The Sleepwalkers

The Sleepwalkers Plot Summary

Introduction

On June 28, 1914, a young Serbian nationalist named Gavrilo Princip fired two shots that would change the course of history. His assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo set in motion a series of events that, within five weeks, plunged Europe into the most devastating war it had ever seen. The First World War claimed over 20 million lives, redrew the map of Europe, and sowed the seeds for future conflicts that would shape the 20th century. The path to war in 1914 remains one of history's most compelling puzzles. How did a localized conflict in the Balkans escalate into a continental catastrophe? This question has preoccupied historians for over a century. Rather than focusing solely on the immediate crisis of July 1914, this historical account traces the complex web of alliances, imperial rivalries, and domestic pressures that had been building for decades. By examining the perspectives of all the key players—not just the great powers but also smaller states like Serbia—it offers a nuanced understanding of how European leaders, like sleepwalkers, stumbled toward the abyss while believing they were pursuing rational policies to protect their national interests.

Chapter 1: The Balkan Powder Keg: Serbian Nationalism and Habsburg Anxiety

The Balkan Peninsula at the dawn of the 20th century was a volatile region where the declining Ottoman Empire's retreat had created a power vacuum. Serbia, having gained independence in 1878, emerged as an ambitious young nation with dreams that extended far beyond its modest borders. The country's national identity was deeply intertwined with the concept of uniting all Serbs living across the Balkans, including those in neighboring Austria-Hungary, into a single state. This Serbian nationalism took a radical turn following the bloody palace coup of 1903, when King Alexander Obrenović and Queen Draga were brutally murdered by a group of army officers. The coup brought Peter Karađorđević to the throne and marked Serbia's pivot toward Russia and away from Austria-Hungary. More significantly, it empowered nationalist military circles who formed secret societies like the infamous "Black Hand," led by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević (known as "Apis"). These organizations pursued an aggressive pan-Serbian agenda, supporting irredentist activities in Habsburg territories. Austria-Hungary viewed Serbia's growing nationalism with mounting alarm. The Habsburg Empire, a multinational state comprising numerous ethnic groups, was particularly vulnerable to nationalist movements that could inspire its own South Slavic populations to seek independence. Vienna's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, home to a significant Serbian population, further inflamed tensions. Serbia, humiliated but unable to respond militarily, was forced to accept the annexation while harboring deep resentment. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 dramatically altered the regional balance of power. Serbia emerged significantly strengthened, nearly doubling its territory and gaining confidence as a military power. This newfound assertiveness alarmed Austria-Hungary, which now saw Serbia as an existential threat to its imperial integrity. Count Leopold Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, warned that Serbia had become "a factor of revolutionary ferment" that threatened to tear the empire apart from within by inspiring its South Slavic subjects. By 1914, the Serbian question had become a continental powder keg. The fundamental incompatibility between Serbian national aspirations and Austria-Hungary's determination to preserve its imperial integrity created a situation where conflict seemed increasingly inevitable. When Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb with connections to Serbian nationalist circles, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, he lit the fuse that would detonate this powder keg and ultimately engulf all of Europe in war.

Chapter 2: Alliances Formed: The European System Polarizes (1887-1907)

