Zero Fail

Zero Fail Plot Summary

Introduction

On a crisp November day in 1963, Secret Service agent Clint Hill leaped onto the back of a presidential limousine in Dallas, desperately trying to shield President Kennedy from an assassin's bullets. He was seconds too late. This catastrophic failure would haunt Hill for decades and force a complete reimagining of presidential protection in America. The Secret Service's story is one of perpetual crisis and reform, where each evolution in security protocols has been written in blood rather than foresight. Through the lens of the Secret Service's development, we witness America's journey through increasing complexity and danger - from the relatively simple threats of lone gunmen to the sophisticated challenges of international terrorism and domestic extremism. This historical progression reveals a troubling pattern: meaningful reforms typically emerge only after failures, with institutional resistance often delaying necessary changes until tragedy strikes. Anyone interested in leadership, institutional resilience, or the delicate balance between security and democratic openness will find valuable lessons in how America's elite protective force has struggled to fulfill its zero-fail mission across six decades of evolving threats.

Chapter 1: Kennedy's Death: The Catalyst for Modern Protection (1963)

The assassination of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, represented the most catastrophic failure in Secret Service history and became the catalyst for its modern transformation. Before that fateful day in Dallas, the Service operated as a relatively small agency with just 34 agents assigned to presidential protection, working in six-man rotating shifts on a modest annual budget of $5 million. Kennedy himself often resisted security measures, famously telling agents, "If I don't mingle with the people, I couldn't get elected dogcatcher." This presidential preference for accessibility over security created a constant tension that would have deadly consequences. The protective detail in Dallas reflected this compromised approach to security. Agents had been positioned according to Kennedy's preference for minimal visible protection. Some were even removed from their positions on the rear bumper of his convertible limousine. The motorcade route included a dangerously slow turn near the Texas School Book Depository, creating an ideal opportunity for an assassin. When shots rang out at 12:30 p.m., the protective bubble around Kennedy had already been fatally compromised. Secret Service agent Win Lawson, who had planned security for the Dallas visit, would later describe himself as "the first agent in Secret Service history to lose a president" - a sentiment of failure and responsibility that permeated the entire organization. In the immediate aftermath, Secret Service Chief James Rowley faced the daunting task of rebuilding an agency shattered by failure. Rather than scapegoating individual agents, Rowley told the Warren Commission, "I did not think in the light of history that they should be stigmatized with something like that." Instead, he channeled his energy into transforming the Service. His first priority was addressing the systemic weaknesses that had allowed Lee Harvey Oswald to gun down the president. Rowley nearly doubled the manpower on the presidential detail overnight, bringing experienced former detail agents back to Washington. He instituted required checks on all buildings along motorcade routes and posted additional agents in crowds. For the first five months of 1964, Rowley "borrowed" 670 FBI agents and other officers to supplement his understaffed force. The Warren Commission's report in September 1964 delivered a harsh assessment, calling for "substantial improvement" to the Service's "seriously deficient" protection methods. Armed with this critique, Rowley and Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon pushed Congress to approve a comprehensive reform plan. Despite President Johnson's resistance to increased security, Congress authorized funding for 205 new agents - a 50% increase in staffing. The Service also began developing a computerized system for tracking threats, replacing their outdated paper index cards. These technological improvements represented the first steps toward a more sophisticated approach to protective intelligence. The transformation initiated by Rowley established a pattern that would define the Secret Service for decades to come: crisis followed by reform. The agency learned that presidential protection required layered security, advanced planning, and the authority to override even the president's wishes when necessary. As one agent later observed, "The Secret Service methodology is born of blood. You can only protect for what you know. Every time the Service is tested, it gets better." This reactive approach to improvement would become both the Service's greatest strength and its most troubling vulnerability as it faced new and evolving threats in the decades ahead.

Chapter 2: Rebuilding Trust: Reforms After Dallas (1964-1980)

