The Man Without A Face

The Man Without A Face Plot Summary

Introduction

In the twilight of the Soviet Union, a seemingly unremarkable KGB officer stationed in Dresden watched helplessly as the Berlin Wall fell and the communist system collapsed around him. As he frantically burned sensitive documents, Vladimir Putin called Moscow for instructions, only to be told: "Moscow is silent." This moment of abandonment would haunt Putin and shape his worldview for decades to come. From these humble beginnings, Putin would rise to become one of the most powerful and enigmatic leaders of the 21st century, transforming Russia from a struggling democracy into an authoritarian state while positioning himself as the indispensable guardian of Russian sovereignty and dignity. Putin's journey from obscurity to absolute power reveals a man of extraordinary adaptability, ruthless determination, and profound cynicism. Through his two decades of rule, we witness the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions, the resurrection of the security services as the dominant force in Russian society, and the creation of a sophisticated propaganda machine that maintains his popularity despite economic hardships and international isolation. Understanding Putin's rise and methods offers crucial insights into how democratic transitions can be reversed, how modern authoritarianism operates, and how personal ambition can reshape an entire nation's trajectory.

Chapter 1: KGB Roots: From Dresden to St. Petersburg

Vladimir Putin's path to power began in the gritty post-war landscape of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), where he was born in 1952 to parents who had survived the devastating Nazi siege of the city. Growing up in a communal apartment in a rough neighborhood, young Putin developed a scrappy, combative personality. Small in stature but fierce in temperament, he found discipline and purpose in martial arts, particularly sambo and judo, which would become lifelong pursuits and shape his approach to both personal conflicts and political challenges. After graduating from Leningrad State University's law faculty in 1975, Putin achieved his childhood dream of joining the KGB. His career in Soviet intelligence, however, proved less glamorous than he had imagined. After training, he was assigned to counterintelligence in Leningrad, monitoring foreigners and potential dissidents – hardly the exciting espionage work he had envisioned. His fortunes seemed to improve when he was posted to Dresden, East Germany in 1985, but even there, his duties primarily involved collecting newspaper clippings and recruiting potential assets rather than high-stakes operations. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked a traumatic turning point for Putin. As protesters surrounded the KGB building in Dresden, he frantically burned sensitive documents while calling Moscow for instructions. The response – "Moscow is silent" – represented not just a communications failure but the collapse of the system to which he had dedicated his life. This experience of abandonment and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union would profoundly shape Putin's political outlook, instilling a deep distrust of popular movements and a determination to restore Russian power and prestige. Returning to a rapidly changing Russia in 1990, Putin demonstrated remarkable adaptability. Despite his KGB background – or perhaps because of the connections and skills it provided – he secured a position as an advisor to Anatoly Sobchak, the democratic reformer who became mayor of St. Petersburg. As Sobchak's deputy mayor overseeing foreign economic relations, Putin positioned himself at the intersection of politics, business, and security, developing a network of loyal allies and accumulating valuable experience in managing economic resources and foreign investments. This period in St. Petersburg revealed aspects of Putin's character and methods that would later define his presidency. An investigation by city council member Marina Salye uncovered evidence suggesting Putin had facilitated questionable food import deals worth millions of dollars that never materialized into actual food deliveries during a period of severe shortages. Though the investigation threatened to derail his career, Putin was protected by his patron Sobchak, and the charges were ultimately buried. This early brush with corruption allegations established a pattern that would repeat throughout his career – serious ethical questions overshadowed by political protection and advancement. When Sobchak lost his reelection bid in 1996, Putin demonstrated the loyalty that would become his calling card – he refused offers to join the new administration. This decision, seemingly career-limiting at the time, caught the attention of Kremlin insiders impressed by his loyalty. Invited to Moscow to work in the presidential administration of Boris Yeltsin, Putin began a meteoric rise through federal positions – from the presidential property management department to head of the FSB (the KGB's successor) and finally to prime minister in August 1999. The former mid-level KGB officer had positioned himself at the threshold of supreme power.

