Every Nation For Itself

Every Nation For Itself Plot Summary

Introduction

On a crisp December evening in 2009, the world's most powerful leaders gathered at Denmark's Christiansborg Palace for a gala dinner during the Copenhagen Climate Summit. Despite the lavish setting, the summit was doomed to failure. The following day, when two dozen heads of state met to negotiate a climate agreement, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao remained at his hotel. U.S. President Barack Obama found himself negotiating with a deputy foreign minister instead. The summit collapsed in acrimony, with no meaningful agreement reached. This moment perfectly captured the emerging reality of global politics: a world where no single country or alliance of countries can meet the challenges of global leadership. For the first time in seven decades, we live in what can be called a "G-Zero" world – a global order characterized by a leadership vacuum. The United States, struggling with mounting debt and political paralysis, is increasingly unwilling to shoulder international burdens. Rising powers like China, India, and Brazil aren't ready to step up either, as they focus on managing their own complex internal development. Traditional global institutions like the United Nations, IMF, and World Bank no longer reflect the world's true balance of power, while newer forums like the G20 prove ineffective when crisis isn't imminent. This leadership vacuum will shape everything from climate change and cybersecurity to economic stability and resource conflicts in the coming decade, transforming how nations, businesses, and individuals navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.

Chapter 1: The Birth of the G-Zero: Post-Cold War Power Vacuum

The end of the Cold War marked a pivotal moment in global politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower. This unipolar moment suggested the beginning of what some called a "Pax Americana" – a period of American dominance across economic, military, and cultural domains. International institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and United Nations, largely designed by Western powers after World War II, continued to shape global governance. The U.S. dollar remained the world's reserve currency, American military power was unrivaled, and Western-style market democracy appeared triumphant. However, this apparent American hegemony masked the seeds of the G-Zero world that would gradually emerge. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, diverted American attention and resources toward counterterrorism and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. These costly wars, combined with the 2008 financial crisis that originated in the United States, severely undermined America's economic strength and political will to lead globally. American taxpayers grew increasingly skeptical of foreign entanglements, with polls showing that by 2011, nearly half of Americans believed the United States should "mind its own business internationally." Meanwhile, the economic transformation of China represented the most significant shift in global power distribution. From a relatively minor player in 1989 with just 0.6% of world trade, China rapidly industrialized under Deng Xiaoping's reforms. By 2010, it had surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy. Other emerging powers like India, Brazil, and Turkey were also rising, each with its own distinct values and ambitions. These nations sought greater influence in global affairs but remained focused primarily on managing their domestic development rather than assuming costly international leadership roles. The established Western-led institutions failed to adapt to this new reality. The IMF and World Bank continued to be dominated by American and European leadership despite the dramatic economic rise of emerging powers. The G7 grouping of industrialized democracies appeared increasingly anachronistic in a world where economic power was rapidly shifting eastward and southward. In 2008, at the height of the financial crisis, the G20 emerged as a forum that included major emerging economies, but it quickly proved ineffective except during moments of acute crisis. By the early 2010s, the contours of the G-Zero world had become clear. The United States remained powerful but increasingly unwilling to lead unilaterally. Europe was consumed by debt crises and internal divisions. China and other emerging powers were not yet ready to assume global leadership responsibilities. Most importantly, no consensus existed among these powers about how the international system should function or who should bear the costs of providing global public goods like security, economic stability, and environmental protection. The G-Zero represented not just a transitional phase but a dangerous new normal. Without effective global leadership, transnational challenges like climate change, financial instability, terrorism, and cybersecurity would become increasingly difficult to address. This leadership vacuum would create both risks and opportunities for nations, businesses, and individuals in the coming decade.

