, hoping to increase revenue while shifting the tax burden to commercial interests. This financial innovation demonstrated Athens' administrative flexibility even in crisis. However, the combination of external military pressure and the intrigues of Alcibiades created conditions for internal political upheaval that would soon threaten Athens from within, even as they fought desperately to preserve their empire abroad. This period fundamentally transformed the nature of the Peloponnesian War. What had begun as a conflict between two Greek alliances now became a complex international struggle involving Persian interests and resources. The entry of Persian gold into the equation meant that Athens' traditional naval advantages could no longer guarantee its security, setting the stage for the political crisis that would soon engulf the city.

Chapter 3: Democracy in Crisis: The Oligarchic Coup of 411 BCE

The spring and summer of 411 BCE witnessed a dramatic political revolution in Athens. Exploiting the city's military vulnerability and financial exhaustion, a group of oligarchic conspirators orchestrated the overthrow of Athens' century-old democracy. This coup represented both a response to military crisis and the culmination of long-standing aristocratic resentment toward democratic governance. The conspiracy began at Samos among Athenian officers intrigued by Alcibiades' promises of Persian support. Led by figures like Peisander and Phrynichus, the movement gained momentum through a network of political clubs (hetairiai) that had long existed in Athens. The conspirators skillfully manipulated public fear, arguing that only by modifying the democracy could Athens secure Persian aid and survive the war. They proposed limiting political rights to 5,000 property owners who could serve as hoplites, eliminating payment for public service, and recalling Alcibiades. The practical burdens facing the propertied classes had become nearly unbearable, creating fertile ground for oligarchic sentiment. The war required maintaining a large fleet year-round, while public expenditures remained high. Meanwhile, revenue was severely curtailed by rebellions of tribute-paying allies. The number of Athenians wealthy enough to perform required public services (liturgies) had plummeted from perhaps 25,000 in 431 BCE to about 9,000 by 411 BCE due to plague and war casualties. Those remaining faced unprecedented financial obligations, with some spending up to 15 talents on public services. Upon returning to Athens, the conspirators employed intimidation and assassination to silence opposition. They eliminated democratic leaders like Androcles, created an atmosphere of terror through targeted violence, and eventually convened a special assembly outside the city at Colonus. There they pushed through constitutional changes that transferred power to a council of Four Hundred, who would rule with "full powers" until the promised government of Five Thousand could be established. The Four Hundred seized power through a combination of procedural manipulation and outright force. Led by the intellectual Antiphon, the demagogue-turned-oligarch Peisander, the cunning Phrynichus, and the politically flexible Theramenes, they expelled the democratic Council of Five Hundred and established their authority. However, the regime was immediately divided between extremists willing to make peace with Sparta at any cost and moderates who had supported constitutional change primarily to win the war more effectively. This political revolution had profound strategic consequences. The democratic Athenian fleet at Samos refused to recognize the oligarchy, effectively creating two Athenian states. The oligarchs' attempts to establish similar regimes in allied cities backfired, often leading to those cities' complete defection to Sparta. Most dangerously, extremists within the Four Hundred began secret negotiations with Sparta and constructed fortifications at Eetioneia that could facilitate enemy entry into Piraeus. The coup had not only divided Athens politically but had brought it to the brink of total defeat through internal betrayal.

Chapter 4: Alcibiades Returns: Naval Victories and Political Instability

The period following the establishment of the Four Hundred in Athens witnessed dramatic shifts in both political alliances and naval fortunes. When news of the oligarchic coup reached the Athenian fleet at Samos, the sailors and soldiers, predominantly from the thetic class, rejected the new regime and declared themselves the true democratic Athens. Under the leadership of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, they recalled Alcibiades from exile and made him their general. Alcibiades' return marked a remarkable reversal of fortune. Condemned to death by Athens, rejected by Sparta after his affair with King Agis' wife, and increasingly distrusted by the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, he now found himself commanding the Athenian fleet. He skillfully portrayed himself as having great influence with Tissaphernes and promised to bring Persian support to the democratic cause. Though these claims were largely exaggerated, they gave the demoralized Athenians new hope. The naval situation had been deteriorating for Athens since 412 BCE. The Spartans had established a foothold on the Hellespont, threatening Athens' vital grain supply route, and had brought Rhodes into rebellion. However, the Spartan fleet remained cautious, often refusing battle even when holding numerical superiority, revealing their continued psychological inferiority at sea. This Spartan hesitation allowed the Athenians to regain the initiative. In late summer 411 BCE, the Athenian fleet under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus defeated the Peloponnesians at the Battle of Cynossema in the Hellespont, though outnumbered seventy-six to eighty-six ships. This victory, achieved despite Athens' political turmoil, restored Athenian confidence and demonstrated that their naval superiority in tactics and morale remained intact. Alcibiades capitalized on this momentum. After returning from a mission to collect money, he arrived just in time to help the Athenians win another victory at Abydos. His most spectacular triumph came at Cyzicus in the spring of 410 BCE, where he employed a complex strategy to defeat the Peloponnesian fleet commanded by the Spartan Mindarus. Using a brilliant strategy of deception and coordination, the Athenian generals Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes trapped the entire Peloponnesian fleet. In the ensuing battle, the Spartan commander Mindarus was killed, and virtually the entire Spartan fleet was captured or destroyed. A captured Spartan dispatch summed up their predicament: "The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do." These naval successes, combined with growing dissatisfaction with the Four Hundred in Athens, led to the overthrow of the extreme oligarchy and its replacement by the more moderate government of the Five Thousand. This constitutional compromise, which Thucydides praised as "a moderate blending of the few and the many," maintained restrictions on citizenship but restored democratic procedures and institutions. By 410 BCE, full democracy had been restored in Athens, and Alcibiades, though still in exile, was emerging as the dominant figure in Athenian strategy, setting the stage for his triumphant return to the city in 407 BCE.