Chapter 2: Unexpected Rise to Power: Yeltsin's Successor

By 1999, Russia was in crisis. Boris Yeltsin's popularity had plummeted to single digits as the country struggled with economic collapse, corruption scandals, and a general sense that the democratic experiment had failed. The aging and ailing president, concerned about his legacy and personal security after leaving office, needed a successor who would protect him and his family from potential prosecution. The search for this successor led Yeltsin's inner circle – known as "the Family" – to consider Vladimir Putin, then heading the Federal Security Service (FSB). Putin's appointment as prime minister in August 1999 surprised both Russian citizens and international observers. He was the fifth prime minister in less than eighteen months, and few expected him to last long in the position. With virtually no public profile and no political base of his own, Putin seemed an unlikely candidate for future leadership. Yet behind the scenes, powerful forces were working to transform this "gray cardinal" into presidential material. Boris Berezovsky, an influential oligarch and media mogul, played a crucial role in this transformation, using his control of Channel One television to shape Putin's public image as a decisive, competent leader. A series of apartment building bombings that struck Russian cities in September 1999 became the defining moment in Putin's rise. These devastating terrorist attacks, which killed hundreds of civilians in their sleep, created an atmosphere of fear and anger across the country. Putin's response – his promise to "rub out the terrorists in the outhouse" – resonated with a public desperate for decisive leadership. When Russian troops entered Chechnya shortly afterward, beginning the Second Chechen War, Putin's popularity soared. His tough, uncompromising stance and use of crude, street language marked a sharp departure from Yeltsin's erratic leadership style. Questions about the apartment bombings would later haunt Putin's presidency. Some investigative journalists and former security officials suggested the attacks may have been orchestrated by the FSB to create a pretext for the Chechen war and boost Putin's image. In Ryazan, residents reported suspicious activity that appeared to be FSB agents planting explosives in their apartment building. When confronted, officials implausibly claimed it was merely a "training exercise." Journalists who investigated these connections, including Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko, later died under suspicious circumstances. In a masterful political maneuver, Yeltsin resigned unexpectedly on December 31, 1999, appointing Putin as acting president. This timing was strategic – it shortened the campaign period before the March election and positioned Putin as an incumbent. In his brief televised New Year's address, Putin projected calm authority while promising stability – exactly what Russians craved after years of upheaval. The presidential campaign that followed was remarkable for its lack of substance. Putin refused to participate in debates, gave few interviews, and offered no detailed policy platform. Instead, his campaign relied on carefully staged photo opportunities and the implicit promise of security and order. On March 26, 2000, Putin won the presidential election with 53 percent of the vote, avoiding a runoff. His victory speech was brief and subdued, focusing on the challenges ahead rather than celebrating his triumph. The man who had been virtually unknown just nine months earlier had completed his improbable journey to the presidency. Few realized then that this quiet transition marked not just a change in leadership but the beginning of a fundamental transformation of Russia's political system – from a flawed democracy to an increasingly authoritarian state centered on one man's power.

