Two Nations Indivisible

Two Nations Indivisible Plot Summary

Introduction

On a warm July evening in 2000, thousands of Mexicans gathered in Mexico City's Zócalo square, waving flags and celebrating what many had thought impossible: the defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after 71 years of uninterrupted rule. This watershed moment marked the culmination of Mexico's long and often painful transition from an authoritarian one-party state to a competitive democracy. The journey had begun decades earlier, with economic crises, social movements, and gradual electoral reforms slowly eroding the foundations of the PRI's political monopoly. This democratic transformation represents one of the most significant political shifts in Latin America's recent history, yet it remains poorly understood outside Mexico. The story encompasses not just electoral politics but profound changes in Mexico's economy, society, and relationship with the United States. Understanding this journey offers valuable insights into how authoritarian systems can evolve into democracies without violent revolution, the challenges of building democratic institutions after decades of one-party rule, and the complex interplay between economic development and political liberalization. For students of democratic transitions, policy makers concerned with Latin America, or anyone interested in how countries transform their political systems, this account provides essential context for appreciating Mexico's remarkable political evolution.

Chapter 1: The PRI's Authoritarian System: Foundations of One-Party Rule (1929-1982)

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) established the world's most successful authoritarian system in 1929, creating a political monopoly that would dominate Mexico for seven decades. Born from the ashes of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), the PRI claimed to embody the revolution's ideals of social justice, land reform, and nationalism. Unlike traditional dictatorships, the PRI maintained the appearance of democracy through regular elections while ensuring it never lost power. This "perfect dictatorship," as Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa famously called it, combined elements of corporatism, patronage, and selective repression to maintain control. The PRI's corporatist structure incorporated key sectors of society—workers, peasants, and the middle class—into the party apparatus. Labor unions and peasant organizations became extensions of the party, with their leaders acting as intermediaries who delivered votes in exchange for benefits. The government distributed land, jobs, subsidies, and services through these corporatist channels, creating networks of loyalty and dependence. Meanwhile, the state controlled most of the economy, from oil production to telecommunications, providing additional resources for patronage. This economic control allowed the PRI to reward supporters and punish opponents through the selective distribution of government contracts and jobs. The system was reinforced by several unique features that distinguished it from other authoritarian regimes. The "no-reelection" principle, ironically established to prevent the return of dictatorship after Porfirio Díaz's 30-year rule, meant that presidents served a single six-year term. Each outgoing president hand-picked his successor through the dedazo (big finger), maintaining elite cohesion while creating the illusion of change. The PRI also co-opted intellectuals and potential opponents by incorporating them into the government, neutralizing criticism while benefiting from their talents. When co-optation failed, the regime was willing to use repression, as demonstrated by the brutal crackdown on student protesters in 1968 at Tlatelolco Square. By the 1970s, cracks began appearing in this seemingly impregnable system. Economic growth, known as the "Mexican Miracle," had created a more educated middle class with greater expectations for political participation. President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) attempted to address growing discontent through populist spending and limited political opening, but these efforts proved insufficient. His successor, José López Portillo (1976-1982), benefited initially from the discovery of massive oil reserves, which funded an expansion of the state and temporarily reinforced the PRI's patronage capabilities. However, this oil-fueled prosperity masked deeper structural problems in the economy. The 1982 debt crisis exposed these weaknesses and fundamentally undermined the PRI's authority. When oil prices collapsed, Mexico found itself unable to service its massive foreign debt, leading to a devastating economic crisis. Inflation soared to 100 percent, real wages plummeted by 40 percent, and the peso lost more than half its value. This economic catastrophe shattered the PRI's claim to competent economic management and eroded its ability to maintain patronage networks. With fewer resources to distribute to supporters, the party's control mechanisms began to weaken, creating openings for opposition forces and setting the stage for Mexico's democratic transition.