Chapter 2: America's Declining Global Leadership (2000-2012)

The dawn of the 21st century revealed the growing constraints on American global leadership. The United States entered the new millennium as the undisputed world hegemon, but a series of events would rapidly challenge this position. The September 11 attacks in 2001 pulled America into costly and controversial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that would drain its treasury and political will. President George W. Bush launched these interventions with the confidence of a superpower, but they soon became quagmires that revealed the limits of American military power to reshape societies. The financial crisis that began in 2008 delivered another severe blow to American leadership. What started as a subprime mortgage crisis in the United States quickly became a global financial meltdown, damaging America's reputation for economic competence and revealing dangerous weaknesses in the Washington Consensus model. The crisis accelerated a shift in global economic power that was already underway. While the United States struggled with recession and mounting debt, China implemented a massive stimulus program that maintained its growth and increased its influence. By 2010, China had surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy, and it was buying increasing amounts of U.S. debt—leading Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to express concerns about the safety of China's massive dollar holdings. Domestic political paralysis further undermined America's global position. Partisan gridlock in Washington made it increasingly difficult for the United States to make basic governance decisions, let alone craft coherent foreign policy. The debt ceiling crisis of 2011 shocked international observers as American lawmakers appeared willing to risk default on U.S. obligations for political advantage. This dysfunctional politics coincided with growing public skepticism about foreign engagements. After a decade of war, Americans were focused on domestic concerns—jobs, healthcare, and retirement security—rather than distant challenges abroad. Meanwhile, the economic foundations of American power were eroding. The U.S. federal debt was rising at an alarming rate, with entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare creating unsustainable long-term obligations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned NATO allies in 2011 that America could no longer afford to be the alliance's primary security provider, a stark admission of America's fiscal constraints. The country that had been the world's largest creditor in 1980 had become its largest debtor by 2011, with China holding trillions in U.S. Treasuries. Despite these challenges, America retained formidable advantages. Its military remained unmatched, its universities were the world's best, and its culture exerted global appeal. Its economy, while struggling, was still the world's largest and most innovative. What had changed was not America's capabilities so much as its willingness to use them in service of global leadership. The costs of being the world's primary provider of public goods—from securing shipping lanes to stabilizing the global financial system—had grown, while the domestic consensus in favor of bearing those costs had weakened. By 2012, it was clear that America would remain a global power but would exercise more selective leadership. The Obama administration's cautious approach to foreign entanglements, sometimes described as "leading from behind," reflected this new reality. This recalibration of American leadership created a vacuum in the international system that other powers were not yet ready to fill, setting the stage for the G-Zero world.

Chapter 3: The Rise of China and Regional Power Centers

As American global influence receded, China's extraordinary rise transformed the international landscape. Between 2000 and 2012, China's economy expanded at an average annual rate exceeding 10%, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and creating the world's largest middle class. This economic miracle was orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party through a distinctive model of state capitalism, where the government maintained control over strategic sectors while allowing market forces to drive growth in others. By 2010, China had become the world's largest exporter and manufacturer, with massive foreign exchange reserves that gave Beijing new global leverage. China's economic expansion translated into growing political and military influence, particularly in East Asia. The country increased defense spending at double-digit rates, modernizing its navy and developing advanced missile systems. Chinese diplomats grew more assertive in international forums, while state-owned companies secured access to natural resources across Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, and many Southeast Asian nations. The 2008 Beijing Olympics symbolized China's arrival as a global power, with spectacular displays that demonstrated both its wealth and organizational capacity. However, Chinese leaders consistently emphasized that their country remained a developing nation with enormous internal challenges. Premier Wen Jiabao described China's economic model as "unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and ultimately unsustainable." The leadership recognized that transitioning from export-led growth to domestic consumption would require painful reforms. China also faced demographic pressures from an aging population, environmental degradation, regional inequality, and growing social unrest. These internal priorities made Beijing reluctant to assume costly global leadership responsibilities, despite its growing power. Beyond China, other regional powers emerged as important players in a multipolar world. Brazil established itself as South America's dominant economy and a voice for the Global South. Under President Lula da Silva, Brazil pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy, exemplified by its 2010 nuclear deal with Iran that irritated Washington. India's economic reforms yielded impressive growth, and its democratic system gave it moral authority in international forums. Russia, revitalized by high energy prices under Vladimir Putin's leadership, reasserted influence in its "near abroad" and opposed Western interventions in countries like Libya and Syria. These emerging powers shared certain characteristics. They valued sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, having experienced Western colonialism or dominance. They sought greater representation in international institutions but were primarily focused on their own development rather than providing global public goods. And while they sometimes coordinated through forums like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), their interests often diverged on specific issues, limiting their ability to present a unified alternative to Western leadership. Regional organizations also gained prominence as global leadership fractured. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became more active in managing regional security and economic integration. The Gulf Cooperation Council, led by Saudi Arabia, coordinated oil policies and responded to the Arab Spring uprisings. The African Union took on peacekeeping responsibilities across the continent. These regional arrangements filled some gaps left by declining American engagement but lacked the resources and cohesion to address truly global challenges. The diffusion of power to multiple regional centers created a more complex international environment. No single power or coalition could dictate global rules as the United States had often done during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. This fragmentation made coordinated responses to transnational threats increasingly difficult, from climate change to nuclear proliferation to financial instability.