The period following Kennedy's assassination was marked by profound changes in how the Secret Service approached its protective mission. President Lyndon Johnson, traumatized by witnessing his predecessor's murder, initially demanded extreme security measures. "I won't even go to the bathroom without a Secret Service agent," he reportedly remarked. However, Johnson's relationship with his detail soon grew complicated. Paranoid by nature, he suspected that most agents remained loyal to the Kennedy family. He told aides that agents were "not deep thinkers" and constantly talking behind his back. This mistrust created a challenging environment for agents still processing their failure in Dallas. Despite these tensions, the Service implemented substantial reforms during this period. The agency's budget continued to grow, reaching nearly $20 million by the early 1970s. Training became more rigorous, with agents receiving specialized instruction in emergency medicine, defensive driving, and advanced weapons handling. The Service also expanded its use of technology, developing more sophisticated communications systems and surveillance equipment. These improvements reflected a fundamental shift in approach - from reactive protection based primarily on physical presence to proactive security informed by intelligence and planning. This reformed approach faced its first major tests during the tumultuous 1970s. In September 1975, President Gerald Ford survived two assassination attempts within a three-week span. On September 5 in Sacramento, Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, a Charles Manson follower, pointed a .45 caliber pistol at Ford from just two feet away. Only the quick action of Secret Service agent Larry Buendorf, who grabbed the weapon and twisted it from her hand, prevented tragedy. Incredibly, just 17 days later in San Francisco, Sara Jane Moore fired a .38 caliber revolver at Ford, missing him by just five inches when a bystander deflected her arm. These incidents prompted further security enhancements, including expanded use of magnetometers at presidential events and larger security perimeters. The most significant test of these reforms came on March 30, 1981, when John Hinckley Jr. shot President Ronald Reagan outside the Washington Hilton Hotel. Though Hinckley managed to fire six shots in 1.7 seconds, the Secret Service's response demonstrated how far the agency had come since Dallas. Detail leader Jerry Parr shoved Reagan into the limousine within 1.5 seconds of the first shot, while agent Tim McCarthy literally took a bullet for the president by turning his body into a human shield. When Parr noticed Reagan coughing blood in the limousine, he made the critical decision to divert to the hospital rather than returning to the White House. This quick action saved Reagan's life, as he had lost nearly half his blood volume from a bullet that ricocheted off the limousine and lodged near his heart. In the aftermath of the Reagan shooting, detail leader Bob DeProspero led another comprehensive security overhaul. His most significant innovation was requiring magnetometers (metal detectors) at all presidential events - a measure the White House initially resisted as unfriendly to voters. DeProspero also implemented "covered arrivals," having the president's limousine enter concealed garages or loading docks, and insisted on bulletproof podiums and keeping agents within arm's reach of the president at all times. The 1983 opening of the James Rowley Training Center in Beltsville, Maryland, marked another milestone in the Service's rebuilding, providing agents with a state-of-the-art facility to train for various scenarios on a life-sized replica of a city street. By the early 1980s, the Secret Service had transformed from a small, overworked force into a more professional, better-equipped organization. As one agent noted, "Every time the Service is tested, it gets better." However, this reactive approach to improvement meant the agency was always addressing the last threat rather than anticipating the next one - a limitation that would become increasingly problematic as new forms of danger emerged in the decades ahead.

Chapter 3: Reagan to Clinton: New Threats and Cultural Challenges (1981-2000)

The George H.W. Bush presidency (1989-1993) is often described as a golden era for the Secret Service. Despite his patrician background, Bush forged genuine connections with the agents who protected him and his family. Having witnessed the near-fatal shooting of President Reagan in 1981 as vice president, Bush respected his detail's recommendations and accepted their constraints with grace. The president and First Lady Barbara treated their protective detail like extended family rather than staff. Bush often thanked agents by name at the end of each day, while Barbara pushed food into agents' hands and mothered them like her own children. The Bushes even adjusted their holiday schedules to ensure agents could spend Christmas Eve with their families - a consideration that deeply touched the Service. However, this mutual affection had an unintended consequence. In April 1989, just three months into Bush's presidency, the Service's eagerness to accommodate the White House's political needs led to a serious security lapse. Bush's aides wanted him to address Polish-Americans in Hamtramck, Michigan, to highlight his support for Poland's Solidarity movement. Despite warnings from headquarters that the cramped town made proper security impossible, an advance agent reported they could "make it work" to please the White House. Unknown to the Service, a mentally ill Army veteran named John Spencer Daughetee had traveled to Hamtramck with a .38 caliber handgun, intending to assassinate the president. Though Daughetee failed to get close enough to shoot, the Secret Service only learned of his presence months later when he was arrested for an unrelated crime in California. This near-miss highlighted a critical vulnerability: the Service's tendency to prioritize political optics over security concerns when protecting a well-liked president. Bill Clinton's arrival at the White House in January 1993 created an immediate cultural shock for the Secret Service. The new president was a youthful, energetic politician with an insatiable appetite for public contact - reminiscent of Kennedy three decades earlier. Clinton's desire to mingle with crowds, his spontaneous schedule changes, and his resistance to security protocols challenged the Service's rigid systems. From the outset, the Clintons maintained a wary relationship with their protectors. They quickly detected the strong loyalty many agents felt toward the outgoing Bush administration, noting the "RE-ELECT BUSH" bumper stickers on cars parked behind the White House. This suspicion deepened when media reports claimed to have inside information about the First Family's private moments, which the Clintons believed came from Secret Service leaks. While the Service navigated this tense relationship with the First Family, a far more dangerous threat was emerging. On February 26, 1993, just one month after Clinton's inauguration, Islamic terrorists detonated a 1,300-pound truck bomb in the parking garage beneath the World Trade Center. Though the attack killed only six people - far fewer than the thousands the bombers had hoped for - it marked the first Islamic terrorist attack on U.S. soil and caught the attention of Osama bin Laden. As Clinton's presidency progressed, bin Laden's al-Qaeda network grew increasingly bold. In October 1993, Somali rebels supported by bin Laden's fighters shot down two American Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu, killing 18 U.S. soldiers and dragging their bodies through the streets. The Secret Service, however, remained focused on traditional threats - particularly lone gunmen like John Hinckley Jr. who had nearly killed President Reagan. Despite commissioning the Exceptional Case Study Project to examine the patterns of would-be assassins, the Service was slow to adapt to the emerging threat of organized terrorism. Their security protocols, while improved since the Reagan years, still relied heavily on "throwing bodies at the problem" rather than developing sophisticated counter-terrorism strategies. By the late 1990s, this gap between the evolving threat landscape and the Service's traditional approach was becoming increasingly problematic. The period from Reagan to Clinton revealed how the Secret Service's effectiveness could be compromised by both positive and negative relationships with those they protected. When presidents respected the Service but pushed for political accommodation, security could be subtly undermined. When presidents distrusted the Service, the essential close relationship needed for effective protection became strained. Meanwhile, new threats were emerging that would soon force the agency to completely reimagine its approach to presidential security in ways they could scarcely anticipate.