Chapter 2: Economic Crisis and Democratic Awakening (1982-1988)

The 1982 debt crisis marked a pivotal turning point in Mexico's political evolution. When President López Portillo announced the nationalization of banks in his final address to Congress, he wept openly, declaring "I will defend the peso like a dog." This dramatic gesture could not mask the catastrophic economic failure that had occurred under his watch. His successor, Miguel de la Madrid, inherited an economy in free fall, with inflation reaching triple digits, capital flight accelerating, and foreign reserves depleted. The new president had little choice but to implement harsh austerity measures demanded by international creditors, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. De la Madrid's administration (1982-1988) embraced neoliberal economic reforms that fundamentally altered Mexico's development model. State-owned enterprises were privatized, trade barriers reduced, and government spending slashed. These policies, while necessary to address the immediate economic crisis, had profound political implications. The PRI had maintained power partly through its control of economic resources and patronage networks. As the state's economic role diminished, so did the party's ability to reward loyalty and punish dissent. Government workers, union members, and peasant organizations who had formed the backbone of PRI support saw their benefits and subsidies disappear, weakening their ties to the ruling party. The devastating Mexico City earthquake of September 19, 1985, further undermined the PRI's legitimacy. When government response to the disaster proved slow and inadequate, ordinary citizens organized themselves into rescue brigades and relief committees. This spontaneous civil society mobilization demonstrated both the state's limitations and citizens' capacity for independent action. The contrast between official incompetence and civic solidarity created new spaces for autonomous social organization outside PRI control. Groups that formed during the earthquake response later evolved into human rights organizations, neighborhood associations, and eventually, political movements challenging the regime. Opposition parties began gaining ground during this period, particularly in northern Mexico. The conservative National Action Party (PAN), founded in 1939, had long served as a loyal opposition that legitimized the PRI's democratic pretensions. Now, however, the PAN began winning municipal elections in states like Chihuahua and Baja California. These victories, though limited, demonstrated that electoral success against the PRI was possible. Meanwhile, dissidents within the PRI itself, frustrated by the party's rightward economic shift, began organizing what would become a significant leftist challenge to the regime. International factors also contributed to Mexico's democratic awakening. As the Cold War wound down, the United States and international financial institutions increasingly linked economic assistance to democratic reforms. Mexico's desire to join the global economy through initiatives like the North American Free Trade Agreement created incentives for political liberalization. Additionally, democratic transitions in other Latin American countries, particularly in South America's Southern Cone, provided models and inspiration for Mexican opposition movements. By 1988, these converging pressures had created conditions for a genuine electoral challenge to the PRI. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of revered 1930s president Lázaro Cárdenas and himself a former PRI governor, broke with the party to run as an opposition candidate. His campaign, representing a coalition of leftist parties and disaffected PRI members, tapped into widespread discontent with economic austerity and one-party rule. The stage was set for the most significant electoral crisis in the PRI's history, one that would accelerate Mexico's democratic transition despite the regime's desperate efforts to maintain control.

Chapter 3: Electoral Reform and Opposition Growth (1988-1997)

The 1988 presidential election represented a watershed moment in Mexico's democratic transition. As vote tallies came in on election night, opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas appeared to be leading PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Then, in a moment that would become infamous in Mexican political history, the government-controlled vote counting system mysteriously "crashed." When it came back online days later, Salinas was declared the winner with 50.4% of the vote. The phrase "se cayó el sistema" (the system crashed) became a metaphor for the PRI's electoral manipulation and would haunt the regime's legitimacy for years to come. Despite this fraudulent victory, the 1988 election fundamentally altered Mexico's political landscape. The PRI's claim to overwhelming popular support had been shattered, with opposition candidates together winning a majority of votes. Salinas, acutely aware of his legitimacy deficit, implemented a series of electoral reforms designed to restore credibility while maintaining PRI control. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was created in 1990, initially under government oversight but gradually gaining independence. A new voter registration system with photo identification cards made traditional ballot-stuffing more difficult, while reforms to the Senate and Chamber of Deputies increased opposition representation. These reforms, though intended to preserve PRI dominance, inadvertently created space for genuine political competition. The conservative PAN, which had negotiated with Salinas in exchange for recognition of its local victories, won the governorship of Baja California in 1989 – the first time the PRI acknowledged losing a state election. Meanwhile, Cárdenas and his supporters formalized their coalition into the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), establishing a significant leftist opposition despite facing harassment and even violence from PRI loyalists. By the mid-1990s, Mexico had evolved from a one-party state to a dominant-party system with increasingly competitive elections. President Ernesto Zedillo, who took office in 1994 after the assassination of PRI candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, accelerated the democratic opening. Unlike his predecessors, Zedillo was not a career politician but an economist who recognized the inevitability of political change. Under his leadership, a comprehensive electoral reform in 1996 created a truly independent electoral authority, established more equitable campaign financing, and opened access to media for all parties. Most significantly, Zedillo broke with tradition by refusing to handpick his successor, allowing the PRI to select its presidential candidate through a primary process. These reforms bore fruit in the 1997 midterm elections, which transformed Mexico's political landscape. The PRI lost its absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time, forcing the government to negotiate with opposition parties to pass legislation. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas won the first direct election for Mexico City mayor, giving the PRD control of the country's largest and most important city. Several state governorships also fell to opposition candidates. These victories demonstrated that the PRI's electoral dominance could be overcome through democratic means, setting the stage for the historic 2000 presidential election. The period from 1988 to 1997 thus witnessed Mexico's gradual transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy. This transformation occurred without a clean break from the past – there was no revolution, coup, or dramatic collapse of the regime. Instead, incremental reforms, often initiated by the PRI itself for tactical reasons, created openings that opposition forces skillfully exploited. Civil society organizations, including election monitoring groups like Alianza Cívica, played crucial roles by documenting fraud and demanding transparency. International pressure, particularly from the United States as NAFTA negotiations proceeded, further encouraged democratization. By 1997, the foundations had been laid for the end of the world's most successful and enduring authoritarian system.

