Why We Get the Wrong Politicians

Why We Get the Wrong Politicians Plot Summary

Introduction

Democracy depends on effective legislative institutions, yet Westminster Parliament consistently fails to deliver on its promise of representative governance. The paradox at the heart of British politics is that an institution designed to scrutinize legislation and hold power accountable instead produces flawed laws while systematically excluding diverse voices. This failure stems not merely from individual politicians' shortcomings but from structural problems that create perverse incentives, reward the wrong behaviors, and impose barriers that filter out potentially excellent representatives. The consequences extend far beyond Westminster itself, affecting millions through poorly designed policies that go inadequately scrutinized. By examining how Parliament selects its members, shapes their behavior, and ultimately undermines effective governance, we gain insight into why democratic institutions can fail even while maintaining the appearance of proper function. This analysis reveals how the intersection of financial barriers, career incentives, and institutional culture creates a system where those best positioned to succeed are often least equipped to serve the public interest.

Chapter 1: The Financial Barrier: How Money Determines Who Enters Politics

Standing for Parliament has become one of the most expensive job applications imaginable, with candidates spending tens of thousands of pounds of their own money with no guarantee of success. A comprehensive survey of parliamentary candidates revealed that the average personal cost of standing exceeds £11,000, with some spending over £100,000 in competitive seats. These expenses include not just campaign materials and travel costs, but also lost income from reduced working hours or quitting jobs entirely to campaign full-time. This financial burden creates a powerful filter that disproportionately excludes candidates from less privileged backgrounds. Conservative candidates in marginal seats spent an average of £121,467 to win, while Labour candidates spent £19,022 - both substantial sums beyond the reach of many talented potential representatives. Even losing candidates face significant financial hits, with many going into debt or depleting their savings in unsuccessful campaigns. The result is a system where financial resources, rather than talent or commitment to public service, determine who can afford to participate. The selection process itself further advantages those with existing connections to political networks. Party selections typically involve a very small number of people - sometimes as few as 15 members in a local association - who choose the candidates that voters must then select between. These party members are increasingly drawn from narrow sections of society and are often unrepresentative of the constituencies they serve, creating a powerful gatekeeping mechanism that limits diversity in Parliament. Time requirements present another significant barrier. Candidates must attend countless local events, knock on thousands of doors, and respond to endless correspondence, all while trying to maintain their regular jobs and family responsibilities. This schedule is particularly challenging for those with young children or caring responsibilities, roles that still disproportionately fall to women. The Fabian Society found that 49% of women who stood for selection couldn't afford what they needed for their campaign, compared to just 27% of men. These financial and practical barriers explain why Parliament remains dominated by certain demographics and professional backgrounds. The 2017 Parliament had 29% of UK-educated MPs from private schools (compared to 7% of the general population), only 32% female MPs, and just 7.8% from ethnic minority backgrounds (versus 14% of the population). The result is a parliament that doesn't look like the country it represents, filled with career politicians rather than people with diverse life experiences who might bring different perspectives to legislation.

Chapter 2: The Selection Problem: How Parties Choose the Wrong Representatives

Political parties function as powerful gatekeepers, determining which candidates appear on ballots and ultimately who enters Parliament. Their selection processes systematically favor certain types of candidates while excluding others who might make excellent representatives. Party selection committees typically comprise small groups of activists whose priorities and preferences often diverge significantly from those of the broader electorate they supposedly represent. Unconscious bias plays a significant role in these selections. Female candidates and those from minority backgrounds regularly report being asked inappropriate questions about their personal lives, childcare arrangements, or cultural backgrounds during selection meetings. One female Labour candidate noted that when people try to imagine an MP, "they imagine a bloke in a suit," creating an immediate disadvantage for anyone who doesn't fit that deeply held impression. These biases persist despite formal equality policies, manifesting in subtle ways that disadvantage candidates who don't match the traditional image of political leadership. The selection system also rewards those who can dedicate years to cultivating relationships with local party members. Successful candidates often spend 3-5 years attending local party meetings, volunteering for campaigns, and building personal connections before even being considered for selection. This requirement effectively excludes those with demanding careers outside politics or significant family responsibilities, contributing to Parliament's lack of diversity in professional backgrounds and life experiences. Party headquarters frequently intervene in selections, imposing preferred candidates on local associations or manipulating shortlists to achieve desired outcomes. While sometimes aimed at increasing diversity, these interventions often favor those with connections to party elites or experience as special advisers and party staffers. This creates a self-perpetuating political class where insiders select future insiders, further narrowing the range of perspectives represented in Parliament. The result is a Parliament increasingly dominated by career politicians rather than representatives with substantial experience outside Westminster. The proportion of MPs with backgrounds in politics-facilitating occupations (party workers, special advisers, think tank researchers) has grown steadily, while those from business, manual trades, and public service have declined. This homogenization reduces Parliament's collective understanding of diverse sectors of society and contributes to policies that fail to address the needs of many communities.