Chapter 5: The Arginusae Trial: Democracy's Self-Destruction

The Battle of Arginusae in 406 BCE stands as one of the largest and most consequential naval engagements of the Peloponnesian War, yet its aftermath would prove even more significant for Athenian democracy. Following Alcibiades' dismissal after a minor defeat at Notium, Athens elected a new board of generals including Conon, Diomedon, Pericles the Younger (son of the great Pericles), Erasinides, and Thrasyllus. Meanwhile, Sparta appointed the young and aggressive Callicratidas to replace Lysander as navarch. The strategic situation had shifted dramatically by early 406. Callicratidas, rejecting Lysander's cautious approach, launched an offensive that captured several Athenian-controlled cities and ultimately trapped the Athenian admiral Conon with forty ships in the harbor of Mytilene. This crisis prompted Athens to make an extraordinary effort, melting down gold statues from the Acropolis to finance a relief fleet and mobilizing every available man—including cavalry, hoplites, and even slaves who were promised citizenship if they fought—to serve as rowers. Within thirty days, the Athenians had assembled and dispatched a fleet of 110 ships, later reinforced by 45 more from their allies. The resulting battle near the Arginusae Islands (between Lesbos and the Asian mainland) involved approximately 155 Athenian ships against 120 Spartan vessels. Despite their numerical advantage, the Athenians faced a significant disadvantage in crew quality and experience. To compensate, they adopted an innovative formation with their wings in double lines and their center protected by the islands, preventing the more skilled Spartans from employing their favored tactics. After fierce fighting, the Athenians achieved a decisive victory, sinking or capturing seventy-seven Spartan ships while losing twenty-five of their own. Callicratidas himself was killed, falling overboard during the battle. What should have been a moment of triumph, however, soon turned to tragedy. A storm arose after the battle, preventing the rescue of survivors clinging to the wreckage and the recovery of the dead—a serious matter in Greek religious culture. The Athenian generals had assigned this task to ship captains including the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasybulus, but the rescue mission was never completed. When news reached Athens, public outrage erupted over the failure to recover the bodies and rescue the survivors. The political aftermath quickly spiraled out of control. Initially, the generals had agreed to present a united front, blaming only the storm. However, suspecting that Theramenes and Thrasybulus were secretly accusing them, the generals sent letters to Athens revealing that these trierarchs had been assigned the rescue mission. This breach of solidarity proved disastrous. Theramenes and his associates, now forced to defend themselves, argued that the generals had delayed too long before ordering the rescue attempt, making it impossible to execute due to the worsening weather. The assembly voted to depose all eight generals and recall them to Athens. Two fled into exile, while six returned to face trial. Though the legal procedure began normally, the process was soon derailed. At a tumultuous assembly meeting, emotions ran high as relatives of the dead appeared in mourning clothes. Despite a spirited defense by Euryptolemus, who pointed out procedural irregularities and argued that the generals should be tried individually rather than collectively, the assembly voted to condemn all six to death. Even the philosopher Socrates, who happened to be serving as one of the presiding officials that day, refused to put the illegal proposal to a vote, though he was overruled. This judicial murder represented a catastrophic failure of Athenian democracy at a critical moment. The city had just eliminated its most experienced naval commanders based on a storm they couldn't control. The episode revealed how wartime stress and demagoguery could override both legal procedure and basic fairness. More practically, Athens had deprived itself of its best leaders just when they were most needed, setting the stage for final defeat the following year.