Chapter 4: Economic Interdependence vs. Political Fragmentation

The G-Zero world presents a fundamental paradox: growing economic interdependence alongside intensifying political fragmentation. Global trade and investment reached unprecedented levels in the early 21st century, creating complex supply chains that crossed multiple borders. By 2012, the value of global exports had reached $18 trillion, nearly triple the figure from 2000. Financial markets became increasingly integrated, with capital flowing more freely across borders than ever before. Multinational corporations operated across dozens of countries, while digital technologies connected billions of people in a single global network. Yet this economic integration was not matched by political cooperation. Instead, as economic power diffused, political coordination became more difficult. The G20, created to manage the 2008 financial crisis, briefly showed promise as a forum where established and emerging powers could collaborate. However, once the immediate crisis passed, divergent interests resurfaced. At the 2010 G20 summit in Seoul, member states clashed over currency policies, with the United States accusing China of manipulating the yuan while other countries criticized American quantitative easing. Similarly, international climate negotiations repeatedly stalled as countries disagreed over how to distribute the costs of reducing carbon emissions. The gap between economic interdependence and political fragmentation created new vulnerabilities. The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated how problems in one country's banking system could rapidly spread worldwide. Supply chain disruptions in one region affected production globally. Energy price fluctuations impacted economies everywhere. Yet the mechanisms for coordinating international responses to these challenges were weakening precisely when they were most needed. State capitalism emerged as a particularly potent challenge to global economic governance. Countries like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia used state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds, and strategic industrial policies to advance national interests through economic means. These governments saw market access, investment rules, and currency policies as tools of statecraft rather than subjects for multilateral coordination. This approach conflicted with the Western vision of a rules-based economic order with minimal government intervention. The international financial architecture remained dominated by institutions designed after World War II. The IMF and World Bank still operated according to voting shares that gave the United States and Europe disproportionate influence. The dollar's status as the world's primary reserve currency gave America what former French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing called "exorbitant privilege." Emerging powers increasingly challenged these arrangements, with China establishing alternative institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and promoting greater use of the yuan in international transactions. Western powers gradually recognized the need to reform global economic governance to reflect new realities. The IMF adjusted its voting shares to give China and other emerging economies greater weight, while the Financial Stability Board expanded to include all G20 members. However, these reforms did not fundamentally alter power dynamics or create a new consensus on economic management. Instead, the global economy operated according to a patchwork of overlapping and sometimes contradictory rules, with different powers asserting influence in different domains. This fragmented economic landscape created both winners and losers. Countries that could navigate multiple systems and play powers off against each other—"pivot states" like Singapore, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam—often benefited. Businesses that adapted quickly to changing rules and power dynamics found new opportunities. But the absence of clear global leadership made the system as a whole more vulnerable to shocks and less capable of addressing long-term challenges like climate change, inequality, and technological disruption.