Chapter 4: Fox's Victory: The End of PRI Dominance (1997-2000)

The period between the watershed 1997 midterm elections and the 2000 presidential contest witnessed the final unraveling of the PRI's seven-decade monopoly on power. With opposition parties controlling the Chamber of Deputies, several important governorships, and the Mexico City mayoralty, the political landscape had fundamentally changed. President Ernesto Zedillo, recognizing these new realities, governed through negotiation rather than imposition, establishing precedents for divided government that would prove crucial for Mexico's democratic future. Meanwhile, the independent Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) consolidated its authority, ensuring that the upcoming presidential election would be the most transparent in Mexican history. Vicente Fox emerged as the standard-bearer for democratic change during this period. A charismatic former Coca-Cola executive and governor of Guanajuato state, Fox projected an image that contrasted sharply with traditional PRI politicians. Standing six-foot-five in his trademark cowboy boots, with an informal speaking style and irreverent humor, Fox connected with voters tired of the PRI's staid formality. His campaign slogan "¡Ya!" ("Enough!") resonated with Mexicans eager for political renewal. Though nominally the candidate of the conservative PAN, Fox built a broader coalition called the Alliance for Change, appealing to voters across the political spectrum whose primary goal was ending PRI rule. The 2000 presidential campaign unfolded on a remarkably level playing field. For the first time, all candidates had comparable media access, campaign resources, and opportunities to present their messages to voters. The PRI nominated Francisco Labastida, a seasoned politician who promised "change with direction" – an acknowledgment that even the ruling party recognized the public's desire for transformation. On the left, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas made his third presidential bid, though his support had diminished since 1988. The IFE organized presidential debates, implemented strict campaign finance rules, and prepared an army of citizen poll workers to ensure electoral integrity. On July 2, 2000, Mexicans voted in record numbers, with turnout exceeding 64 percent. As results began coming in, it became clear that Fox was leading by a substantial margin. In a remarkable moment for Mexican democracy, President Zedillo appeared on television before the official count was complete, acknowledging Fox's victory and pledging a smooth transition. This announcement, coming from the PRI president himself, prevented any attempt to manipulate the results and ensured a peaceful transfer of power. Fox ultimately won with 42.5 percent of the vote, compared to 36.1 percent for Labastida and 16.6 percent for Cárdenas. Fox's victory represented the culmination of Mexico's long democratic transition. After 71 years of uninterrupted rule, the PRI peacefully surrendered the presidency, accepting the verdict of voters rather than attempting to maintain power through fraud or force. This peaceful alternation in power – the ultimate test of a democracy – demonstrated the success of Mexico's incremental approach to democratization. Rather than a revolutionary rupture, Mexico had achieved democracy through a series of reforms that gradually transformed the rules of the political game while maintaining stability. The international community, particularly the United States, responded positively to Mexico's democratic breakthrough. President Bill Clinton called to congratulate Fox immediately, and financial markets reacted favorably, with Mexican stocks rising and the peso strengthening. Fox's victory was seen as completing Mexico's transformation from an authoritarian system to a modern democracy, complementing the economic opening that had begun with NAFTA in 1994. However, the euphoria of democratic triumph would soon give way to the complex challenges of governing a country with deep social inequalities, weak institutions, and entrenched interests resistant to further reform.