Chapter 4: 9/11 and Beyond: Terrorism Transforms Protection (2001-2008)

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, fundamentally transformed the Secret Service's mission and operational environment. As al-Qaeda hijackers crashed planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the Service faced its most complex crisis since Kennedy's assassination. Agents scrambled to evacuate Vice President Dick Cheney from his White House office while President George W. Bush was airborne on Air Force One, temporarily unable to return to Washington due to security concerns. The attacks exposed critical vulnerabilities in presidential security. The Service had focused primarily on protecting against lone assassins or small terrorist cells, not coordinated, multi-target attacks that could potentially decapitate the entire government. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Secret Service underwent its most significant organizational change since its founding. The 2003 Homeland Security Act transferred the agency from the Treasury Department, its home for 138 years, to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. This shift reflected the Service's evolving mission beyond its traditional roles of presidential protection and financial crimes investigation. The agency received significant budget increases, growing from approximately $1 billion in 2001 to over $1.6 billion by 2008. New specialized units were created, including enhanced counter-assault teams capable of responding to complex attacks. The Service also expanded its use of technology, implementing advanced weapons detection systems, explosive-detecting canines, and counter-surveillance measures. The Service's responsibilities expanded dramatically during this period. Beyond protecting the president and vice president, agents now secured an ever-growing list of officials and their families, international dignitaries, and major public events designated as National Special Security Events. The 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, the first major international gathering on American soil after 9/11, required over 2,000 agents and officers - the largest deployment in the agency's history. Presidential movements became more secretive, with multiple decoy motorcades and last-minute route changes becoming standard procedure. Security perimeters around the White House and presidential events expanded dramatically, and airspace restrictions became more stringent. These expanded duties placed enormous strain on the Service's resources and personnel. By 2008, the agency was responsible for protecting 32 individuals - a number that would grow to 42 by 2012. Yet staffing levels failed to keep pace with these new demands. Agents routinely worked 12-hour shifts for weeks without days off, particularly during campaign seasons and international summits. The Service's training facility in Beltsville, Maryland, originally designed to provide regular refresher courses, became underutilized as agents couldn't be spared from protection duties. This operational tempo created significant morale and retention problems, with many experienced agents leaving for better-paying, less demanding jobs in the private sector or other federal agencies. The post-9/11 era also saw the Service adopt a more aggressive posture toward potential threats. The agency developed sophisticated counter-drone capabilities and enhanced its coordination with military assets. Presidential protection now involved massive, multi-agency operations with thousands of personnel for even routine movements. This enhanced security came at a cost - not just financially, but in terms of presidential accessibility and public interaction. The days of spontaneous presidential walks among crowds had largely ended, replaced by carefully choreographed events with pre-screened attendees. By the end of the Bush administration, the Secret Service had adapted to the post-9/11 world, but at a significant cost to its institutional health. The agency that had rebuilt itself after Dallas now faced a different kind of crisis - not a catastrophic failure but a slow erosion of capabilities due to overextension and under-resourcing. As former agent Jonathan Wackrow explained, "There is a line of demarcation in the Service: before and after 9/11. Before 9/11, we talked about an attack like Squeaky Fromme. No one ever thought of this type of attack, including the military." The Service had transformed to meet new threats, but the fundamental tension between security and openness remained unresolved - a challenge that would only grow more acute in the years ahead.