The two decades preceding World War I witnessed a profound transformation in European international relations. In 1887, Europe operated within a flexible, multi-polar system where alliances were fluid and multiple points of balance prevented any single conflict from engulfing the entire continent. By 1907, this had given way to a rigid bipolar structure with two opposing alliance blocs: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) and the Triple Entente (France, Russia, and Britain). This polarization began with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. France, isolated and bitter after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, sought allies to counter German power. Russia, meanwhile, felt threatened by what it perceived as growing British and German influence. The alliance between republican France and autocratic Russia was unlikely in ideological terms, but it served the strategic interests of both powers, creating a potential two-front threat against Germany. Britain's gradual alignment with this Franco-Russian bloc represented another crucial development. Traditionally, Britain had maintained "splendid isolation," avoiding permanent continental commitments. However, imperial rivalries with Russia in Asia and growing concerns about German naval expansion led British policymakers to reconsider this stance. The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904 resolved colonial disputes between the two powers, while the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 settled tensions in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. These agreements were not formal military alliances but created a framework for cooperation that would prove decisive in 1914. Germany's role in this polarization process was complex. After Otto von Bismarck's dismissal as chancellor in 1890, Germany abandoned his careful balancing act, allowing the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia to lapse. German foreign policy became more erratic and assertive, exemplified by Kaiser Wilhelm II's impulsive diplomacy. The decision to build a large navy under Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's direction particularly alarmed Britain, which viewed naval supremacy as essential to its security. The Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911, where Germany challenged French influence in North Africa, further solidified the emerging alliance blocs. The consequences of this polarization were profound. As Europe divided into two camps, conflicts that might once have remained localized now risked drawing in multiple powers. The alliance systems, originally designed to enhance security, paradoxically increased the likelihood of a general European war. When crisis struck in July 1914, these rigid structures would severely constrain the options available to diplomats and statesmen, making escalation difficult to contain.

Chapter 3: Diplomatic Failures: Missed Opportunities for Peace

The July Crisis of 1914 was marked by numerous diplomatic initiatives that might have prevented war had circumstances been different. These failed peace efforts reveal both structural weaknesses in the international system and specific misjudgments by key decision-makers. Britain's Sir Edward Grey led several mediation attempts. On July 26, he proposed a four-power conference (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) to resolve the Austro-Serbian dispute. This approach had successfully defused tensions during the Balkan Wars, but Austria-Hungary rejected it, fearing international pressure to moderate its demands on Serbia. Germany, though officially supporting mediation, did little to press its Austrian ally to participate. Grey's subsequent proposal for direct talks between Austria and Russia gained more traction but came too late to halt mobilization. The "Halt in Belgrade" proposal represented another missed opportunity. On July 28, German Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg suggested that Austria-Hungary could occupy Belgrade as a guarantee while negotiations continued. This compromise might have satisfied both Austrian security concerns and Russian honor, but it was undermined by Austria's declaration of war on Serbia the same day and by Moltke's resistance to any plan that might disrupt German mobilization schedules. Direct communication between monarchs offered another potential path to peace. The "Willy-Nicky" telegrams exchanged between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II between July 29 and August 1 showed both rulers searching for a peaceful solution. In one poignant exchange, Nicholas agreed to a German proposal that Russia maintain a waiting position while Austria and Serbia negotiated directly. However, this personal diplomacy was overtaken by military imperatives when Russian general mobilization was ordered on July 30. Several structural factors undermined these peace efforts. The alliance system created rigid obligations that limited diplomatic flexibility. The secrecy surrounding military planning meant that civilian leaders often did not fully understand the implications of mobilization decisions. The speed of modern communications accelerated the crisis, giving diplomats less time to find solutions. The absence of effective international institutions for conflict resolution left mediation dependent on ad hoc arrangements. Individual misjudgments also played a crucial role. Austria-Hungary's leaders believed they could isolate their conflict with Serbia, failing to anticipate Russian intervention. German officials calculated that Russian backing for Serbia would collapse in the face of firm Austro-German solidarity, as it had during the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909. Russian decision-makers underestimated the automaticity of German war plans once Russian mobilization began. French leaders, focused on maintaining solidarity with Russia, did little to restrain their ally. Perhaps the most fundamental diplomatic failure was the inability to recognize that the July Crisis differed from previous confrontations. The lessons drawn from earlier crises—that firmness would prevail and that escalation could be controlled—proved catastrophically wrong in 1914. When war came, it arrived not because peace was impossible, but because the paths to peace were not taken.