Chapter 5: Resource Conflicts and Security Challenges

In a G-Zero world, competition for natural resources intensifies while security arrangements grow more uncertain. Without effective global leadership, conflicts over oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and even food and water have become more difficult to manage. The 2008-2011 period saw global food prices reach record levels, triggering riots in dozens of countries and contributing to the Arab Spring uprisings. This "agflation" resulted from a perfect storm of growing demand, biofuel production diverting crops from food uses, extreme weather events, and export restrictions by major producers. Water security emerged as another critical flashpoint. By 2012, over 260 water basins worldwide were shared between two or more countries, creating potential for conflict as supplies grew strained. China's construction of dams along the Mekong River affected water flows to downstream countries like Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. Egypt expressed alarm over Ethiopia's plans for the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile, which Cairo viewed as threatening its water security. Climate change exacerbated these tensions by altering precipitation patterns and increasing the frequency of droughts. The scramble for resources manifested most visibly in the Arctic, where melting ice opened access to potentially vast deposits of oil, gas, and minerals. Russia planted its flag on the seabed at the North Pole in 2007, symbolically claiming the region. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United States also asserted competing claims, while China declared itself a "near-Arctic state" with legitimate interests in the region. Without strong international governance, the Arctic became a theater for geopolitical competition rather than cooperative development. Traditional security challenges took on new dimensions in the G-Zero environment. Nuclear proliferation accelerated as the established powers lost leverage to enforce non-proliferation norms. North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with little consequence. Iran pursued uranium enrichment despite international sanctions, calculating that nuclear capability would provide insurance against regime change. The discovery of the Stuxnet computer worm targeting Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010 revealed how cybertechnology was creating new frontiers in international conflict. Regional security dynamics grew more complex as American security guarantees became less certain. In East Asia, China's growing military power and territorial assertions in the South China Sea alarmed neighbors like Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines. These countries sought to maintain security ties with the United States while expanding economic relations with China—a balancing act that grew increasingly difficult. In the Middle East, traditional U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia began developing more independent security policies as they questioned America's long-term commitment to the region. Cyberspace emerged as a new domain for security competition. State-sponsored hackers targeted government agencies, businesses, and critical infrastructure across borders. The 2007 cyberattacks on Estonia, widely attributed to Russia, demonstrated how digital operations could disrupt a modern society. By 2012, major powers were developing offensive cyber capabilities while struggling to establish norms governing their use. Unlike traditional warfare, cyberattacks often remained below the threshold that would trigger conventional military responses, creating ambiguity about appropriate countermeasures. Non-state actors exploited the security vacuum created by declining global leadership. Terrorist groups established footholds in fragile states like Yemen, Somalia, and Mali. Criminal organizations expanded transnational networks for trafficking drugs, weapons, and people. Pirates operating off the coast of Somalia threatened vital shipping lanes. These challenges required coordinated international responses that proved increasingly difficult to organize in the G-Zero environment. The United States maintained by far the world's largest military, spending more than the next ten countries combined. However, America's ability to translate this hard power into diplomatic influence diminished as other countries questioned its staying power and as economic tools of statecraft gained relative importance. The age of uncontested American military supremacy was giving way to a more complicated security landscape where multiple powers competed across different domains.

