The Future Is History

The Future Is History Plot Summary

Introduction

In December 1991, the unthinkable happened: the Soviet Union, one of history's most powerful empires, simply ceased to exist. The red flag with its hammer and sickle was lowered from the Kremlin, replaced by the Russian tricolor, marking the end of a 74-year experiment in communist rule. What followed was one of history's most dramatic and consequential transitions, as Russia and fourteen other newly independent states struggled to build new political and economic systems from the ruins of Soviet totalitarianism. This remarkable journey from Soviet collapse through democratic experimentation to authoritarian resurgence reveals profound insights about the challenges of political transformation. How does a society transition from totalitarianism to democracy? Why did Russia's democratic experiment falter, giving way to a new authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin? And perhaps most importantly, how do the psychological and cultural legacies of totalitarianism persist long after the system itself has disappeared? These questions matter not just for understanding Russia's trajectory but for anyone interested in the fragility of democratic institutions and the enduring appeal of authoritarian alternatives in times of uncertainty and rapid change.

Chapter 1: The Soviet Twilight: Gorbachev's Reforms (1985-1991)

When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, few could have predicted that his attempts to reform the Soviet system would lead to its complete collapse just six years later. The USSR Gorbachev inherited was already showing serious signs of decay. The economy had stagnated under the aging leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, while the war in Afghanistan had become a costly quagmire. Most significantly, the communist ideology that had once inspired millions had calcified into empty ritual, with citizens and officials alike going through the motions of belief while privately harboring doubts. Gorbachev introduced two transformative policies: glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Glasnost allowed unprecedented freedom of expression, lifting censorship and encouraging critical discussion of Soviet history and current problems. Suddenly, citizens could speak openly about previously forbidden topics like Stalin's purges, environmental disasters, and the privileges of the Communist elite. Perestroika aimed to revitalize the economy by introducing limited market mechanisms and decentralizing decision-making. However, these economic reforms proved more difficult to implement than political liberalization, creating confusion and disruption without delivering immediate benefits. As restrictions loosened, long-suppressed forces emerged with surprising speed. Nationalist movements gained strength in the Baltic republics, Ukraine, Georgia, and other regions, challenging the very foundation of the multinational Soviet state. Independent political organizations formed for the first time since the 1917 Revolution, including Valeria Novodvorskaya's Democratic Union, which openly called for the end of Communist rule. When Poland and Hungary began their own democratic transitions in 1989, Gorbachev made the fateful decision not to intervene militarily, effectively abandoning the "Brezhnev Doctrine" that had limited the sovereignty of Eastern Bloc countries. The collapse accelerated in 1990-1991 as Boris Yeltsin emerged as Gorbachev's chief rival. After winning election as president of the Russian Republic within the USSR, Yeltsin pushed for greater Russian sovereignty. The Baltic states declared independence, and other republics followed. In August 1991, hardliners attempted a coup to preserve the Soviet system, detaining Gorbachev at his Crimean dacha. The coup failed when Yeltsin rallied resistance from atop a tank outside the Russian White House, and the plotters lost their nerve. By December 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved, with Gorbachev resigning as president of a country that no longer existed. What made the Soviet collapse particularly remarkable was how the elaborate system of signals and responses that had maintained order simply disintegrated. When authorities tried to ban demonstrations, people demonstrated anyway. When the KGB threatened dissidents, they ignored the threats. The terror that had once enforced compliance had lost its power. This revealed a profound truth: the Soviet system had been maintained not primarily through physical coercion but through a complex psychological and social arrangement that had simply lost its legitimacy. The collapse of the USSR created an unprecedented situation - fifteen new countries suddenly emerged from the ruins of a superpower, with no roadmap for building democratic institutions or market economies. For ordinary citizens, this historical rupture meant navigating an entirely new reality, where old certainties vanished and new possibilities emerged. The Soviet twilight revealed how quickly seemingly permanent political structures can crumble when their ideological foundations erode, a lesson with implications far beyond the post-Soviet space.