Chapter 3: The Scrutiny Failure: Why Parliament Produces Flawed Legislation

Parliament's primary constitutional function is to scrutinize and improve legislation, yet it routinely fails in this fundamental responsibility. New MPs are frequently shocked by how little time they spend examining laws and how those who attempt serious scrutiny are rarely rewarded. One Conservative MP confessed after a year in office: "I am voting on things that I don't understand, and this upsets me." This sentiment echoes across party lines, with members describing the scrutiny of legislation as "shocking," "very bad," and "a theatre." The parliamentary whipping system creates powerful disincentives for meaningful scrutiny. MPs who wish to join bill committees to improve legislation are often blocked unless they agree to support the government's position without question. Sarah Wollaston, a GP elected as Conservative MP, was told she wouldn't get a place on the Health and Social Care Bill committee unless she agreed to table only amendments acceptable to the government—despite her 24 years of experience in the health service. This pattern systematically excludes subject matter experts from the very committees that would benefit most from their knowledge. Bill committees, which should provide line-by-line scrutiny of legislation, have become what one MP called an "18-day charade." Government MPs are expected to remain silent or make supportive speeches, while opposition members table amendments they know will fail. These committees are infamous for being an opportunity to write Christmas cards while paying little attention to the arguments being presented. One committee chair noted that during a typical two-hour session, only four people spoke while sixteen MPs sat silently, effectively abdicating their scrutiny responsibilities. Secondary legislation receives even less examination despite often containing significant policy changes. Ministers can choose to put major reforms into statutory instruments, which are typically debated for just 90 minutes, if at all. MPs cannot amend these regulations—they must either approve or reject them entirely. Between 1950 and 1990, the number of statutory instruments produced each year rarely exceeded 2,500; since 1992, it has never fallen below 3,000, with Parliament scrutinizing only about 1,200 annually. This creates a dangerous democratic deficit where important decisions bypass proper oversight. The culture in Westminster rewards those who aspire to join the executive rather than those who take their legislative duties seriously. MPs quickly learn that the path to promotion involves demonstrating loyalty rather than asking difficult questions about legislation. During departmental question times, government backbenchers ask what one MP called "Utterly Pointless Questions" designed to make ministers look good rather than hold them accountable. The result is a system where scrutiny is sacrificed in favor of career advancement, producing flawed legislation that fails to achieve its intended outcomes or creates unintended negative consequences.

Chapter 4: The Career Trap: How Ambition Undermines Parliamentary Effectiveness

The career structure within Parliament creates a perverse incentive system that fundamentally undermines its scrutiny function. For most MPs, the ultimate career goal is to join the government front bench as ministers. This ambition creates a powerful motivation to demonstrate loyalty to party leadership rather than to scrutinize legislation effectively. The result is a legislature filled with aspiring ministers who view their scrutiny responsibilities as merely a temporary phase to be endured before promotion. Ministerial positions offer significant advantages over backbench roles: higher salaries, greater influence, media attention, and enhanced career prospects after leaving Parliament. By contrast, MPs who focus on scrutinizing legislation receive little recognition or reward for their efforts, regardless of how valuable their contributions might be. This stark disparity in incentives means that rational, career-minded MPs will prioritize behaviors that increase their chances of ministerial appointment over those that improve legislative outcomes. The parliamentary private secretary (PPS) system exemplifies this problem. These unpaid positions serve as the first rung on the ministerial ladder, requiring absolute loyalty to the government in all votes. With dozens of MPs serving as PPSs at any time, a significant portion of the legislature is effectively removed from its scrutiny function. When combined with those hoping to become PPSs, the pool of potentially independent-minded scrutineers shrinks dramatically, weakening Parliament's ability to hold the executive accountable. The whipping system reinforces this dynamic by demanding strict party discipline. MPs who question government proposals or vote against party lines face severe consequences, including blocked promotion opportunities and social ostracism within their party. Even raising concerns privately can mark an MP as insufficiently loyal. This creates an environment where thoughtful critique is suppressed in favor of unquestioning support for the party position, regardless of a policy's merits. This career trap explains why Parliament fails to identify and correct flaws in legislation before implementation. When ambitious MPs recognize problems with government bills, they face a difficult choice: speak up and risk their career prospects, or remain silent and allow flawed legislation to pass. Given the incentive structure, most choose the latter, resulting in laws that create real-world harm when implemented. The tragedy is that many policy failures could have been prevented had MPs been willing to prioritize their duty to scrutinize over their personal ambitions.