Chapter 4: From Assassination to War: The July Crisis Unfolds

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, triggered a chain reaction that transformed a Balkan crisis into a global catastrophe. The path from this event to general European war unfolded through a series of fateful decisions over approximately five weeks. The immediate Austrian reaction to the assassination was restrained. Emperor Franz Joseph and Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold initially hesitated to take drastic action. However, the discovery of connections between the assassins and Serbian nationalist networks, particularly the Black Hand organization led by Colonel Apis, hardened attitudes in Vienna. Conrad von Hötzendorf, the aggressive Chief of the General Staff who had long advocated war against Serbia, seized the opportunity to press his case. The crucial turning point came when Austria-Hungary secured Germany's support—the famous "blank check" offered by Kaiser Wilhelm II on July 5-6, promising to back Vienna regardless of its actions against Serbia. With this assurance, Austria-Hungary prepared an ultimatum designed to be unacceptable to Serbia. Delivered on July 23, it demanded that Serbian officials participate in an investigation on Serbian soil and that Serbia suppress all anti-Austrian propaganda—terms that would have effectively ended Serbian sovereignty. Serbia was given just 48 hours to respond. The Serbian government, led by Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, crafted a conciliatory reply that accepted most demands while carefully qualifying others. This measured response surprised many European diplomats, who considered it remarkably accommodating. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary declared it insufficient and broke diplomatic relations on July 25. Russia's reaction proved decisive in expanding the conflict. Tsar Nicholas II and his ministers felt they could not abandon Serbia without sacrificing Russian prestige and influence in the Balkans. On July 25, Russia began preliminary military preparations, and on July 29, ordered partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary. This step triggered escalation because military mobilization plans were rigid and interconnected. When Germany demanded that Russia cease all military preparations, Russia responded with general mobilization on July 30, knowing this would likely provoke German intervention. Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which required a rapid attack through Belgium to defeat France before turning east against Russia, further accelerated the crisis. Once Russian mobilization began, German military leaders insisted they could not afford to wait. On August 1, Germany declared war on Russia and demanded free passage through Belgium. When Belgium refused, Germany invaded on August 4, bringing Britain into the conflict due to its commitment to Belgian neutrality. Throughout this crisis, diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution continued but were undermined by miscalculations and poor communication. Britain's Sir Edward Grey proposed a four-power conference to mediate the dispute, but Germany and Austria-Hungary rejected this approach. Direct negotiations between Russia and Austria-Hungary came too late to prevent mobilization. The crisis revealed how the alliance systems, originally designed for security, had created a web of commitments that transformed a local conflict into a continental catastrophe.

Chapter 5: War Plans and Mobilization: The Point of No Return

The military planning that shaped the July Crisis represented years of strategic thinking by Europe's general staffs. These elaborate war plans, designed to maximize national advantage in a future conflict, ultimately accelerated the descent into war and expanded its scope. Germany's Schlieffen Plan, developed by Count Alfred von Schlieffen and modified by his successor Helmuth von Moltke, dominated German strategic thinking. Faced with the prospect of a two-front war against France and Russia, the plan called for a massive wheeling movement through neutral Belgium to quickly defeat France before turning east against the slower-mobilizing Russians. This strategy required precise timing and left little room for diplomatic pauses once mobilization began. As Moltke told Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg when the latter suggested limiting operations to the east: "It cannot be done. We have only one plan, and that is to attack France." France's Plan XVII, championed by General Joseph Joffre, envisioned an immediate offensive into Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes. Based on the doctrine of offensive à outrance (offense to the utmost), it reflected the belief that moral factors like élan and aggressive spirit would overcome material disadvantages. The plan dangerously underestimated German strength and failed to anticipate the main German thrust through Belgium. French military planning was tightly coordinated with Russia through the Franco-Russian Military Convention, which committed both powers to immediate offensive operations against Germany. Russia's mobilization system was particularly problematic. The Russian General Staff had developed two distinct mobilization plans: Mobilization Schedule 19 (against Austria-Hungary alone) and Mobilization Schedule 19A (general mobilization against both Austria-Hungary and Germany). However, the technical complexity of Russian railways and administrative systems meant that partial mobilization was extremely difficult to implement without disrupting general mobilization preparations. When Tsar Nicholas II ordered partial mobilization on July 29, his generals persuaded him that this was impractical and potentially disastrous. The switch to general mobilization on July 30 was seen in Berlin as a hostile act requiring immediate response. Austria-Hungary's war plans reflected its complex internal politics. Plan B (Balkan) focused on Serbia, while Plan R (Russia) addressed the threat from the east. The dual monarchy could not effectively execute both simultaneously, creating a strategic dilemma when Russia intervened in what Vienna had hoped would be a localized conflict with Serbia. Conrad von Hötzendorf's planning assumed German support against Russia, but coordination between the allies was poor. Britain lacked a comprehensive continental war plan, reflecting its traditional focus on naval power. However, secret staff talks with France since 1906 had developed arrangements for deploying a British Expeditionary Force to support French operations. Though not formally binding, these plans created expectations that influenced British decision-making during the crisis. The rigidity of these mobilization systems meant that military imperatives increasingly drove political decisions as the crisis deepened. Once the first mobilization orders were issued, Europe was on a countdown to war that diplomatic initiatives struggled to halt. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov observed: "The day mobilization is declared, we have fired the gun."