Chapter 5: Institutional Failures: From Obama to Trump (2009-2020)

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 presented the Secret Service with unprecedented protection challenges. As the first African American president, Obama received three times as many threats as his predecessors. The Service investigated over 12,000 threats against Obama during his first year in office alone. This alarming increase stretched the agency's protective intelligence division, which remained understaffed and technologically outdated compared to other federal law enforcement agencies. Despite these challenges, the Service maintained its outward appearance of impenetrable security around the new president. This facade began to crack in November 2009, when Michaele and Tareq Salahi managed to crash a White House state dinner despite not being on the guest list, exposing serious flaws in the Service's screening procedures. More alarming was the November 2011 incident when Oscar Ortega-Hernandez fired eight shots at the White House residence from a car on Constitution Avenue. Though several bullets struck the building, including one that landed just feet from the First Family's living room, the Service initially misidentified the sounds as a backfiring vehicle. It took four days for agents to realize the White House had been hit by gunfire, and only then because a housekeeper noticed broken glass and bullet fragments. When Michelle Obama learned about the shooting days after it occurred, she was furious that neither the Service director nor her detail leader had mentioned anything during their long flight back from Hawaii. The Service's institutional problems became more publicly visible in April 2012, when several agents were caught hiring prostitutes while on advance assignment in Cartagena, Colombia, ahead of President Obama's visit. This scandal exposed a troubling "wheels up, rings off" culture within certain elements of the Service, where some agents viewed presidential trips as opportunities for misconduct once their immediate duties were complete. Director Mark Sullivan's handling of the scandal raised questions about transparency and accountability within the agency. When testifying before Congress, Sullivan insisted this behavior was "absurd" and not condoned, yet internal investigations would later uncover evidence that similar misconduct had occurred on other trips. The institutional crisis deepened in September 2014 when an armed intruder, Omar Gonzalez, jumped the White House fence and managed to run through the North Portico door, overpowering an officer and making it deep into the East Room before being tackled. This catastrophic security breach led to the resignation of Director Julia Pierson, who had been appointed as the first female director partly to reform the agency's male-dominated culture. A subsequent investigation revealed multiple failures: alarms had been muted because they frequently malfunctioned, radio communications broke down, and officers lacked proper training for such scenarios. A bipartisan panel concluded the agency was "starved for leadership" and hampered by inadequate training, staffing, and technology. The Trump administration brought fresh challenges to an already strained agency. President Trump's frequent weekend trips to his private properties in Florida and New Jersey created unprecedented logistical and budgetary demands. By August 2017, the Service had exhausted its annual budget for protecting the president and his family, forcing it to request additional funding from Congress. Trump's large family and their extensive business travel created demands on the Service's resources that had no historical precedent. More problematically, Trump's administration began using the Secret Service in ways that echoed Nixon's attempts to politicize the agency decades earlier. The president reportedly pressured the Service to remove agents he personally disliked from his detail and replace them with those he considered loyal. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 presented yet another unprecedented challenge. Despite the health risks, agents continued to staff crowded campaign rallies and travel with an infected president. In October 2020, when Trump contracted COVID-19, he insisted on taking a drive around Walter Reed Medical Center to wave to supporters, forcing Secret Service agents to accompany him in a sealed vehicle despite the extreme risk of exposure. This incident crystallized how far the agency had drifted from its core protective principles, now unable to resist political pressures even when they directly endangered agents' health. By the end of the Trump administration, the Secret Service faced a perfect storm of problems: chronic understaffing, budget constraints, leadership turnover, low morale, and political pressures. The January 6, 2021, insurrection at the U.S. Capitol represented a final, dramatic illustration of the security challenges facing the agency. As Vice President Mike Pence was evacuated from the Senate chamber with rioters just steps away, the thinly stretched protective detail demonstrated both remarkable bravery and the systemic vulnerabilities that had accumulated over years of institutional neglect.