Chapter 2: Shock Therapy: Yeltsin's Turbulent Decade (1991-1999)

Boris Yeltsin, as the first democratically elected president of an independent Russia, inherited a country in profound crisis. Store shelves stood empty, hyperinflation loomed, and industrial production was collapsing. His government, led by young reformers like Yegor Gaidar, embarked on what became known as "shock therapy" - a rapid transition to market economics through price liberalization, privatization, and opening to international trade. On January 2, 1992, price controls were lifted on most goods, causing prices to rise by 352% within weeks and wiping out most Russians' savings. Yet goods began appearing on store shelves, and private commerce flourished as Yeltsin signed decrees legalizing private trade. The privatization of state assets became the most controversial aspect of Yeltsin's reforms. The voucher privatization program of 1992-1994 gave each citizen a certificate to purchase shares in newly privatized companies, but most ordinary Russians, struggling to survive, sold their vouchers for cash or food. Later, the notorious "loans-for-shares" scheme allowed politically connected businessmen to acquire valuable state enterprises at bargain prices, creating a class of oligarchs who wielded enormous economic and political power. By the mid-1990s, Russians were using the term "robber-baron capitalism" to describe their new system, as wealth concentrated in the hands of a few while poverty engulfed many. Political transition proved equally turbulent. Yeltsin faced fierce opposition from the parliament, leading to a constitutional crisis in 1993. After months of deadlock, he ordered tanks to fire on the White House - the parliament building where his opponents had barricaded themselves. This shocking violence, which left 146 dead, was followed by the adoption of a new constitution that greatly strengthened presidential powers. While formally democratic, this constitution created a system vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies, with few effective checks on executive power. The "Execution of the White House" represented a pivotal moment when the democratic promise of post-Soviet Russia was compromised by the use of force. By 1998, Russia faced economic collapse again when the government defaulted on its debt, sending the ruble into free fall. Banks closed, savings vanished, and many Russians felt betrayed by the promise of market reforms. Throughout this period, nostalgia for Soviet stability grew steadily. Surveys showed increasing numbers of Russians regretting the USSR's collapse and viewing Stalin more positively. The chaotic transition created what sociologist Yuri Levada called "retrospective adaptation" - a psychological mechanism where people idealized the past to cope with a difficult present. Crime and corruption flourished in the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet authority. Contract killings, protection rackets, and widespread bribery became commonplace. The Russian mafia gained unprecedented power, infiltrating businesses and government institutions. Many Russians came to associate democracy not with freedom and prosperity but with lawlessness and national humiliation. Public health deteriorated dramatically, with alcoholism rates soaring and male life expectancy dropping to just 57 years by the mid-1990s - a demographic catastrophe unprecedented in a developed country during peacetime. Yeltsin's presidency ended on December 31, 1999, when he unexpectedly resigned and appointed Vladimir Putin as acting president. His legacy was deeply contradictory - he had defeated Soviet communism and introduced democratic elections and market economics, yet his rule was marked by corruption, economic hardship, and the use of force against political opponents. Most Russians experienced the 1990s not as a triumph of freedom but as a period of humiliation and disorder - creating fertile ground for the authoritarian restoration that would follow. The traumatic nature of this transition would shape Russian political culture for decades, associating democracy with chaos rather than prosperity and freedom.

Chapter 3: Putin's Rise: Restoring State Power (2000-2008)

Vladimir Putin's ascent to power marked a dramatic turning point in post-Soviet Russia. When Boris Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned on December 31, 1999, few Russians knew much about his chosen successor. Putin, a former KGB officer who had served as head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and then prime minister, was virtually a blank slate onto which Russians could project their hopes for stability and restored national pride. His popularity soared almost immediately, coinciding with a series of apartment building bombings that killed nearly 300 Russians, which the government blamed on Chechen terrorists. Putin responded with tough rhetoric, promising to "rub out the terrorists in the outhouse," and launched a second war in Chechnya that, unlike the first Chechen war, enjoyed broad public support. Once in office, Putin moved systematically to consolidate power. He reined in the oligarchs who had dominated under Yeltsin, making it clear they could keep their wealth only if they stayed out of politics. Those who resisted, like media magnates Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, were forced into exile. The October 2003 arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest man and head of the Yukos oil company, sent an unmistakable message to Russia's business elite: economic power was now subordinate to political power. Within his first term, all major television networks came under state control, while regional governors lost autonomy as Putin created a "power vertical" extending from the Kremlin throughout the country. The early Putin years coincided with economic recovery, fueled largely by rising oil prices. After the 1998 default, the Russian economy grew by about 7% annually from 2000 to 2008. Salaries were paid on time, pensions increased, and a new consumer culture emerged in major cities. This economic improvement, coming after years of hardship, cemented Putin's popularity and created what analysts called "performance legitimacy" - support based on delivering concrete improvements in living standards. For many Russians, material well-being took priority over abstract democratic principles, especially given their recent experience with "democracy" in the 1990s. Putin's approach to governance reflected what political scientist Richard Sakwa called "dual state" - maintaining democratic institutions in form while emptying them of substance. Elections continued but were carefully managed to ensure predetermined outcomes. Parliament functioned as a rubber stamp for presidential initiatives. Courts maintained independence in routine cases but followed political direction in matters important to the Kremlin. This system allowed Putin to claim democratic legitimacy while exercising increasingly authoritarian control, a model that would be termed "managed democracy" or "competitive authoritarianism" by political scientists. A key element of Putin's consolidation of power was his reconfiguration of the security services. By 2004, former KGB officers (siloviki) occupied approximately 25% of senior government positions, according to political scientist Olga Kryshtanovskaya. This "militocracy" brought a distinctive worldview to governance - one that emphasized hierarchy, discipline, and suspicion of Western intentions. The security apparatus gained expanded powers through anti-terrorism legislation passed after the 2002 Moscow theater siege, in which Chechen militants took over 900 theatergoers hostage, resulting in 130 civilian deaths during the rescue operation. By the end of Putin's second term in 2008, Russia had transformed from the weak, chaotic state of the 1990s into a more assertive and centralized power. While formally respecting the constitutional limit of two consecutive terms, Putin ensured continuity by endorsing his loyal prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev, as his successor, while himself becoming prime minister. This "tandem" arrangement preserved Putin's power while maintaining constitutional appearances. The restoration of state authority came at the cost of democratic development, creating a system that combined Soviet-style control mechanisms with modern techniques of manipulation. This model would prove remarkably durable, adapting to changing circumstances while maintaining its authoritarian essence.