Chapter 5: Democratic Consolidation and Institutional Challenges (2000-2012)

Vicente Fox's historic victory in 2000 marked the beginning rather than the end of Mexico's democratic journey. The new president faced the daunting task of governing with a divided Congress, an opposition-controlled Mexico City, and a bureaucracy still dominated by PRI loyalists. Fox's administration (2000-2006) achieved important democratic advances, including the passage of Mexico's first freedom of information law in 2002, which opened government records to public scrutiny. This landmark legislation resulted from a remarkable collaboration between civil society organizations, media outlets, and politicians from across the political spectrum, demonstrating the potential for democratic cooperation in the post-PRI era. However, Fox's reform agenda encountered significant obstacles. Mexico's presidential system grants the executive limited formal powers, requiring coalition-building to pass major legislation. With no party holding a majority in Congress, and deep divisions among the three main political forces, gridlock often prevailed. Fox, more comfortable as a campaigner than a legislative tactician, struggled to build the necessary alliances to implement his more ambitious proposals for fiscal, energy, and labor reforms. This pattern of divided government and legislative paralysis would continue under his successor, highlighting the challenges of democratic governance after decades of authoritarian rule. The 2006 presidential election revealed both progress and persistent weaknesses in Mexico's democratic institutions. The contest between Felipe Calderón of the PAN and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the PRD was the closest in Mexican history, with Calderón winning by just 0.56 percent of the vote. López Obrador refused to accept the results, claiming fraud and organizing massive protests that paralyzed Mexico City for weeks. However, unlike in previous eras, the electoral authorities maintained their independence, meticulously reviewing the evidence and confirming Calderón's narrow victory. This crisis tested Mexico's young democratic institutions, which ultimately proved resilient despite intense pressure. Calderón's presidency (2006-2012) continued the process of democratic consolidation while facing enormous security challenges. His administration implemented several important reforms, including changes to the public pension system and a constitutional overhaul of the justice system in 2008. This judicial reform promised to transform Mexico's deeply flawed legal processes by introducing oral trials, strengthening due process, and better protecting the rights of both defendants and victims. However, implementation proceeded slowly, highlighting the difficulty of institutional reform in a system with deeply entrenched interests and practices. Democratic governance at the state level presented particular challenges during this period. While federal institutions had become more transparent and accountable, many state governments remained bastions of authoritarian practices. Governors, empowered by fiscal decentralization but facing weak local legislatures and judiciaries, often ruled as virtual feudal lords. Cases of corruption, embezzlement, and abuse of power at the state level multiplied, with governors from all three major parties implicated in scandals. This subnational authoritarianism represented a significant obstacle to Mexico's full democratic consolidation. Civil society played a crucial role in advancing democracy during these years. Organizations focused on transparency, human rights, electoral observation, and judicial reform maintained pressure on the government to deepen democratic practices. Independent media outlets, though still facing challenges including violence against journalists, provided greater scrutiny of public officials than had been possible under PRI rule. These non-governmental actors represented an important counterweight to political parties, which often seemed more interested in power than in substantive reform. By 2012, Mexico had established the basic framework of electoral democracy but still faced significant challenges in building effective democratic institutions. The country had successfully conducted multiple free and fair elections, achieved peaceful alternation in power, and created independent oversight bodies. However, weak rule of law, persistent corruption, and powerful entrenched interests limited the quality of democracy. The return of the PRI to the presidency with Enrique Peña Nieto's victory in 2012 would test whether Mexico's democratic gains were irreversible or whether the old authoritarian practices could reemerge in a new guise.