Chapter 6: The Four Scenarios for Post-G-Zero Order

As the G-Zero world evolves, four distinct scenarios emerge for the future global order, each shaped by two crucial variables: the U.S.-China relationship and the relative strength of other powers. Understanding these possible futures is essential for nations, businesses, and individuals navigating an uncertain landscape. The first scenario, a "G2" world, would emerge if the United States and China develop a cooperative partnership while remaining significantly stronger than other powers. In this future, Washington and Beijing would share global leadership responsibilities despite their different political and economic systems. They would coordinate on critical issues like climate change, pandemics, financial stability, and nuclear proliferation. This scenario requires both powers to overcome deep mutual suspicion and domestic political obstacles. For America, it means accepting China as an equal partner; for China, it means taking on costly global responsibilities before completing its own development. While some economists like C. Fred Bergsten have advocated for such a "G2" arrangement, Chinese officials have consistently rejected the concept, insisting their country remains a developing nation focused on internal challenges. The second scenario is a "Concert" world, similar to the 19th-century Concert of Europe, where multiple powers share leadership responsibilities. This would occur if the United States and China cooperate while other powers like Europe, Japan, India, and Brazil also maintain significant influence. The G20 would evolve from an aspirational forum into an effective steering committee for global governance. Regional organizations would manage issues in their neighborhoods while coordinating globally on transnational challenges. This scenario demands a level of compromise and burden-sharing that has proven elusive thus far. The diversity of political systems, economic models, and cultural values among major powers makes consensus difficult except during acute crises when all face an imminent common threat. The third scenario, "Cold War 2.0," would emerge if U.S.-China relations deteriorate into sustained rivalry while both powers remain dominant. Unlike the original Cold War, this competition would center on economic rather than ideological conflict. Control of markets, technologies, and resources would become the primary battleground. Countries would face pressure to align with either the American or Chinese camp, creating new dividing lines across the global economy. Military competition would intensify, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, though mutual economic interdependence would create powerful incentives to avoid direct conflict. This scenario risks fragmenting the global economy into competing blocs, reversing decades of integration and potentially triggering dangerous security crises in Taiwan, the South China Sea, or cyberspace. The fourth scenario, a "World of Regions," would develop if the U.S.-China relationship becomes adversarial while other powers maintain significant autonomy. The international system would fragment into regional spheres of influence, with powers like Germany, Brazil, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia dominating their neighborhoods. Global institutions would weaken further as regional arrangements gain prominence. Economic integration would continue within regions but diminish between them. This scenario offers flexibility for "pivot states" that can maintain relations with multiple powers, but it complicates responses to truly global challenges like climate change. The increasing importance of regional powers does not necessarily mean greater stability, as seen in Asia's unresolved territorial disputes and the Middle East's sectarian tensions. A wild-card fifth scenario lurks beneath these four possibilities: a "G-Subzero" world where power fragments not just between nations but within them. State authority could erode in the face of rising challenges from local governments, separatist movements, powerful corporations, and non-state actors. Climate disasters, food shortages, mass migration, and pandemic diseases might overwhelm governance capacity in multiple regions simultaneously. Digital technologies could accelerate this fragmentation by empowering new forms of identity and organization outside traditional state structures. This scenario represents the most dangerous outcome of the G-Zero era. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive or evenly distributed in likelihood. Elements of different futures will likely emerge in different regions and on different issues. The trajectory toward any particular scenario is not predetermined but will be shaped by critical choices made by leaders in coming years—choices about whether to compete or cooperate, to build walls or bridges, to look inward or outward. The G-Zero transition period offers an opportunity to influence which future ultimately prevails.