Chapter 4: Managed Democracy: Controlling Dissent (2008-2012)

The period from 2008 to 2012, known as the "Medvedev interlude," initially raised hopes for liberalization among some Russians and Western observers. Dmitry Medvedev, with his lawyer background and tech-savvy image, spoke of modernization, fighting corruption, and improving relations with the West. His presidency coincided with the global financial crisis, which hit Russia hard in 2009, exposing the vulnerabilities of its resource-dependent economy. Despite this setback, Medvedev pursued initiatives like the Skolkovo innovation center, intended to diversify the economy beyond oil and gas, and a "reset" in relations with the United States under President Obama. However, real power remained with Putin as prime minister, and the tandem arrangement soon revealed its limitations. When Medvedev ordered Russian forces into Georgia in August 2008 following provocations in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it demonstrated that Russia remained willing to use military force to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space. The five-day war resulted in Russia recognizing the independence of these territories, effectively cementing their separation from Georgia and establishing a precedent for intervention that would later be applied in Ukraine. The space for civil society and independent media continued to shrink during this period, despite Medvedev's more liberal rhetoric. New laws restricted public gatherings and expanded the definition of extremism to include a wide range of political speech. Independent journalists faced intimidation and sometimes violence, with the murder of investigative reporter Anna Politkovskaya in 2006 remaining unresolved. Television, the primary source of information for most Russians, became increasingly dominated by state-controlled narratives emphasizing Russia's resurgence under Putin's leadership and the threats posed by external enemies. The announcement in September 2011 that Putin would return to the presidency in 2012, revealing the "tandem" as a mere placeholder arrangement, catalyzed widespread discontent. Following parliamentary elections in December 2011, which independent observers deemed fraudulent, tens of thousands of Muscovites took to the streets in the largest protests since the Soviet collapse. Middle-class urbanites, who had benefited from economic growth but now demanded political rights, formed the core of these demonstrations. The white ribbon became the symbol of a movement calling for fair elections and an end to corruption. The Kremlin's response to the protests combined targeted repression with efforts to mobilize its base. Pro-government rallies were organized, with participants often pressured or paid to attend. After Putin's inauguration in May 2012, security forces violently dispersed a demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, leading to dozens of arrests and lengthy prison sentences for protesters. The "Bolotnaya case" signaled a new era of political repression, with opposition leaders facing criminal charges, house searches, and imprisonment. Alexei Navalny, who had gained prominence by labeling United Russia the "party of crooks and thieves," became a particular target, facing multiple prosecutions that appeared politically motivated. This crackdown was accompanied by new legislation designed to restrict civil society. The "foreign agent" law, requiring non-governmental organizations receiving international funding to register under this stigmatizing label, effectively branded human rights defenders and election monitors as traitors. A law banning "propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations to minors" criminalized public discussion of LGBTQ issues. These measures reflected a comprehensive strategy to control dissent by limiting both the physical spaces for protest and the ideological framework for opposition, defining legitimate political discourse as necessarily patriotic and traditional. By 2012, Russia had completed its transition from the hybrid regime of Putin's early years to a more openly authoritarian system. The brief window for political liberalization had firmly closed, and the regime had demonstrated its willingness to use both legal mechanisms and physical force to maintain control. This period revealed the fundamental insecurity underlying Russia's authoritarian resurgence - despite controlling vast resources and security forces, the regime viewed peaceful protesters as an existential threat requiring harsh suppression. The stage was set for an even more dramatic turn toward nationalism and confrontation with the West.