Chapter 6: Security Crisis: Drug Violence and Rule of Law (2006-2012)

The security crisis that engulfed Mexico during Felipe Calderón's presidency (2006-2012) posed the most serious threat to the country's democratic consolidation. Shortly after taking office in December 2006, Calderón launched a military offensive against drug trafficking organizations, deploying over 45,000 troops to combat zones across the country. This decision, made partly to establish his authority after a contested election, transformed what had been a persistent but manageable problem into a full-blown national security crisis that would claim tens of thousands of lives and test the resilience of Mexico's democratic institutions. The roots of this crisis extended beyond Calderón's policies to deeper structural changes in both Mexico and the drug trade. The dismantling of Colombia's large cartels in the 1990s had allowed Mexican organizations to move from being mere transporters to controlling more of the drug supply chain, increasing profits and stakes in territorial disputes. Simultaneously, Mexico's democratic opening had disrupted long-standing, unwritten arrangements between traffickers and the authoritarian PRI government. Under the old regime, corruption had been centralized and managed, with clear rules about which criminal activities would be tolerated and where. As power fragmented among competing parties and levels of government, these informal understandings collapsed, leading to violent competition among criminal groups. The human cost of this violence was staggering. Government estimates indicated that over 60,000 people were killed in drug-related violence between 2006 and 2012, with some outside sources claiming even higher numbers. While most victims were involved in criminal activities, innocent civilians, journalists, police officers, and politicians were also targeted. The violence was particularly concentrated in border cities like Ciudad Juárez, which in 2010 experienced nearly 3,000 homicides, making it one of the most dangerous cities in the world. Brutal tactics, including public executions, beheadings, and mass graves, were employed to terrorize communities and intimidate authorities. Mexico's weak institutions struggled to respond effectively to this security crisis. Police forces, especially at the local level, were often underpaid, poorly trained, and vulnerable to corruption or intimidation. The justice system, with its presumption of guilt, lack of due process, and high rates of impunity, provided little deterrent to criminal behavior. Studies showed that only about 2 percent of crimes resulted in convictions, creating a permissive environment for organized crime to flourish. Military forces, while less corrupt than police, were not trained for law enforcement roles and faced accusations of human rights abuses as they assumed policing functions. The Calderón administration attempted to address these institutional weaknesses alongside its military campaign. It created a new federal police force with higher standards, better training, and improved technology. The 2008 judicial reform promised to transform the justice system, though implementation proceeded slowly. Vetting programs were implemented to identify corrupt officials, leading to the dismissal of thousands of police officers and some prosecutors. However, these institution-building efforts were overshadowed by the immediate security crisis and hampered by entrenched corruption networks. The United States played a significant role in Mexico's security strategy during this period. The Mérida Initiative, launched in 2008, provided Mexico with over $1.9 billion in security assistance, including helicopters, surveillance technology, and training programs. This marked a significant shift in bilateral security cooperation, as Mexico had historically been reluctant to accept U.S. security assistance due to sovereignty concerns. While this cooperation achieved some tactical successes, including the capture or killing of numerous high-profile traffickers, it failed to significantly reduce drug flows or violence. Civil society responded to the security crisis with remarkable resilience. Victims' organizations like the Movement for Peace with Justice and Dignity, led by poet Javier Sicilia whose son was killed by cartel members, organized massive marches demanding changes in security strategy. Business associations in affected cities developed innovative approaches to community security, while journalists continued reporting despite targeted violence that made Mexico one of the world's most dangerous countries for the press. These civil society efforts represented Mexico's best hope for overcoming the security challenge and preventing a retreat from democratic governance in the face of violence.