Chapter 6: Lessons from History: The Pattern of Crisis and Reform

Throughout its history, the Secret Service has demonstrated a troubling pattern: significant reforms typically occur only after catastrophic failures. The Kennedy assassination prompted the first major expansion of the agency's resources and authority. The attempts on Ford's life led to enhanced screening procedures. The Reagan shooting improved emergency response protocols. Each crisis revealed vulnerabilities that should have been addressed proactively rather than reactively. As one veteran agent observed, "The Service's methodology is born of blood. You can only protect for what you know. Every time the Service is tested, it gets better." This reactive approach, however, meant the agency was perpetually playing catch-up with evolving threats. This pattern reflects a deeper institutional challenge: the Service has often struggled to balance its protective mission with political pressures. Presidents naturally resist security measures that limit their public interaction, creating tension between protection and accessibility. Meanwhile, Congress has frequently underfunded the agency until high-profile failures make additional resources politically necessary. The Service's culture of loyalty and discretion, while essential to its mission, has sometimes prevented honest assessment of failures. Agents who raised concerns about procedures or leadership decisions were often marginalized or labeled troublemakers, allowing problematic behaviors to persist unchecked. The Service has also struggled with technological adaptation. When Omar Gonzalez breached the White House in 2014, investigators discovered that several alarm systems were either malfunctioning or had been deliberately turned off because they generated too many false alarms. This technological failure reflected broader issues with the agency's approach to modernization, often hampered by budget constraints and institutional resistance to change. Similarly, the Service's protective intelligence capabilities frequently lagged behind the evolving threat landscape, from the slow recognition of organized terrorism in the 1990s to the challenges of monitoring social media threats in the digital age. Leadership transitions have frequently disrupted reform efforts. The Service has oscillated between insider directors steeped in agency tradition and outsiders brought in to shake up the culture. Insider directors typically understood the nuances of protection but sometimes lacked the perspective to recognize institutional problems. Outsider directors often faced resistance from career agents who viewed them with suspicion. This leadership instability made sustained reform difficult, with each new director often abandoning their predecessor's initiatives to implement their own vision. Despite these challenges, the Secret Service has demonstrated remarkable resilience. The vast majority of agents remain deeply committed to their mission, willing to "take a bullet" for those they protect. The agency has successfully adapted to evolving threats, from lone gunmen to sophisticated terrorist plots. And despite occasional high-profile failures, the Service has maintained an impressive overall record of presidential protection. The lessons from its history are clear: meaningful reform requires not just resources but cultural transformation; transparency and accountability must be balanced with necessary operational secrecy; and most importantly, the agency must develop the capacity to identify and address vulnerabilities before they lead to tragedy. The Secret Service stands as a powerful example of how institutions can be simultaneously resilient and fragile. Its ability to recover from failures demonstrates organizational strength, while its recurring problems reveal the difficulty of sustaining excellence in high-pressure environments. As America faces increasingly complex security challenges, the Service's capacity to learn from its history while embracing innovation will determine whether it can fulfill its zero-fail mission in an increasingly unpredictable world.

Summary

The Secret Service's evolution from a small Treasury unit to America's elite protective force mirrors the nation's journey through increasing complexity and danger. Throughout its history, the agency has been defined by a fundamental tension: balancing absolute security with the democratic necessity of presidential accessibility. This tension has driven the Service through cycles of crisis and reform, from the Kennedy assassination to 9/11 to modern White House security breaches. Each failure exposed vulnerabilities that prompted significant changes, yet the pattern of reactive rather than proactive reform has persisted across administrations, revealing how difficult institutional transformation can be even when lives are at stake. This historical progression offers crucial lessons for any organization with critical responsibilities. First, organizational culture can be both a strength and a vulnerability - the Service's legendary loyalty and discretion have sometimes prevented necessary self-criticism and transparency. Second, leadership matters profoundly - the agency has performed best when led by directors who could balance respect for tradition with openness to innovation. Finally, the most effective protection comes not from physical barriers or weapons but from intelligence, preparation, and the human judgment of well-trained professionals who are properly resourced and supported. As threats to democracy and its leaders continue to evolve, institutions must develop the capacity to anticipate challenges rather than merely respond to them, breaking the cycle of crisis and reform before the next tragedy occurs.

About Author

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Carol Leonnig

Carol Duhurst Leonnig is an American investigative journalist and a longtime staff writer for The Washington Post. She was part of a team of national security reporters that won the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service in 2014 for reporting that revealed the NSA's expanded spying on Americans. She later received Pulitzers for National Reporting in 2015 and 2018. She is a member of the '87 class at Bryn Mawr College

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