Chapter 6: Aegospotami and Surrender: The Empire's Final Collapse (405-404 BCE)

The final act of the long Peloponnesian War centered around the remarkable figure of Lysander, a Spartan commander of humble origins but extraordinary ambition and ability. Though Spartan law prohibited serving twice as admiral (navarch), the Spartans circumvented this restriction by appointing Lysander as "vice-admiral" while giving him effective command. His close relationship with the Persian prince Cyrus ensured a steady flow of funds to pay his rowers well and maintain their loyalty. Lysander's strategy focused on avoiding battle until conditions favored him absolutely. When the Athenian fleet under Conon pursued him to the Hellespont in 405 BCE, Lysander established his base at Lampsacus while the Athenians camped at Aegospotami directly across the strait. For four consecutive days, the Athenians sailed out offering battle, and for four days Lysander refused to engage. This created a dangerous complacency among the Athenian forces, who began dispersing to forage for supplies after their daily maneuvers. Seizing his moment, Lysander launched a surprise attack when the Athenian ships were beached and their crews scattered. The result was a total disaster for Athens—Lysander captured nearly the entire fleet of 170 ships while losing almost none of his own. In a brutal demonstration of Spartan ruthlessness, he executed approximately 3,000 Athenian prisoners, including all but one of the captured generals. Only Conon escaped with eight ships, too ashamed to return to Athens. News of the catastrophe reached Athens during the night, spreading from the harbor through the Long Walls to the city. Xenophon vividly described how "that night no one slept" as the Athenians realized their empire, their naval supremacy, and perhaps their very existence as a free city were now at risk. With no fleet, dwindling food supplies, and enemies at their gates, Athens faced the prospect of complete destruction. Lysander methodically tightened the noose, securing the Hellespont to cut off grain shipments and systematically reducing Athens' remaining allies. He also began establishing pro-Spartan oligarchic governments throughout the former Athenian Empire, installing his own supporters and Spartan governors to maintain control. This would form the basis of a new Spartan empire replacing the Athenian one. After months of blockade and growing starvation in Athens, the Athenians finally surrendered in April 404 BCE. The peace terms were harsh but could have been worse: Athens would lose its walls, its fleet (except for twelve ships), and its empire, but the city itself would be spared destruction—a fate many of Sparta's allies had demanded. The Athenians were required to "have the same friends and enemies as the Spartans" and recall their exiles, many of whom were pro-Spartan oligarchs. The formal surrender took place in the spring of 404 BCE. Lysander sailed into the Piraeus as flute players accompanied the demolition of the Long Walls. "That day," Xenophon wrote, "was thought to be the beginning of freedom for Greece"—a bitter irony for the defeated Athenians. The final humiliation came with the installation of the Thirty Tyrants, an oligarchic regime led by Critias and including Theramenes, who established a reign of terror, executing political opponents and confiscating property. The fall of Athens represented not just the end of an empire but the collapse of the democratic naval power that had dominated the Aegean for over seventy years. Athens had transformed naval warfare, created innovative financial systems to support its fleet, and developed sophisticated administrative structures to manage its empire. These innovations had made possible a level of democratic participation unprecedented in history, as naval power gave the common citizens who served as rowers political leverage within the state. With the loss of its empire and navy, Athens would survive, but the golden age of classical Athens had come to a definitive end.

Summary

The fall of the Athenian Empire reveals a complex interplay between external pressures and internal weaknesses that ultimately doomed one of history's most dynamic imperial powers. Throughout this dramatic period, we witness how Athens' remarkable resilience repeatedly collided with fatal strategic mistakes. The core tension that defined this era was Athens' struggle to maintain its democratic identity while fighting an existential war that increasingly demanded centralized decision-making and strategic consistency. Persian intervention provided the external resources that ultimately tipped the balance, but Athens' own political volatility—from the Sicilian Expedition to the oligarchic coup to the execution of victorious generals—repeatedly undermined its military advantages. This historical episode offers enduring lessons about imperial overreach and political resilience. First, even the most powerful states can rapidly decline when they pursue ambitious foreign adventures beyond their resource capacity. Second, political unity becomes increasingly crucial during existential crises; Athens' internal divisions proved as dangerous as external enemies. Finally, we see how democratic systems can simultaneously demonstrate remarkable adaptability while also suffering from decision-making vulnerabilities during prolonged crises. The Athenian experience reminds us that great powers rarely fall from a single blow, but rather through a cascade of strategic miscalculations compounded by internal dysfunction—a pattern that continues to resonate in the rise and fall of empires throughout history.

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Donald Kagan

Donald Kagan (May 1, 1932 – August 6, 2021) was a Lithuanian-born American historian and classicist at Yale University specializing in ancient Greece. He formerly taught in the Department of History at Cornell University. Kagan was considered among the foremost American scholars of Greek history and is notable for his four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War.

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