Chapter 5: Crimea and Beyond: Nationalism as Legitimacy (2012-2017)

The winter of 2013-2014 witnessed dramatic events in neighboring Ukraine that would profoundly reshape Russia's domestic politics and international relations. When Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych abandoned plans to sign an association agreement with the European Union under Russian pressure, massive protests erupted in Kyiv's Maidan Square. After months of demonstrations and violent clashes, Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014. The Kremlin portrayed these events as an illegal, Western-backed coup against a legitimate government, setting the stage for Russia's most aggressive foreign policy move since the Soviet collapse. In late February 2014, Russian special forces without insignia - dubbed "little green men" - seized key installations in Crimea. A hastily organized referendum, conducted under military occupation, showed overwhelming support for joining Russia. On March 18, 2014, Putin formally annexed Crimea, delivering a triumphant speech that framed the action as correcting a historical injustice and protecting ethnic Russians from Ukrainian nationalism. This marked the first forcible change of European borders since World War II and signaled Russia's willingness to directly challenge the post-Cold War international order. The annexation of Crimea triggered a wave of patriotic euphoria across Russia. Putin's approval ratings soared to over 80%, as many Russians celebrated the return of territory they considered historically Russian. State media portrayed the annexation as Russia standing up to Western encroachment and defending its interests. Even many Russians who had previously been critical of Putin supported the move. The government capitalized on this nationalist sentiment to further marginalize opposition voices, now easily branded as traitors or foreign agents. This "Crimea consensus" effectively neutralized the protest movement that had challenged Putin in 2011-2012. Following the Crimea annexation, Russia supported separatist movements in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region, providing weapons, fighters, and eventually direct military intervention. The conflict escalated when Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down over rebel-held territory in July 2014, killing all 298 people aboard. Despite overwhelming evidence that the plane was downed by a Russian-supplied missile system, the Kremlin denied responsibility and offered multiple alternative explanations, demonstrating a new level of information warfare that would become a hallmark of Russia's approach to international relations. Western countries responded with economic sanctions targeting key sectors of the Russian economy and individuals close to Putin. Russia countered with its own import bans on Western food products, framing the economic confrontation as an opportunity for import substitution and self-sufficiency. The sanctions, combined with falling oil prices, pushed Russia into recession in 2015-2016. Real incomes declined, but the government successfully channeled economic discontent into anti-Western sentiment rather than criticism of the leadership. The economic hardship was portrayed as the price of defending national sovereignty against hostile external forces. By 2017, a comprehensive state ideology had emerged combining traditional values, anti-Western sentiment, and Russian exceptionalism. The Russian Orthodox Church gained prominence as a pillar of national identity, with Patriarch Kirill declaring that Russia represented a unique civilization distinct from the liberal West. Television programming relentlessly portrayed the West as decadent, hostile, and in decline, while celebrating Russia's military capabilities and historical achievements. This ideological framework, blending Soviet nostalgia with Orthodox Christianity and Eurasianist geopolitics, provided a powerful alternative to Western liberal democracy and justification for Russia's increasingly assertive international posture.