Chapter 3: Dismantling Democracy: Media Control and Opposition Silencing

The systematic dismantling of Russia's independent media marked the beginning of Putin's authoritarian turn. Within weeks of taking office, armed police raided the headquarters of Media-Most, Russia's largest independent media company owned by Vladimir Gusinsky. This raid, conducted in broad daylight in central Moscow, sent a clear message about the consequences of opposing the new president. Gusinsky was later arrested on dubious charges and forced to sign over his media empire to the state gas monopoly Gazprom in exchange for his freedom – a practice Putin's critics called "state racketeering." Boris Berezovsky, the oligarch who had helped create Putin's public image, soon discovered that his protégé would not be the pliant figure he had anticipated. When Berezovsky's ORT television network criticized the government's handling of the Kursk submarine disaster in August 2000, Putin moved swiftly against him. Faced with the prospect of criminal charges, Berezovsky fled to London, joining Gusinsky in exile. By the end of Putin's first year in office, all three major television networks were under state control, establishing a propaganda machine that would become increasingly sophisticated over time. Print media faced similar pressure. Newspapers that maintained independent editorial policies saw their journalists harassed, their offices raided, and their funding sources cut off. The message was clear: journalism that questioned the Kremlin narrative would not be tolerated. Reporters who persisted in investigating sensitive topics – particularly corruption or the war in Chechnya – faced grave dangers. Anna Politkovskaya, who documented human rights abuses in Chechnya, was shot dead in her apartment building on Putin's birthday in 2006. When asked about her murder at a press conference, Putin dismissively remarked that her "influence on political life in Russia was minimal," and that her death "does much more harm to Russia and Chechnya than her publications." The political opposition faced equally ruthless treatment. In 2003, oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had begun funding opposition parties and advocating for greater transparency, was arrested on charges of tax evasion and fraud. His real crime, however, was challenging Putin's political monopoly. After a show trial widely condemned by international observers, Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years in prison (later extended to fourteen), while his Yukos oil company was dismantled and its assets transferred to state-controlled enterprises. The message to Russia's business elite was unmistakable: wealth was permitted only with political loyalty. Electoral manipulation became increasingly brazen under Putin's rule. Following the 2003 parliamentary elections, international observers concluded that the vote "failed to meet many OSCE and Council of Europe commitments," citing media bias, abuse of administrative resources, and irregularities in vote counting. By 2004, when Putin ran for reelection, he faced only token opposition and received an improbable 71 percent of the vote. Local officials competed to deliver the highest possible vote totals for the president and his party, sometimes producing results that defied statistical probability. In the aftermath of the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, which ended with the deaths of 334 people, including 186 children, Putin announced sweeping political changes that he framed as anti-terrorism measures. These included abolishing direct elections for regional governors (who would now be appointed by the president) and eliminating single-mandate districts for parliamentary elections. With these changes, Russia's brief experiment with democracy effectively ended. The system Putin created maintained democratic appearances – elections continued, parliament still met, courts still functioned – but real power was concentrated in the hands of the president and his security service allies.

Chapter 4: The Security State: FSB's Growing Influence

The resurrection of Russia's security services as the dominant force in politics and society stands as one of Putin's most consequential achievements. Upon taking office, he immediately began placing former KGB colleagues in positions of power throughout the government. In his first major speech to FSB officers in 2000, Putin joked, "The group of FSB officers dispatched to work undercover in the federal government has been successful in fulfilling the first set of assignments." The audience laughed, but the statement contained more truth than humor. Within a few years, individuals with backgrounds in the security services (siloviki) occupied key positions throughout the government, state-owned companies, and regional administrations. Under Putin's direction, the FSB regained much of the power and prestige it had lost after the Soviet collapse. Its budget and personnel expanded dramatically, while its responsibilities grew to encompass not only counterintelligence but also counterterrorism, economic security, and border protection. Most importantly, the FSB became the primary instrument for identifying and neutralizing potential threats to the regime. The agency established specialized departments to monitor political opposition, civil society organizations, religious groups, and the internet. Its officers were embedded in major companies, universities, and media outlets, creating a surveillance network that extended throughout Russian society. The security services' methods became increasingly brutal, particularly in dealing with perceived enemies of the state. The Second Chechen War, launched shortly after Putin became prime minister, was characterized by widespread human rights abuses, including torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. When Chechen terrorists took hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in 2002, security forces pumped an unknown gas into the building before storming it, resulting in the deaths of 129 hostages – many of whom died because medical responders were not informed about the gas used, preventing proper treatment. The government declared the operation a success while refusing to acknowledge mistakes or hold anyone accountable. The FSB's reach extended far beyond Russia's borders. In 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, who had publicly accused the agency of orchestrating the 1999 apartment bombings and other crimes, was poisoned in London with polonium-210, a rare radioactive isotope produced only in Russia under strict government control. British investigators concluded that the murder was "probably approved" by Putin himself. This assassination, along with other extraterritorial killings and attempted murders of Russian émigrés, sent a chilling message: those who betrayed the system could not escape its reach, even in Western democracies. Inside Russia, the security services developed a sophisticated system for monitoring and controlling the internet. The SORM system (System for Operative Investigative Activities) required all Russian internet service providers to install equipment giving the FSB direct access to all data traffic. Later legislation required social media companies to store Russian users' data on servers within the country and to provide encryption keys to the authorities. Bloggers with more than 3,000 followers were required to register with the government, while a series of laws criminalized "extremist" content – a deliberately vague term that could be applied to almost any criticism of the government. Perhaps most disturbing was the security services' apparent involvement in acts of terrorism that were then used to justify further repression. Beyond the unresolved questions surrounding the 1999 apartment bombings, investigators found troubling evidence suggesting FSB complicity in both the Moscow theater siege and the Beslan school hostage crisis. By creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, these events helped justify Putin's dismantling of democratic institutions while positioning him as the only leader capable of protecting Russians from terrorism. The security state that emerged under Putin combined Soviet-era methods of control with modern surveillance technology, creating a system where political opposition became not just difficult but dangerous.