Chapter 5: The Personal Cost: Mental Health and Relationship Strain in Politics

The parliamentary lifestyle exacts a heavy toll on the personal lives of politicians, contributing to alarming rates of mental health problems, relationship breakdowns, and substance abuse. Of the 666 MPs elected between 2010 and 2015, 12% got divorced while serving—a statistic that doesn't capture the full extent of relationship breakdown in Parliament. Many MPs cite the parliamentary lifestyle as the direct cause of their marital problems, with the constant separation between London and constituency creating unbearable strain. MPs face impossible choices about where to base their families. Those who keep their families in the constituency only see them for half the week, while those who move to London face criticism for being "out of touch" with their communities. The pressure to be visible in the constituency has grown dramatically, with voters expecting MPs to be available at community events throughout weekends. One MP whose marriage broke down within years of election said: "I thought my marriage was rock-solid. But I had so many people warning me that you should absolutely not do this unless your spouse is 100% supportive." Mental health issues are prevalent among parliamentarians. Charles Walker, who has spoken openly about his own OCD, believes that "If you are predisposed to having a weakness or a condition, Parliament will expose it." The constant public scrutiny, separation from family, and pressure to perform create perfect conditions for anxiety and depression to flourish. MPs also face relentless abuse online, with women and those from minority backgrounds receiving particularly vicious attacks, including rape and death threats. Parliament's drinking culture creates another set of problems. While the infamous all-night drinking sessions may have diminished, alcohol remains a constant presence from lunchtime onwards. In 2012, the Commons doctor expressed concern about the proportion of MPs she had seen with alcohol-related problems. For some, drinking becomes a way to cope with loneliness and pressure. Charles Kennedy, Fiona Jones, Jamie Cann, and Iain Mills all died from alcohol-related illnesses after struggling with addiction during their parliamentary careers. The social media environment has become increasingly toxic for politicians. One MP confessed that after a year in Parliament, she was starting to believe what trolls told her every day about how stupid and useless she was—a tactic similar to those used by domestic abusers. Many MPs check their social media late at night, inviting the most unpleasant people into their bedrooms when most sensible people wouldn't even stop to listen to them on the street. This hostile environment not only harms those directly affected but also deters talented people—particularly women—from entering politics at all.

Chapter 6: The Accountability Gap: Why Bad Policies Persist Unchallenged

A fundamental disconnect exists between MPs' constituency work and their legislative responsibilities, creating a dangerous accountability gap. MPs spend increasing amounts of time dealing with constituents' problems—often described as "glorified social work"—while devoting less attention to scrutinizing the very laws that create these problems in the first place. This creates a vicious cycle where parliamentarians are too busy patching up the consequences of bad legislation to prevent it from being passed. Constituency surgeries reveal the human cost of policy failures. MPs regularly meet people drowning in bureaucracy, facing eviction, struggling with benefit cuts, or caught in immigration limbo. One MP described how constituents arrive with "plastic bags full of pages to sort through, trying to work out what the problem was and who was at fault." These piles of paper symbolize the mess that poorly designed systems leave people in. Yet the MPs who spend hours helping constituents navigate these systems often vote for the very policies that create such chaos. External pressures further distort accountability mechanisms. Lobby groups and campaigning organizations can mobilize impressive support for or against specific policies, but their influence isn't always proportionate to the merits of their arguments. The National Trust's successful campaign against planning reforms in 2011 led ministers to avoid seriously considering reforms that could help build more homes and address Britain's housing crisis. Similarly, online petition sites can generate thousands of identical emails to MPs' offices, creating the impression of mass opposition to policies without necessarily reflecting informed public opinion. Media coverage compounds these problems by focusing on personality and conflict rather than substantive policy analysis. MPs who make noise about how good they are rarely turn out to be the most talented, yet Westminster rewards those who are visible in the media over those doing the unglamorous work of improving legislation. As one special adviser noted, impressing journalists with good conversation skills means you can "create a reputation for being an effective minister, one that is sustained largely by writers who haven't got a clue whether any of your policies are actually working." Perhaps most troublingly, when MPs leave government, many choose to leave Parliament entirely rather than apply their experience to scrutinizing legislation from the backbenches. William Hague, Andrew Lansley, David Willetts, and others all departed after leaving ministerial office, despite having valuable expertise that could have improved policy-making. David Cameron, who had spoken about the importance of experienced hands providing wisdom from the backbenches, resigned as an MP just months after stepping down as prime minister. This exodus of experienced parliamentarians further weakens the legislature's ability to hold the executive to account.