Chapter 6: The Totalitarian Legacy: How Soviet Patterns Persist

Despite the formal collapse of the Soviet system, many of its psychological and social patterns continue to shape contemporary Russian society. What sociologist Yuri Levada termed "Homo Sovieticus" - a distinctive personality type shaped by totalitarian experience - has proven remarkably durable. This Soviet person was characterized by several key traits: self-isolation from the outside world, dependence on the paternalistic state, and what Levada called "hierarchical egalitarianism" - a paradoxical combination of accepting strict social hierarchy while demanding equality within one's assigned station. Most distinctively, Homo Sovieticus mastered the art of "doublethink" - holding contradictory beliefs simultaneously, separating public pronouncements from private thoughts. The persistence of Soviet mentality is evident in contemporary Russian political culture. Surveys conducted by the Levada Center show that Russians continue to value "openness" and "patience" as their defining national characteristics - traits that reflect adaptation to authoritarian rule rather than democratic citizenship. The habit of compartmentalizing - maintaining private beliefs while publicly conforming to expected behaviors - remains widespread. This adaptation strategy, perfected during Soviet times, reemerged as political space contracted under Putin. Many Russians developed what sociologists called "double consciousness," allowing them to function within an increasingly authoritarian system while preserving a sense of inner autonomy. The Soviet legacy is particularly visible in attitudes toward the state. Despite frequent complaints about corruption and inefficiency, many Russians maintain a fundamentally paternalistic view of government, expecting it to provide security, employment, and social benefits. This dependency creates vulnerability to authoritarian appeals promising order and stability. The traumatic experience of the 1990s, when the state's retreat from many aspects of life created profound insecurity, reinforced this tendency. Putin's restoration of state authority resonated deeply with a population that associated the democratic experiment with chaos rather than freedom. Historical memory, or its absence, plays a crucial role in perpetuating Soviet patterns. Unlike Germany after Nazism or South Africa after apartheid, Russia never underwent a comprehensive reckoning with its totalitarian past. There was no truth commission, no systematic opening of archives, no consensus on responsibility for Soviet crimes. The brief period of historical openness during the late 1980s and early 1990s gave way to a more selective and nationalistic interpretation of history under Putin. Stalin, responsible for the deaths of millions, is now viewed positively by a significant portion of the population, celebrated as the leader who industrialized the country and won the Great Patriotic War. The weaponization of historical memory has become a key tool of state control. Victory in World War II has been elevated to a sacred national myth, with alternative interpretations increasingly treated as blasphemy. Soviet achievements in space exploration, sports, and culture are celebrated while repressions are minimized or justified as necessary sacrifices for national greatness. This selective approach to history serves to legitimize the current political system as the heir to Russian imperial and Soviet power, obscuring the fundamental differences between democratic governance and authoritarian rule. Perhaps most significantly, the Soviet legacy is evident in what political philosopher Hannah Arendt identified as the essence of totalitarianism: the elimination of spontaneity and the reduction of human beings to predictable, manageable subjects. While contemporary Russia is not a totalitarian state in the Stalinist sense, it has revived many totalitarian techniques for controlling society - from the manipulation of information to the creation of an atmosphere where citizens police themselves and each other. The system no longer requires mass terror to function, having developed more sophisticated methods of ensuring compliance. This evolution demonstrates how totalitarian legacies can adapt to new conditions, maintaining their essential character while changing their external forms.

Summary

The trajectory of post-Soviet Russia reveals a society trapped in cycles of reform and regression, unable to fully break free from its totalitarian past. From the collapse of the Soviet system through the chaotic 1990s and Putin's restoration of centralized authority, a clear pattern emerges: brief periods of opening and liberalization followed by authoritarian retrenchment. This pendulum swing reflects deeper tensions in Russian political culture between desires for freedom and stability, between Western-style modernization and assertions of unique Russian values. The annexation of Crimea marked a decisive turn toward a more aggressive nationalism and confrontation with the West, completing Russia's transformation from an aspiring democracy to a revanchist power with increasingly totalitarian features. The Russian experience offers profound lessons about the challenges of democratic transition after decades of totalitarian rule. First, economic reforms without strong institutions create opportunities for corruption and oligarchy rather than genuine market economies. The rapid privatization of the 1990s, conducted without adequate legal frameworks or regulatory oversight, produced a system where political connections determined economic success. Second, unprocessed historical trauma leaves societies vulnerable to authoritarian appeals and nationalist mobilization. Russia's failure to honestly confront its Soviet past allowed old patterns of thinking and behavior to persist, creating fertile ground for Putin's restoration project. Finally, democracy requires more than elections - it needs independent courts, free media, and a vibrant civil society to take root and flourish. These supporting institutions were never fully developed in Russia, making its democratic experiment fragile and reversible. As other countries navigate their own transitions from authoritarian rule, Russia's experience serves as a cautionary tale about the difficulty of building democracy on the ruins of totalitarianism and the persistent appeal of strong leadership in times of uncertainty.

About Author

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Masha Gessen

Masha Gessen (born 1967) is an American-Russian journalist, translator, and nonfiction author. They identify as non-binary and use they/them pronouns. Born into an Ashkenazi Jewish family in Russia, in 1981 they moved with their family to the United States to escape anti-Semitism. They returned in 1991 to Moscow, where they worked as a journalist, and covered Russian military activities during the Chechen Wars. In 2013, they were publicly threatened by prominent Russian politicians for their political activism and were forced to leave Russia for the United States.They write in both Russian and English, and has contributed to The New Republic, New Statesman, Granta and Slate. Gessen is a staff writer at The New Yorker, covering international politics, Russia, LGBT rights, and gender issues.

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