Chapter 5: Wealth and Power: Creating a Kleptocracy

Putin's Russia witnessed an unprecedented fusion of political power and personal enrichment, creating a system where loyalty to the president determined one's economic fate. Upon taking office, Putin struck an unwritten deal with Russia's oligarchs – the super-wealthy businessmen who had amassed fortunes during the chaotic privatizations of the 1990s. The terms were simple: they could keep their wealth as long as they stayed out of politics and shared their profits with the Kremlin inner circle. Those who violated these terms, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, saw their assets seized and their freedom forfeited. The case of Yukos Oil Company illustrated the new rules with brutal clarity. After Khodorkovsky began funding opposition parties and publicly questioning corruption in state companies, he was arrested in 2003 and subjected to a show trial. Yukos, then Russia's largest oil company, was dismantled through dubious tax claims and its most valuable assets transferred to state-controlled Rosneft at a fraction of their market value. The message to other oligarchs was unmistakable, and they quickly fell in line, becoming dependent on Putin's favor for their continued prosperity. As the old oligarchs were tamed, a new class of Putin-loyal billionaires emerged. Childhood friends, former KGB colleagues, and St. Petersburg associates received lucrative government contracts, preferential access to privatized assets, and appointments to manage state corporations. Gennady Timchenko, Putin's former judo partner, became a major shareholder in oil trader Gunvor, which handled up to 40 percent of Russia's oil exports. Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, Putin's childhood judo partners, received billions in government contracts, particularly for the Sochi Olympics. These "state oligarchs" understood that their wealth was conditional on absolute loyalty and willingness to share proceeds with the wider network around Putin. Putin's personal wealth became the subject of intense speculation. While officially reporting a modest income and few assets, investigations by journalists and opposition figures suggested he had amassed a fortune potentially worth tens of billions of dollars, hidden behind a complex network of proxies and shell companies. Former business associates who fled Russia described elaborate schemes where businesses would donate funds ostensibly for state projects, but significant percentages would be diverted to accounts controlled by Putin associates. One such project, described by businessman Sergei Kolesnikov, involved the construction of a vast $1 billion palace on the Black Sea coast, funded through a combination of "donations" from oligarchs and diverted state funds. The corruption that began at the top permeated the entire system. By 2011, Russia ranked 154th out of 178 countries on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Human rights activists estimated that approximately 15 percent of Russia's prison population consisted of entrepreneurs who had been jailed by well-connected competitors using the court system to seize their businesses. The practice became so common it acquired a name: "raiding" (reiderstvo). Police and regulatory agencies became profit centers, extracting bribes from businesses large and small. Even basic government services required unofficial payments. This system of state-sanctioned corruption served multiple purposes for Putin's regime. It enriched his inner circle while making them dependent on his continued rule for their freedom and prosperity. It created leverage over the business elite, who could be selectively prosecuted for the same practices everyone engaged in. And it undermined the development of independent institutions and rule of law that might challenge Putin's authority. The result was a modern feudalism, where political loyalty determined economic opportunity, and the line between state property and the personal assets of the ruling elite effectively disappeared.