Chapter 6: The First Battles: Expectations vs. Reality (1914)

When war erupted in August 1914, a wave of patriotic enthusiasm swept across Europe. Young men rushed to enlist, fearing the conflict might end before they could participate. "Home before the leaves fall" became a common refrain in Germany, while in Britain, recruitment posters proclaimed "Your Country Needs You." This initial euphoria reflected widespread expectations of a short, decisive war that would resolve Europe's tensions once and for all. Military planners had prepared for a war of movement and quick victories. Germany's Schlieffen Plan aimed to knock France out of the war within six weeks through a massive wheeling movement through Belgium, before turning east to face Russia. France's Plan XVII called for an immediate offensive into Alsace-Lorraine to recapture the provinces lost in 1871. Russia promised to launch attacks against East Prussia to draw German forces away from France. These plans reflected the offensive doctrine that dominated pre-war military thinking. Reality quickly shattered these expectations. The German advance through Belgium encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance, delaying their timetable. Although they drove deep into northern France, the German forces were halted at the Battle of the Marne in early September, ending hopes for a quick victory. On the Eastern Front, Russia mobilized faster than anticipated but suffered catastrophic defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. Austria-Hungary's campaigns against Serbia and Russia proved disastrous, with the Habsburg forces suffering over 50% casualties by year's end. By December 1914, the Western Front had congealed into a continuous line of trenches stretching from the Swiss border to the English Channel. New weapons like machine guns and quick-firing artillery gave defenders overwhelming advantages, making frontal assaults suicidal. The war of movement had become a war of attrition. As one British officer wrote, "This isn't war—it's more like a natural catastrophe." Casualties reached unprecedented levels: France alone lost nearly 300,000 men killed in the first four months. The year ended with the realization that the conflict would be longer and more terrible than anyone had imagined. Christmas 1914 saw the famous unofficial truces along parts of the Western Front, where British and German soldiers briefly fraternized in no-man's-land. These moments of humanity stood in stark contrast to the industrial slaughter that had become the new normal. As 1915 approached, governments began reorganizing their economies for a prolonged struggle, requisitioning resources and implementing rationing systems. The "short war illusion" had been shattered, and Europe now faced the prospect of a conflict that would test the very foundations of its civilization.

Chapter 7: Lessons from the Abyss: Could War Have Been Avoided?