Chapter 7: Winners and Losers in a Leaderless World

The G-Zero world creates distinct categories of winners and losers among nations, businesses, and organizations. Understanding these patterns is crucial for navigating the opportunities and risks of a leaderless international system. Among nations, the clear winners are "pivot states" that maintain flexibility in their international relationships. Brazil exemplifies this category, having diversified its partnerships beyond traditional ties with the United States to develop strong relations with China, Europe, and fellow emerging powers. Turkey has similarly positioned itself at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, maintaining valuable relationships in multiple directions. Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan have all benefited from their ability to balance relations between competing powers rather than aligning exclusively with any single patron. These pivot states can extract better terms in economic negotiations, reduce dependence on any single market, and maintain strategic autonomy in an uncertain environment. Another category of winners comprises "rogues with powerful friends" – states that flout international norms while protected by major powers. North Korea has exploited China's fear of regime collapse to advance its nuclear program despite international sanctions. Iran has leveraged Russia's support and China's energy needs to resist Western pressure over its nuclear ambitions. In the G-Zero world, sanctions and other forms of international pressure become less effective as alternative patrons emerge for isolated regimes. In the business world, adaptable companies thrive while rigid ones struggle. State-owned enterprises from countries practicing state capitalism often enjoy advantages like preferential financing, regulatory support, and diplomatic backing. However, private multinational corporations that can navigate diverse political systems and form strategic partnerships also succeed. Companies that provide security services—from cybersecurity to water purification—find growing demand as governments and businesses seek protection against emerging threats. Meanwhile, those dependent on stable global rules or unable to adapt to fragmenting standards face mounting challenges. The clearest losers in the G-Zero world are international institutions designed for an earlier era. The United Nations Security Council, with its permanent membership reflecting the power balance of 1945, struggles to address contemporary conflicts. The IMF and World Bank face challenges to their legitimacy as emerging powers demand greater representation. NATO searches for purpose three decades after the Cold War's end, with European members reluctant to increase defense spending while questioning America's commitment to the alliance. These institutions resist reform partly because established powers seek to preserve their privileges, but this resistance ultimately undermines their effectiveness and relevance. "Exposed states" that depend heavily on American security guarantees face difficult adjustments. Japan and Taiwan must recalibrate their strategies as China's power grows and questions arise about U.S. willingness to risk conflict with Beijing. Israel confronts growing regional challenges as American attention shifts away from the Middle East. These countries are forced to develop more autonomous defense capabilities while seeking new partnerships to supplement traditional alignments. "Shadow states" that remain overly dependent on a single powerful neighbor constitute another category of potential losers. Mexico's economy remains deeply integrated with the United States, limiting its strategic options. Ukraine finds itself caught between Russian pressure and European attraction without the ability to fully pivot toward either. These countries lack the flexibility of true pivot states and face difficult choices when their dominant partner's interests conflict with their own. The final pattern involves states that are simultaneously winners and losers in different dimensions. Russia benefits from high energy prices and declining Western influence in its neighborhood but struggles with economic diversification and demographic challenges. India's democratic system provides legitimacy but complicates decision-making compared to China's more centralized approach. The United States retains enormous advantages in military power, technological innovation, and cultural influence even as its relative economic weight declines and its political system shows signs of dysfunction. What distinguishes winners from losers in the G-Zero world is not simply raw power but adaptability. Winners recognize and respond to changing circumstances rather than clinging to outdated assumptions. They diversify their relationships rather than depending exclusively on traditional partners. They identify specific domains where they can exert influence rather than seeking dominance across all spheres. And they recognize that in a world without clear leadership, the ability to forge coalitions around specific issues often matters more than traditional measures of national power.

Summary

The G-Zero world represents a profound transformation in global politics, defined by the absence of any country or alliance capable of providing effective international leadership. This leadership vacuum emerged from converging trends: America's declining ability and willingness to bear global burdens, the focus of rising powers like China on internal development rather than external responsibilities, and the growing mismatch between outdated international institutions and contemporary power realities. Unlike previous transitions between hegemonic powers, this shift has not produced a new stable order but rather a period of uncertainty and volatility. The implications of this leaderless era extend far beyond diplomatic maneuvering between great powers. Without effective global coordination, transnational challenges like climate change, pandemic diseases, nuclear proliferation, and cybersecurity become increasingly difficult to address. Economic governance fragments as countries pursue competing models and institutions. Resource competition intensifies without robust mechanisms to manage conflicts. The resulting environment rewards adaptability, favoring nations and organizations that can navigate multiple systems rather than those dependent on a single set of rules or relationships. While the G-Zero will not last forever, the transition toward whatever comes next—whether a U.S.-China condominium, a concert of powers, a new cold war, or a world of regions—will shape the international landscape for decades to come. Those who understand these dynamics and position themselves accordingly will be best equipped to thrive in an age where every nation increasingly looks out for itself.

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Ian Bremmer

Ian Bremmer (born November 12, 1969) is an American political scientist specializing in US foreign policy, states in transition, and global political risk. He is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, a leading global political risk research and consulting firm, and a professor at Columbia University. Eurasia Group provides financial, corporate, and government clients with information and insight on how political developments move markets. Bremmer is of Armenian and German descent.

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