Chapter 6: Foreign Policy: Confrontation with the West

Vladimir Putin's approach to international relations evolved from cautious pragmatism to increasingly aggressive confrontation as his domestic power consolidated. In his early years as president, Putin attempted to position himself as a cooperative partner to the West while maintaining Russia's distinct interests. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, he was the first foreign leader to call President George W. Bush, offering solidarity and intelligence cooperation against terrorism. This brief honeymoon period saw Russia providing logistical support for the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and joining the "War on Terror" narrative to justify its own operations in Chechnya. However, Putin harbored deep resentment over what he perceived as Western disregard for Russia's status and security concerns. The expansion of NATO into former Warsaw Pact countries and then into former Soviet republics represented, in his view, a broken promise and a strategic threat. In a pivotal speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin openly challenged the U.S.-led international order, condemning American "unilateralism" and warning that NATO expansion was "a serious provocation." This speech marked Russia's formal break with the post-Cold War consensus and signaled Putin's determination to reassert Russia as an independent great power. Russia's military interventions in neighboring countries revealed Putin's determination to maintain a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space. The 2008 war with Georgia, triggered by tensions over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, demonstrated Russia's willingness to use force to prevent former Soviet republics from aligning with the West. Though brief, the conflict established a pattern that would be repeated and refined in Ukraine years later: using separatist proxies, deploying "peacekeepers" to solidify territorial gains, and presenting the West with a fait accompli it was unwilling to reverse through direct confrontation. Energy resources became a central tool in Putin's foreign policy arsenal. Russia's vast oil and gas reserves, combined with Europe's growing energy dependence, provided powerful leverage. Through state-controlled companies like Gazprom, the Kremlin repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use energy supplies as a political weapon, particularly against former Soviet states seeking closer ties with the West. Ukraine experienced gas cutoffs in 2006, 2009, and 2014, always during winter months when the impact would be most severe. Meanwhile, lucrative energy deals were offered to Western European countries willing to accommodate Russian interests, creating divisions within NATO and the European Union. Putin's approach to the Middle East reflected both opportunism and a desire to challenge American dominance. Russia's longstanding relationship with Syria became particularly significant after the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. When President Bashar al-Assad faced a growing rebellion, Russia provided diplomatic protection through UN Security Council vetoes and eventually direct military intervention beginning in 2015. This operation achieved multiple objectives: preserving Russia's only Mediterranean naval base, demonstrating the reliability of Russian support compared to the West's abandonment of allies like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, showcasing Russian military capabilities, and establishing Russia as an indispensable power broker in the region. Information warfare emerged as perhaps the most innovative aspect of Putin's foreign policy. Drawing on Soviet active measures but updated for the digital age, Russia developed sophisticated capabilities to influence public opinion and political processes in Western democracies. The Internet Research Agency, a St. Petersburg-based "troll factory" with ties to Putin associate Yevgeny Prigozhin, created thousands of fake social media accounts to spread disinformation and amplify social divisions in the United States and Europe. These operations aimed not necessarily to promote specific policy outcomes but to undermine trust in democratic institutions, increase polarization, and create a general atmosphere of cynicism where objective truth became impossible to discern.