The catastrophe of World War I raises the haunting question of whether the conflict could have been avoided. The July Crisis presented several moments when different decisions might have altered the course of events, revealing both structural factors and individual choices that propelled Europe toward war. Austria-Hungary's response to the Sarajevo assassination represented the first critical juncture. Rather than pursuing a limited diplomatic solution, Vienna chose to use the crisis as an opportunity to eliminate Serbia as a threat. Count Leopold Berchtold and other Austrian leaders deliberately crafted an ultimatum designed to be rejected, creating a pretext for war. Had Austria pursued a more measured approach – perhaps accepting international mediation or limiting its demands to those compatible with Serbian sovereignty – the crisis might have been contained. Germany's "blank check" to Austria-Hungary on July 5-6 removed a crucial restraint on Vienna's actions. Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and Kaiser Wilhelm II, believing that a localized Austro-Serbian war was possible and that Russia would not intervene, encouraged their ally to take decisive action. As the Kaiser told the Austrian ambassador: "If we had truly recognized the necessity of a military action against Serbia, then he would regret it if we failed to exploit the present moment, which is so advantageous to us." This miscalculation of Russian intentions proved catastrophic. Russia's early military preparations, beginning on July 25 with the "Period Preparatory to War" and culminating in general mobilization on July 30, significantly accelerated the crisis. These steps were taken before Austria-Hungary had launched any military operations against Serbia, reflecting Russia's determination to support its Balkan client. Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov and other Russian leaders failed to appreciate how these measures would trigger Germany's own mobilization plans, creating an unstoppable momentum toward war. British diplomatic efforts under Sir Edward Grey represented a missed opportunity for mediation. Grey's proposal for a conference of powers not directly involved in the dispute came too late and lacked the forceful backing needed to succeed. More significantly, Britain's ambiguous position regarding its own involvement – maintaining until the last moment that it had no formal obligations to France or Russia – deprived its diplomacy of the leverage that might have restrained Germany. The rigid military planning of the European powers created a dangerous automaticity once mobilization began. Germany's Schlieffen Plan required immediate attack through Belgium once mobilization was ordered, while Russia's mobilization plans made no provision for a partial mobilization against Austria alone. As German Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke told the Kaiser when the latter suggested halting operations against France: "Your Majesty, it cannot be done. The deployment of millions cannot be improvised." Perhaps the most fundamental missed opportunity lay in the failure of European leaders to recognize the catastrophic nature of the conflict they were unleashing. As British Foreign Secretary Grey famously remarked on August 3: "The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." This prescient understanding came too late to prevent the descent into war, reflecting how the decision-makers of 1914 sleepwalked into a conflict whose scale and consequences none of them had fully anticipated.

Summary

The road to World War I represents one of history's most profound examples of how interconnected decisions, structural tensions, and human fallibility can combine to produce catastrophic outcomes that no single actor intended. Throughout the 1900-1914 period, we witness a tragic paradox: the very systems designed to prevent war—alliances, deterrence through armaments, and diplomatic balancing—ultimately helped trigger the conflict they were meant to avoid. The alliance system transformed local disputes into tests of great power loyalty, while military planning created rigid timetables that left little room for diplomacy once mobilization began. Meanwhile, domestic politics increasingly influenced foreign policy decisions, as leaders worried about appearing weak to their own populations. This historical episode offers crucial lessons that remain relevant today. First, security dilemmas are real and dangerous—when nations seek to increase their own security through armaments or alliances, they often make others feel less secure, triggering escalatory cycles. Second, crisis management requires clear communication and flexibility; the ambiguous signals sent by key powers like Britain in 1914 created dangerous misunderstandings. Finally, we must recognize how institutional structures shape decision-making; the fragmented nature of governance in countries like Austria-Hungary made coherent policy formulation nearly impossible during critical moments. By understanding these dynamics, we can better recognize similar patterns in contemporary international relations and perhaps avoid repeating one of history's most catastrophic failures of collective wisdom.

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Christopher Clark

Sir Christopher Munro Clark FBA is an Australian historian living in the United Kingdom and Germany. He is the twenty-second Regius Professor of History at the University of Cambridge. In 2015, he was knighted for his services to Anglo-German relations.

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