Chapter 7: U.S.-Mexico Relations: From Distant Neighbors to Integrated Partners

The relationship between the United States and Mexico has undergone a profound transformation over the past four decades, evolving from one of distant neighbors to deeply integrated partners. This shift began in the aftermath of Mexico's 1982 debt crisis, which forced the country to abandon its state-centered development model and open its economy to global markets. President Miguel de la Madrid initiated this process, but it was his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who dramatically accelerated Mexico's economic opening by pursuing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. NAFTA, which took effect on January 1, 1994, fundamentally altered the bilateral relationship. Trade between the two countries exploded from approximately $85 billion in 1993 to over $500 billion by 2011. More importantly, the nature of this trade changed from simple exchange of finished goods to integrated production chains spanning both countries. The average manufactured product now crosses the border eight times during production, creating deep economic interdependence. This integration has made Mexico the United States' second-largest export market and third-largest trading partner overall, with approximately six million American jobs depending directly on trade with Mexico. The human dimension of this relationship has grown equally significant. Approximately 35 million people of Mexican origin live in the United States, including both immigrants and U.S.-born citizens. These connections create transnational families and communities that maintain ties in both countries. Remittances from migrants working in the United States provide essential income for millions of Mexican households, totaling over $20 billion annually. Meanwhile, over one million American citizens live in Mexico, creating reverse migration flows that receive far less attention in political discourse but reflect the growing interpenetration of the two societies. Despite these deep connections, the political relationship has often failed to reflect this reality. Immigration policy represents perhaps the clearest example of this disconnect. The United States has invested billions in border enforcement, including hundreds of miles of physical barriers, while maintaining an immigration system that provides few legal pathways for the workers its economy demands. This approach has disrupted circular migration patterns, paradoxically increasing the permanent undocumented population while failing to address the economic forces driving migration. Meanwhile, demographic changes in both countries – with Mexico's fertility rate now at replacement level and the U.S. population aging – are already reducing migration pressures in ways that policy has been slow to recognize. Security cooperation has emerged as another crucial dimension of the relationship. The Mérida Initiative, launched in 2008, represented an unprecedented level of collaboration against transnational criminal organizations. While this cooperation achieved tactical successes, it failed to address the fundamental drivers of the drug trade: continued U.S. demand for illegal drugs, southbound flow of weapons from the United States to Mexico, and weak rule of law institutions in Mexico. The security crisis revealed both the potential for bilateral cooperation and its limitations when underlying structural problems remain unaddressed. Looking ahead, the relationship faces both opportunities and challenges. Climate change and energy transition present areas for potential collaboration, with Mexico's abundant renewable resources complementing U.S. technology and capital. Water scarcity in the shared border region will require coordinated management of the Colorado River and Rio Grande/Río Bravo watersheds. Economic integration could deepen further through "nearshoring" as companies seek alternatives to Asian supply chains. However, realizing these opportunities will require overcoming nationalist rhetoric on both sides of the border and developing governance mechanisms that acknowledge interdependence while respecting sovereignty concerns. The evolution of U.S.-Mexico relations demonstrates how economic integration and human connections can transform international relationships even when political discourse lags behind. The challenge for both countries is to develop policies that reflect the reality of their shared future rather than outdated notions of separation. This will require moving beyond the rhetoric of walls and sovereignty to recognize that neither country can effectively address shared challenges – from economic competitiveness to security and environmental sustainability – without the other's cooperation.

Summary

Mexico's democratic journey from authoritarian one-party rule to competitive democracy represents one of the most significant political transformations in Latin America's recent history. The seven-decade dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) created a remarkably stable but fundamentally undemocratic system that combined the appearance of democracy with the reality of authoritarian control. This system began to unravel in the 1980s, when economic crisis undermined the PRI's patronage capabilities and civil society mobilization following the 1985 earthquake created new spaces for political organization. The fraudulent 1988 election marked a turning point, forcing the regime to implement reforms that inadvertently created openings for genuine competition. These changes culminated in Vicente Fox's historic victory in 2000, which ended the world's longest-running one-party dominant system and established Mexico as an electoral democracy. The lessons of Mexico's democratic transition remain relevant for understanding political change worldwide. First, democratization often proceeds incrementally rather than through revolutionary rupture, with authoritarian regimes making tactical concessions that eventually undermine their control. Second, economic liberalization can have unintended political consequences, as the PRI discovered when neoliberal reforms weakened its traditional mechanisms of control. Third, building democratic institutions after authoritarian rule presents challenges that persist long after competitive elections are established. Mexico continues to struggle with weak rule of law, corruption, and security threats from organized crime, demonstrating that electoral democracy represents the beginning rather than the end of democratic development. For countries transitioning from authoritarian rule, Mexico's experience offers both inspiration about the possibility of peaceful democratic change and caution about the long, difficult process of institutional reform that must follow the initial breakthrough.

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Shannon K. O'Neil

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