Chapter 7: The Cult of Personality: Manufacturing Putin's Image

Vladimir Putin's transformation from an unknown bureaucrat to the personification of Russian power was achieved through a carefully crafted cult of personality that combined traditional authoritarian imagery with modern media techniques. In the early years of his presidency, state television began devoting extraordinary attention to Putin's daily activities, presenting him as a tireless leader addressing national problems while surrounded by deferential officials. News broadcasts typically opened with several minutes of "Putin content" before covering other stories, creating the impression that all positive developments in Russia stemmed from his personal intervention. The cultivation of Putin's macho image became a central element of his appeal. Staged photo opportunities showed him engaged in various displays of physical prowess and masculine adventure: flying fighter jets, riding horses shirtless in Siberia, scoring goals in hockey games against professional players, tranquilizing tigers, and discovering ancient artifacts while scuba diving. These carefully choreographed events, no matter how transparently artificial, served to contrast Putin with his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, whose public drunkenness and health problems had symbolized Russia's weakness in the 1990s. Putin's public persona incorporated elements designed to appeal to different constituencies within Russian society. For traditionalists and the Orthodox Church, he presented himself as a defender of conservative values against Western moral decay. For those nostalgic for Soviet power, he rehabilitated symbols of the USSR, restoring the Soviet national anthem (with new lyrics) and describing the Soviet collapse as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." For nationalists, he positioned himself as the protector of ethnic Russians both within the country and in neighboring states. For the security services, he was one of their own who had restored their prestige and power. The Kremlin's control of television enabled the creation of an alternate reality where Putin's Russia was constantly under threat from external enemies and internal traitors, with only Putin standing between the people and chaos. Opposition figures were either ignored entirely or portrayed as Western puppets seeking to return Russia to the humiliation and disorder of the 1990s. Major events that reflected poorly on the government, like the Kursk submarine disaster or the Beslan school siege, were presented with carefully managed narratives that absolved Putin of responsibility while highlighting his decisive leadership in response. As Putin consolidated power, his public statements became increasingly unfiltered and crude, revealing a street fighter's mentality beneath the statesman's facade. When asked about Russia's brutal military campaign in Chechnya, he promised to "rub the terrorists out in the outhouse." Responding to a French journalist's question about civilian casualties, he suggested the reporter should come to Moscow for an Islamic circumcision, adding that he would "recommend that the operation be performed in such a way that nothing will ever grow there again." These vulgar outbursts, far from damaging his image, enhanced his popularity with many Russians who saw them as evidence of authenticity and strength. The Putin cult extended beyond media representations into everyday life. His portrait hung in government offices throughout the country. Schools incorporated "patriotic education" programs that presented Putin as the culmination of Russian historical greatness. Consumer products from vodka to ice cream featured his image. A youth movement called Nashi (Ours) organized massive rallies in his support and harassed opposition figures. By his third term as president (following the Medvedev interlude), Putin had achieved a status in Russian political life that transcended normal institutional constraints. The system was increasingly referred to as a "personalist dictatorship" rather than merely an authoritarian regime, with all decisions of consequence requiring his personal approval.

Summary

Vladimir Putin's rise from obscurity to absolute power represents one of the most consequential political transformations of the 21st century. His journey from a communal apartment in post-siege Leningrad to the Kremlin reveals a man of extraordinary adaptability, ruthless determination, and profound cynicism about democratic values. Through his systematic dismantling of independent media, elimination of political opposition, empowerment of security services, and creation of a sophisticated propaganda machine, Putin has demonstrated how quickly democratic institutions can be hollowed out when their foundations are weak. His most enduring legacy may be the creation of a modern authoritarian template that maintains democratic appearances while concentrating real power in the hands of a single leader and his loyal circle. The Putin era offers sobering lessons about the fragility of democratic transitions and the enduring appeal of authoritarian leadership. His success in establishing control relied not only on repression but on exploiting genuine public desires for stability after the chaotic 1990s and for restored national pride after the humiliation of the Soviet collapse. For those concerned with defending democratic values globally, understanding Putin's methods provides essential insights into how authoritarianism adapts to the modern world – using selective rather than mass repression, sophisticated propaganda rather than crude censorship, and the appearance of legality rather than naked force. His ability to maintain power despite economic sanctions, military setbacks, and declining living standards testifies to the effectiveness of a system that has inspired similar leaders around the world and challenged the assumption that economic development naturally leads to democratic governance.

About Author

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Masha Gessen

Masha Gessen (born 1967) is an American-Russian journalist, translator, and nonfiction author. They identify as non-binary and use they/them pronouns. Born into an Ashkenazi Jewish family in Russia, in 1981 they moved with their family to the United States to escape anti-Semitism. They returned in 1991 to Moscow, where they worked as a journalist, and covered Russian military activities during the Chechen Wars. In 2013, they were publicly threatened by prominent Russian politicians for their political activism and were forced to leave Russia for the United States.They write in both Russian and English, and has contributed to The New Republic, New Statesman, Granta and Slate. Gessen is a staff writer at The New Yorker, covering international politics, Russia, LGBT rights, and gender issues.

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