Chapter 7: The Reform Agenda: Rebuilding Parliament for Better Democracy

Meaningful reform of Parliament requires addressing both the entry barriers that limit who becomes an MP and the structural problems that prevent effective governance once they arrive. Any successful reform agenda must tackle the financial costs of candidacy, which currently favor the wealthy and well-connected. Political parties could provide greater financial support for candidates, particularly those from underrepresented backgrounds, and implement stricter spending limits for selection campaigns to level the playing field. Selection processes themselves need reform to produce more representative outcomes. All-women shortlists have proven effective for Labour, with 50% of women elected to Parliament having been chosen using this method. However, more fundamental changes are needed to address unconscious biases that lead selection panels to favor candidates who fit their preconceived image of an MP. Training for selection panels, more diverse selection committees, and clearer criteria focused on skills rather than background could help overcome these biases. The scrutiny function of Parliament requires significant strengthening. Bill committees need particular attention, as government whips currently select members based on loyalty rather than expertise. Reforming this system could involve random selection of committee members, requirements for relevant expertise, or independent chairs with the power to ensure genuine scrutiny. The handling of secondary legislation also requires urgent reform, with major policy changes receiving proper examination rather than being pushed through with minimal oversight. Separating the career paths for legislators and ministers could help address the perverse incentives that undermine scrutiny. MPs who develop expertise in scrutinizing legislation should be rewarded with higher status and pay, creating a viable alternative to the ministerial career track. This would reduce the overwhelming focus on ministerial ambition and encourage MPs to take their legislative responsibilities seriously. Mental health support for MPs should be expanded and normalized. The current services available within Parliament have made significant progress, but more could be done to address the toxic culture that contributes to mental health problems in the first place. Regular appraisals for both MPs and their staff could help identify issues before they become crises, while clearer HR structures could provide support for those experiencing harassment or bullying. Digital democracy tools offer opportunities to enhance public engagement with the legislative process. Platforms that enable citizens to contribute their expertise and experiences to bill committees could address the knowledge gap that currently hampers scrutiny. Such innovations would not only improve legislation but also help rebuild public trust in parliamentary democracy by making the process more transparent and inclusive. Ultimately, reforming Parliament requires political will from those who have succeeded within the current system. This presents a classic collective action problem, as those with the power to change the system have little personal incentive to do so. However, declining public trust in democratic institutions and growing awareness of Parliament's dysfunctions create pressure for reform. By addressing the structural problems that undermine effective representation and scrutiny, Parliament could better fulfill its essential role in democratic governance.

Summary

Westminster Parliament systematically fails in its core democratic functions through a complex interplay of financial barriers to entry, perverse career incentives, and institutional cultures that prioritize loyalty over scrutiny. The result is flawed legislation, unrepresentative governance, and declining public trust in democratic institutions. This failure stems not from individual shortcomings but from structural problems that create a parliament populated by career politicians incentivized to advance their ministerial ambitions rather than serve the public interest through rigorous legislative oversight. The path to reform requires addressing both who enters Parliament and how the institution shapes their behavior once there. Financial barriers must be lowered to diversify representation, while career structures need redesigning to reward effective scrutiny rather than blind loyalty. Without such reforms, Parliament will continue producing legislation that fails to serve the public interest while excluding the diverse voices needed for truly representative democracy. The parliamentary paradox reveals a fundamental truth about democratic institutions: formal structures alone cannot guarantee effective governance when underlying incentives and cultures systematically undermine their intended functions.

About Author

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Isabel Hardman

Isabel Hardman is a political journalist and the assistant editor of The Spectator. In 2015, she was named Journalist of the Year at the Political Studies Association's annual awards.She is the daughter of Michael Hardman, the first chairman and one of the four founders of the Campaign for Real Ale. She attended St Catherine's School, Bramley, and Godalming College, before graduating from the University of Exeter with a first class degree in English Literature in 2007. While at university, Hardman worked as a freelance journalist for The Observer. She completed a National Council for the Training of Journalists course at Highbury College in 2009.Hardman began her career in journalism as a senior reporter for Inside Housing magazine. She then became assistant news editor at PoliticsHome. In September 2014, GQ magazine named her as one of their 100 most connected women in Britain, and in December 2015, she was named "Journalist of the Year" at the Political Studies Association's annual awards. She is currently the assistant editor of The Spectator, and writes a weekly column for The Daily Telegraph.She appears on television programmes such as Question Time, This Week, The Andrew Marr Show and Have I Got News for You, and is a presenter of the BBC Radio 4 programme Week in Westminster.She hosts The Spectator Podcast.

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